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ABSTRACT
Closing Up Shop:
Meditations on the Departmental/Programmatic Elimination Experience
By
Susan Beth Donoff
Dr. Vicki J. Rosser, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Higher Education
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Departmental and programmatic eliminations represent a new paradigm in the
history of American higher education. Hastened by a national economic recession and
competing state funding priorities, public post-secondary institutions have turned to
academic attrition as a solution to continuous budgetary shortfalls. As a means of
addressing the lived experience of faculty members and department chairs, the following
qualitative case study explores perceptions of implementing departmental and/or
programmatic eliminations.
Utilizing uncertainty reduction theory as a conceptual framework, interviewed
faculty in saved units experienced considerable strategic uncertainty, failing to
understand why they had been selected for elimination. Guided by a college-wide
strategic planning process, faculty in eliminated units understood the rationale for
abolishing departments, though they experienced considerable structural uncertainty in
terms of adjusting to a new, non-academic reporting structure. These findings indicate
that a transparent strategic planning process diminishes strategic uncertainty, while the
elimination of traditional departmental structures heightens structural uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Formerly the favorite son of American enterprise, higher education has become
the tortured stepchild of state government. Too valuable to expel and too large to sustain,
public institutions walk a precarious line between dependence and autonomy. As such,
while Medicaid, corrections, public safety, and K-12 compulsory education consume
ever-increasing shares of state budgets, the percentage of public aid allocated to higher
education continues to dwindle (Holmwood & Bhambra, 2012; Hovey, 1999). With an
ability to generate instant income via tuition increases, public colleges and universities
are often prime targets for reductions in state-level appropriations during periods of
economic recession (Slaughter, 1993). Functioning as a budgetary balance wheel, higher
education’s revenue-generating capability allows the state to shift its scarce fiscal
resources to those entities which have no financial failsafe (Okunade, 2004). However,
while tuition increases may help to balance the state’s budget, this inequitable public
policy has forced many institutions to walk a precarious line between affordability and
accessibility of educational services (Kissler, 1997).
With the entrenched model of exponential growth supplanted by the economic
reality of recession, departmental and programmatic eliminations have become a new
paradigm in higher education (Crano, 1995; Eckel, 2003; Fedler, Carey, & Counts, 1998;
Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995). Indeed, as higher education slowly recovers
from the most recent financial downturn, anecdotal accounts have become increasingly
common, underscoring the scope and breadth of the nation’s academic reversals (Carlson,
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2011; Glenn, 2008; Reed, Cooper, & Young, 2007; Rosser, 2012; Wasley, 2008; Wilson,
2009). Though it is undeniable that this phenomenon is sweeping the scholarly
community, academic literature addressing the lived experience of eliminating a
department or program is noticeably lacking. By exploring the perceptions of faculty and
department chairs in eliminated units, it may be possible to contribute to the intellectual
discourse on an under-researched, though increasingly prevalent facet of academic life.
Review of the Literature
The literature on departmental/ programmatic discontinuance tends to address two
broad categories: historical/financial context and human actions/agency. Provided the
emergent nature of academic attrition, it is imperative to chronicle both the historical and
financial forces which have combined to create this phenomenon, and the effect that this
phenomenon has had upon individuals in the academy. Though recent scholarly works
have combined these interrelated categories, the preponderance of scholarship treats these
issues as separate constructs. The following literature review attempts to outline the
confluence of events which has precipitated this paradigm, providing additional context
for this emergent trend in American higher education.
Predicated upon mutual beneficence, the “social contract” between the federal
government and higher education has changed dramatically since its post-war inception
(Perorazio, 2001). Forged in 1944 with the passage of the GI Bill, this groundbreaking
legislation granted WWII veterans a free collegiate education based upon length of
military service (Thomas, 1997). Though the GI Bill did not place restrictions on courses
of study, many veterans selected disciplines which closely matched their military roles
(Thomas, 1997). In this manner, the federal government came to value the limitless
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research potential of post-secondary institutions. With the launch of Sputnik in 1957,
research universities gained even greater prominence, as federal funds flowed freely in an
effort to improve America’s technological and cultural competitiveness (Freeland, 2007).
Though Cold War conflict sustained the social contract through the 1950s and
early 1960s, America’s involvement in Vietnam radically altered this symbiotic
relationship. As the Baby Boomer generation supplanted WWII veterans at the nation’s
colleges and universities, military and domestic affairs converged to create a new
paradigm for American higher education (Geiger, 2005). Influenced by televised footage
of the Vietnamese conflict, college students came to connect the oppression of peoples of
color abroad with the injustices perpetrated against African Americans at home (Cohen,
1998). Reinvigorating the long-simmering civil rights movement, college students of all
races and creeds protested institutional racism through sit-ins, campus protests, and
counter-cultural expression (Geiger, 2005). Moreover, progressive academics and likeminded students began to demand a more diverse curriculum, forging new disciplinary
offerings in African American, Asian, Chicano, and Women’s studies (Crowley, 1999;
Trombley, 1970). Though these demonstrations succeeded in widening the scope of
academia, they failed to engender widespread support amongst the American
establishment (Lazerson, 2007). Indeed, politicians and the public at large soured on
their commitment to higher education, believing it to be a hotbed for radical, antigovernment expression. This disconnect disproportionately affected certain areas of the
liberal arts—such as history and American studies—while leaving pre-professional and
professional disciplines—such as business and engineering—relatively unscathed.
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With the passing of this watershed moment, the federal government recast higher
education as a private, economic benefit as opposed to a public, societal good. In tandem
with the Reagan revolution of the 1980s, institutions of higher education came to espouse
a more market-oriented philosophy, emphasizing research productivity, revenue
generation, and graduate earnings (Ginsberg, 2011; Holmwood & Bhambra, 2012;
Zusman, 2005). In the public sector, in particular, precipitous declines in state
appropriations jeopardized the traditional liberal arts and non-scientific specialty
programs, as these units often failed to conform to free market indicators (Trow, 2010).
As illustrated by Slaughter (1993) and Brint, Turk-Bicakci, and Levy (2005), academic
retrenchment became the preferred vehicle for the downsizing of academe, as higher
education turned away from the liberal arts towards vocational, revenue-generating
degree offerings.
In the 1990s, the struggle between market alignment and educational altruism
reached its tipping point, as several anecdotal accounts of departmental and
programmatic eliminations surfaced in the academic literature. Underscoring the
vulnerability of the liberal art and social scientific disciplines, authors Crano (1995),
Fedler, Carey, and Counts (1998), Reinardy and Halter (1994), and Seiler (1995)
published cautionary tales of selective attrition in higher education. Indeed, as economic
recession prompted declines in state revenue, the leadership in these post-secondary
institutions turned to degree elimination as a means of meeting budget reduction targets.
Amid discussions of research productivity and external funding streams, disciplines with
lower-than-average levels of production became easy targets for eradication (Crano,
1995; Fedler et al., 1998; Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995).
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As a function of the post-September 11th economic recession, the aforementioned
trends have only intensified, engendering a new financial paradigm in American higher
education. Forced to contend with diminished coffers and increased demand for services,
state governments across the country have radically altered their funding priorities,
leading to diminished resources for public higher education (Fethke & Policano, 2012;
Layzell, 2007). A discretionary item on a budget ledger, higher education often functions
as a “balance wheel,” receiving disproportionate increases during a flush economy, and
disproportionate decreases during an economic recession (Hovey, 1999). With its ability
to generate income via tuition revenue, higher education finds itself in a unique position
relative to other state funding priorities.
In this manner, state governments devote roughly 60% of their budgets to K-12
education, Medicaid, and corrections—services which have no financial failsafe (Layzell,
2007). When compounded by swelling elderly and school-aged populations, states have
little choice but to allocate their limited resources to compulsory programs and social
services which benefit the greatest proportion of the residential population (Cheslock &
Hughes, 2011). Forced to contend with diminished legislative allocations, public postsecondary institutions have accelerated their search for external funding streams. While
this entrepreneurial orientation undoubtedly benefits STEM (science, technology,
engineering, and math) disciplines, education, liberal arts, and the social sciences are not
as closely aligned with this commercial facet of academe (Zusman, 2005). In his classic
case study of department eliminations at four Carnegie-classified research institutions,
Eckel (2003) elaborated on this very point, noting that liberal arts, education, and
communications disciplines were disproportionate targets for academic attrition.
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Highlighting the importance of “campus power circles” (p.114) in brokering department
elimination decisions, Eckel (2003) underscores individual discourse as a critical
component of the larger decision-making process.
Provided this overarching environment, I now turn to the human element of
departmental/programmatic eliminations. In the context of the current study, department
chairs and faculty members are the individuals most affected by academic attrition, due to
their jeopardized livelihood as educational professionals. As such, it is imperative to
discuss department chair roles and the department chair/faculty relationship, as they
pertain to this phenomenon. Likened to the Roman god, Janus, “with faces oriented in
opposite directions,” (Gmelch & Burns, 1993, p.260) academic department chairs must
balance the many stresses associated with the duality of this position. As an administrator
with a faculty members’ perspective, department chairs must attend to the bureaucratic
aspects of leadership, as well as nurture the professional growth of the faculty members
within their unit (Hendel & Horn, 2008).
Placed in this exceedingly difficult position, department chairs must effectively
assume a variety of role orientations in order to engage in successful management of an
academic unit (Tucker, 1993). While it is impossible to delineate the exhaustive
responsibilities of an academic department chair, several scholars (Carroll & Gmelch,
1992; Leaming, 2007; Lees, 2006; Wolverton, Gmelch, Wolverton, & Sarros, 1999)
agree that communication, resource management, and faculty development are significant
duties of any department chair. Taking a holistic approach to the position, Berdrow
(2010) discovered a significant “disconnect between stakeholder views of the DC role”
(p.508). While department chairs focused the majority of their energies addressing daily
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administrative tasks and faculty needs, stakeholders voiced varied opinions on where
department chairs should devote the bulk of their time, demonstrating a lack of
institutional understanding as to the nature of the position.
In this regard, as the “king among kings,” (Berdrow, 2010, p.508), the department
chair’s rapport with his/her faculty colleagues is among the most crucial of all academic
interactions. During times of retrenchment, in particular, department chairs bear
responsibility for navigating this murky academic terrain and motivating their faculty to
press forward in the midst of job-related uncertainty (Bordia, Hobman, Jones, Gallois, &
Callan, 2004; Wheeler, 2007). Provided these less-than-ideal circumstances, department
chairs must work doubly hard to create a coherent faculty unit (Tierney, 1997), forge a
positive working environment (Lindholm, 2003; Zorn & Boler, 2007), and protect faculty
identity (Hakala, 2008). Indeed, the leadership and cohesion of an academic unit are
critical components of any effort to counteract departmental and/or programmatic
elimination proceedings—an under-researched phenomenon in American higher
education (Eckel, 2003).
Conceptual Framework
The changing historical and financial landscape of public post-secondary
education has and will continue to affect individual department chairs and faculty
members across American higher education. A complex and convoluted process, the
elimination of a department and/or program is a highly emotional occurrence plagued by
various iterations of uncertainty (Department Chair X, personal communication, April 7,
2011). As such, this study employs uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004) as a
guiding theoretical framework.
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An adaptation of Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) seminal work, Bordia et al.
(2004) posit three iterations of uncertainty during organizational change: strategic,
structural, and job-related. In this regard, strategic uncertainty refers to uncertainty
regarding organization-level issues, such as reasons for change, planning and future
direction of the organization, its sustainability, the nature of the business environment the
organization will face, and so forth. Further, structural uncertainty refers to uncertainty
arising from changes to the inner workings of the organization, such as reporting
structures and functions of different work units. Finally, job-related uncertainty refers to
uncertainty regarding job security, promotion opportunities, changes to the job role, and
so forth. Tested via a Likert-type survey, the combinations of strategic, structural, and
job-related uncertainties informed individuals’ appraisal of organizational change. For
the purposes of the present study, the findings elicited by the Bordia et al. (2004)
conceptual framework warrant further application. Indeed, the similarities in
organizational type (state government organization), unit of analysis (the individual), and
organizational context (change) identify this study as a viable candidate for transference
to qualitative methodology.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore department chair and
faculty perceptions of implementing a departmental or programmatic elimination.
Specifically, this study addressed the extent to which strategic, structural, and job-related
uncertainties prevail during a departmental or programmatic elimination. This study took
place at a public, research intensive institution located in the western region of the United
States (hereafter referred to as Mountain University), and focused on the events leading
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up to and including the implementation of the state’s 2011-2013 legislative appropriation
for higher education.
Research Design
As the purpose of this dissertation is to explore individual, lived experiences, I
selected a qualitative research design to accomplish this objective. In accordance with
Merriams’s (1998) case study protocol, the intent of this inquiry is to gain and “in-depth
understanding…of a single unit or bounded system” (p.19). In this multiple, embedded
case study, the bounded systems were four academic departments impacted by
departmental or programmatic eliminations at Mountain University during the 2011-2013
biennial budgetary cycle. In an effort to illuminate this broader construct, I examined
four instrumental iterations (Creswell, 2007) of a departmental/programmatic
elimination: two units slated for elimination but ultimately saved, and two units
eliminated outright. Within these iterations, I interviewed the department chair and two
faculty members, in an effort to understand the resultant individual experiences
characteristic of these three unique outcomes.
Moreover, the rationale for selecting Mountain University for this case study was
directly attributable to the institution’s fiscal predicament as a public institution. Forced
to contend with an overall decline in state revenue, the Mountain State legislature
significantly reduced appropriations to Mountain University during the 2011-2013
budgetary biennium (Lake, February 16, 2011). As a means of meeting the reduction
targets mandated by the Mountain State legislature, Mountain University elected to
eliminate selected academic departments and programmatic units. Based upon the
qualitative concept of purposive sampling (Bernard & Ryan, 2010), department chairs
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and faculty members in these units represented the individuals qualified to participate in
this study. All eligible department chairs received a physical letter of contact inviting
them to participate in this study. The willingness of the department chair to participate in
this study determined which units were ultimately selected for inclusion. Faculty in units
with participating department chairs were then contacted for inclusion in this study.
In accordance with case study protocol, I included multiple sources of information
and employed several analytic methodologies throughout this dissertation. Though semistructured interviews formed the foundation of this study, I supplemented these narrative
accounts with observations, public records, and personal documents (Merriam, 1998).
Aided by the qualitative software package of ATLAS.ti, I constructed codes, categories,
and themes using a variety of methodological techniques (Lewins & Silver, 2004).
Guided by uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004), I employed constant
comparison and analytic induction in an effort to explicate the essence of the narrators’
lived experiences. Within-case analysis and cross-case analysis ensued upon completion
of data collection, resulting in a comprehensive narrative account of the
departmental/programmatic elimination process at Mountain University (Merriam, 2009).
Research Questions
Upon review of the relevant literature, it became apparent that the departmental
and programmatic elimination process is an under-researched topic of inquiry. In an
effort to remedy this oversight, I aimed to address the following research questions
during the course of this study:
1. How do individuals experience a potential departmental/programmatic
elimination?
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2. To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest
themselves during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations?
3. How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainties?
4. How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between
saved and eliminated units?
These research questions flow from the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction
theory, highlighting the complex interaction between faculty members and department
chairs during a departmental/programmatic elimination.
Definition of Key Terms
The following definitions are provided to clarify the terms used throughout this
study:
Academic Department: The strategic unit within colleges and universities in
which faculty and department chairs serve the constituents of the department and where
faculty fulfill their teaching and research interests (Leaming, 2007).
Academic Program: A cohesive arrangement of college level credit courses and
experiences designed to accomplish predetermined objectives leading to the awarding of
a degree, diploma, or certificate (Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, 2009).
Across-the-Board (Horizontal) Cut Backs: The most frequently used institutional
cost-saving strategy; these approaches are not concerned with intentionally changing the
ways in which the organization interacts with its environment (Eckel, 2003).
Department Chair: The official designated leader of an academic department in a
college or university (Leaming, 2007).
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Financial exigency: An imminent financial crisis that threatens the survival of the
institution as a whole and that cannot be alleviated by less drastic means (AAUP, 2009).
Job-related uncertainty: Uncertainty regarding job security, promotion
opportunities, changes to the job role, and so forth (Bordia et al., 2004).
Latent content: The deep structural meaning conveyed by a message (Berg, 2007).
Manifest content: The surface structure present in a message (Berg, 2007).
Strategic uncertainty: Uncertainty regarding organization-level issues, such as
reasons for change, planning and future direction of the organization, its sustainability,
the nature of the business environment the organization will face, and so forth (Bordia et
al., 2004).
Structural uncertainty: Uncertainty arising from changes to the inner workings of
the organization, such as reporting structures and functions of different work units
(Bordia et al., 2004).
Targeted (Vertical) Cutbacks: Institutional cost-saving strategy where particular
units or programs face deeper reductions, or even elimination. These targeted cuts
consist of an evaluation of one unit against others based upon criteria to maximize the
organization-environment fit (Eckel, 2003).
Uncertainty: An individual’s inability to predict something accurately (Milliken,
1987).
Limitations
Limitations are a natural component of any research design; no study can
encompass all aspects of a phenomenon in its entirety. As such, this study is limited by
its institutional-level focus and small pool of potential participants. Furthermore, though
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an abundance of official documentation exists in relation to the budgetary woes of
Mountain University, it is wise to consider the sanitized nature of this form of
communication. Formal accounts in administrative reports, newspaper interviews, and
authorized meeting minutes may not truly reflect the highly contentious nature of
university downsizing. With insufficient access to private correspondence and
confidential communications, I readily acknowledge the limits of documental
triangulation.
In addition to aforementioned constraints, it must be noted that all participants in
this study were full-time, tenured faculty members gainfully employed at Mountain
University. During departmental/programmatic elimination proceedings, non-tenured
faculty and visiting professors are generally the first individuals to be terminated, as their
contracts are not guaranteed beyond yearly appointments. Furthermore, the perceived
instability of an institution embroiled in this type of organizational change often prompts
tenured faculty to retire early or seek employment elsewhere, limiting the pool of
potential participants. As such, the perspectives of the individuals highlighted in this
study should be taken within this institutional context.
Moreover, facets of qualitative interview methodology place additional
limitations on the findings of this study. Indeed, retrospective reflection on past events is
limited by the narrator’s memory, his/her perceptive lens, and a natural inclination to
present one’s self in the best possible light. Controversial actions and personal
conversations relevant to the study may be purposefully withheld from the researcher, in
order to protect the narrator and attendant institutional confidantes. Furthermore,
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narrators may temper their responses for fear of institutional identification and retributive
repercussions.
Additionally, as the conduit for data collection, the researcher brings her own
inherent limitations to bear on this study. As the quality of dialogue is dependent upon
the interviewer’s ability to provide appropriate prompts, probes, and directional guidance,
my value as a researcher will hinge on the aforementioned standards. Moreover, the
conversion of raw interview data into robust explanatory content is limited by my
analytical ability to triangulate ideas, discern motivations, and analyze themes. Past
experiences and integrated knowledge of the related literature may well introduce
unforeseen biases; these can only be remedied by extensive explication by the researcher
in areas appropriate for first-person commentary.
Significance of the Study
As a function of the current economic downturn, the concept of “budget cuts” is
firmly entrenched in the public mind. However, abstract figures on institutional balance
sheets do not adequately address the human toll of financial retrenchment. While
declining state support for higher education is well documented from a quantitative
standpoint, qualitative analyses are few and far between. Indeed, there is no available
scholarship on the implementation of departmental or programmatic elimination
directives. As such, the current study stands to fill a noticeable gap in university
leadership literature. In addition to the numerous roles and responsibilities already
assumed by department chairs and faculty members, it is increasingly evident that
departmental and programmatic attrition has become a new facet of academic life. Given
this burgeoning trend of academic downsizing, it is critical that those at the forefront of
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this phenomenon have the ability to research and learn from the experiences of their
colleagues.
Summary
This chapter provided a brief overview of the research topic and introduced the
basic tenets of the study’s design. In an effort to explicate the phenomenon of academic
attrition, the following sections were included in this chapter: a succinct summary of the
relevant literature, an explanation of the study’s conceptual framework; the purpose of
conducting the study; research questions; research design; definition of key terms;
limitations; and significance of the study. The following chapter will provide a more
comprehensive review of the related literature, with reference to the broader historical
and financial context of the departmental/programmatic elimination movement in higher
education. Through a more nuanced understanding of pertinent scholarship, uncertainty
reduction theory will emerge as the intellectual scaffolding undergirding the present
study.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The contextual factors which influence departmental and programmatic
eliminations are indeed numerous, and draw from a variety of disciplinary frameworks.
An emergent paradigm in higher education, departmental/programmatic eliminations
have forced academics to reconsider the multifarious purposes, priorities, and politics
inherent in public university systems (Eckel, 2003). As such, the purpose of this
qualitative case study is to explore department chair and faculty perceptions of
implementing departmental and/or programmatic eliminations at one public, research
extensive institution. Through this analysis of lived experience, it may be possible to
contribute to a burgeoning body of practical scholarship on academic attrition. As such,
this study aims to assist institutional stakeholders across the country who are struggling
to understand this emergent phenomenon in higher education.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the pertinent scholarly research and theory on
departmental and programmatic eliminations, department chair roles and responsibilities,
and the relationship of the department chair to his or her faculty colleagues. The chapter
begins with a chronological overview of academic expansion and attrition in American
higher education, followed by a discussion on the external environmental factors
impacting public post-secondary funding streams. Having addressed the historical and
economic conditions undergirding this phenomenon, the second part of the literature
review focuses on the human element of department/program eliminations. Following
this explication of department chair roles, responsibilities, and attendant faculty
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relationships, the chapter concludes with a detailed explanation of the conceptual
framework underpinning this study.
Historical Background on Department/Program Eliminations
The relationship between the federal government and American higher education
is often characterized as a “social contract” (Perorazio, 2001). In this symbiotic
exchange, public investment in post-secondary education resulted in a series of civic
gains benefitting society at large. In addition to economic and cultural development,
advances in education, technology, medicine, and modern science are all attributable to
the strong linkages forged between higher education and the federal government
(Perorazio, 2001). However, in the past thirty years, fissures in this seemingly
unbreakable social contract have surfaced, resulting in a competitive disciplinary
hierarchy in higher education (Geiger, 2005). Indeed, as the private economic benefits of
post-secondary education supplanted the old paradigm of societal betterment, an
individual’s return on investment came to dictate the relative worth of various
departments and degree programs (Cohen, 1998). Reflecting on historical cross-currents
from World War II to the present, it is apparent that cycles of departmental/programmatic
growth and attrition in American higher education have occurred in concert with broader
national developments.
History of Higher Education 1945-1960s
The immediate post-war period to the mid-1960s is often referred to as the
“golden age” of American higher education (Freeland, 2007). Confronted with the
possibility of civil unrest and rampant unemployment upon the return of tens of
thousands of U.S. soldiers, the federal government drafted legislation designed to retool
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these newly minted veterans of World War II (Thomas, 1997). The Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944 (more commonly referred to as the GI Bill), underwrote the
post-war higher education boom by providing a sizable financial incentive to enroll in a
post-secondary institution. Covering tuition, books, and a housing stipend for full-time
students based on years of military service, the GI Bill retrained soldiers for careers in the
burgeoning post-war economy (Cohen, 1998).
Though the GI Bill did not restrict veterans as to discipline of study, a series of
national events heightened the attractiveness of selected career paths. Indeed, just as the
European combat phase was winding down, an ideological conflict erupted between the
backers of American-style capitalism and those in favor of Soviet communism (Lazerson,
2007). Winning this quasi-military conflict, known as the Cold War, became the top
priority of the federal government, resulting in significant ramifications for higher
education (Geiger, 2005). Following the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957,
the Eisenhower administration took decisive action to improve America’s technological
and cultural competitiveness (Freeland, 2007). In August 1958, Congress passed the
National Defense Education Act, providing additional federal grant aid to students
studying foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, and the new educational
technologies of television and radio (Furman, 1958).
As higher education became inexorably intertwined with national security, federal
funding flowed freely to sustain and strengthen this mutually beneficial enterprise. In
tandem with the Sputnik scare of 1957, President Eisenhower’s Committee on Education
Beyond the High School published a report detailing the alarming shortage of Ph.D.’s in
higher education (Freeland, 2007). With demand for doctorates outpacing supply,
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graduate programs and faculty salaries grew exponentially, elevating the status of
academia to previously unforeseen heights (Freeland, 2007). As competition for federal
research dollars accelerated, institutions devised generous compensation packages to
attract top scholars in a variety of disciplines (Geiger, 2005). Through the creation and
generous funding of several agencies in the 1950s and 1960s, most notably the National
Science Foundation, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, the National
Institutes of Health, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, the federal
government institutionalized a national infrastructure to support scholarly achievement in
higher education (Geiger, 2005). Devised out of economic necessity and sustained by
synergetic purpose, this reciprocal relationship insured a booming American economy
and laid the foundation for a superior system of higher education. However, as national
interests turned to a new foreign conflict and social issues took center stage on American
campuses, this seemingly unbreakable bond began to unravel, forever altering public
perception of the social contract.
History of Higher Education 1960s-1970s
As the Baby Boomer generation supplanted WWII veterans at the nation’s
colleges and universities, military and domestic affairs converged to create powder keg
conditions for American higher education. With the century’s largest eighteen-to-twentyone-year-old age cohort (Geiger, 2005) occupying the hallowed halls of academe,
changing political headwinds threatened to disrupt this extended period of postwar
prosperity. Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, escalating combat
operations in Vietnam eventually turned a cold war of words into a full-blown military
engagement (Cohen, 1998). As advances in information technology beamed horrific
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wartime footage to television sets across the country, college students came to connect
the oppression of peoples of color abroad with the injustices perpetrated against African
Americans at home (Cohen, 1998).
Reinvigorating the long-simmering civil rights movement, college students of all
races and creeds protested institutional racism through sit-ins, campus protests, and
counter-cultural expression (Geiger, 2005). Within the ivory tower, progressive
academics and like-minded students questioned an outmoded curriculum founded on the
preeminence of Western civilization. Reflecting on this curricular change, higher
education historian Roger Geiger (2005) made the following observation:
One clarion call of the student rebellion was for relevance in university studies.
Relevance indeed became a hallmark of the new era but in ways not anticipated
by student activists. They had advocated a tendentious relevance predicated on
the university’s role as an aloof critic of society. Thus, they urged universities to
study and seek to ameliorate problems stemming from the Vietnam War, racial
inequality, poverty, and the environment. These topics long remained
preoccupations on campuses, but more powerful trends toward relevance were
welling up. Students sought a more tangible form of relevance by turning away
from the arts and sciences and toward more vocational or professional majors
(p.65).
Indeed, just as departments of African American, Asian, Chicano, and Women’s studies
emerged on the academic landscape, (Crowley, 1999; Trombley, 1970) flagging student
interest caused degree production in the liberal arts disciplines to decline from a high of
47% in the heyday of the 1960s to just over 25% in the 1970s (Geiger, 2005). Moreover,
the “demonstrations, strikes, and violence during the 1960s and early 1970s divided
higher education from within and diminished enthusiasm for it among politicians and the
public at large as they questioned whether higher education had become yet another
mistaken entitlement of the welfare state” (Lazerson, 2007, p. 794). Undeniably broken,
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the sacrosanct social contract shifted from public societal good to private economic
benefit with the passing of this watershed moment in American higher education.
History of Higher Education 1980s
In sharp contrast to the rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960s and
1970s, a new conservatism accompanied the Reagan revolution of the 1980s (Geiger,
2005). This powerful political paradigm pervaded the nation, redefining the discourse on
public-private enterprise. In this manner, the private economic benefits of postsecondary attainment slowly superseded the social democratic function of higher
education. As a function of this decisive shift, institutions of higher education came to
espouse a more market-oriented philosophy, emphasizing research productivity, revenue
generation, and graduate earnings (Zusman, 2005). In the public sector, in particular,
precipitous declines in state appropriations jeopardized the traditional liberal arts and
non-scientific specialty programs, as these units often failed to conform to free market
indicators (Trow, 2010).
In one of the first articles to address this phenomenon, Slaughter (1993) analyzed
seventeen faculty dismissal cases reported by the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) in Academe from 1980-1990. Dealing specifically with downsizing,
financial exigency, and programmatic reduction, this case study provided an enlightening
overview of the burgeoning retrenchment phenomenon in higher education. Utilizing
critical feminist and neo-Marxian theories to guide her study, Slaughter (1993) situated
her findings in larger political, economic, and patriarchal discourses. Linking abrogation
of tenure to the recession of 1983 and the conservatism of the Reagan/Bush eras,
Slaughter (1993) examined the restructuring of professional labor, the managerial
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practice of retrenchment, and faculty response to downsizing, drawing conclusions as to
the identifiable patterns in all seventeen cases.
Slaughter’s (1993) findings indicated that state budgetary shortfalls and property
tax limitations often precipitated programmatic reductions, and that these “intimations of
financial crisis consolidated power and authority in institutional administrations” (p.260).
Moreover, this concentration of influence allowed administrators to fundamentally
restructure higher education under the guise of retrenchment. Breaking down the
seventeen AAUP cases by field, Slaughter (1993) discovered that “72.9 percent of the
firings occurred in the social sciences, liberal arts, and education,” (p.270)
disproportionately impacting female faculty and the female students who gravitated
toward those disciplines. Furthermore, “faculty who were not retrenched (science,
engineering, medicine, business, law) were generally in fields close to major mission
agencies, had powerful external constituencies, and were routes to highly paid careers
that enabled graduates to donate monies to colleges and universities” (p.273). Lending
credence to Slaughter’s (1993) prescient discovery, authors Brint, Turk-Bicakci, and
Levy (2005) drew similar conclusions when analyzing the decline of the liberal arts in
American higher education. Expounding on this phenomenon, Brint et al. (2005)
concluded:
The smaller arts and sciences disciplines, particularly area studies and foreign
languages and literatures, have faced significant downsizing and even elimination,
while interdisciplinary majors in the arts and sciences have grown more popular
among administrators, sometimes as much for economic as for intellectual
reasons (p.172)
Provided the larger economic and political pressures to conform to the free market, it is
small wonder that higher education turned away from the liberal arts towards vocational,
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revenue-generating degree offerings in this business-oriented decade. In the coming
years, state fiscal crises would accelerate this trend, solidifying the academic
preeminence of STEM (science, technology, engineering, math) disciplines (Brint,
Proctor, Murphy, & Hanneman, 2012).
History of Higher Education 1990s-Present
Moving into the 1990s, it is clear that market factors continued to shape the
academic landscape. In this manner, several authors (Crano, 1995; Fedler et al., 1998;
Reinardy & Halter, 1994; Seiler, 1995) provided anecdotal evidence of departmental
elimination battles in vulnerable liberal art and social scientific fields. Just as the
recession of 1983 precipitated many of the AAUP cases in Slaughter’s (1993) study,
economic downturns in the 1990s placed faculty in social work (Reinardy & Halter,
1994), communication studies (Crano, 1995; Seiler, 1995) and journalism (Fedler et al.,
1998) in the unenviable positions of having to defend their respective disciplinary merits.
Indeed, discussions of research productivity (Fedler et al., 1998), external funding
(Crano, 1995; Seiler, 1995), and a disproportionate impact on women (Reinardy &
Halter, 1994) pervade this literature, lending credence to Slaughter’s (1993) predictive
prowess.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the sporadic literature on
programmatic reduction reached its tipping point, culminating in Eckel’s (2003) case
study of four Carnegie classified research universities. Using a multi-lens organizational
framework to study institutional structure, human resources, politics, and symbolism,
Eckel (2003) examined the process, effects, and common themes of program
discontinuance. Like the aforementioned studies, Eckel’s (2003) institutions were forced
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to contend with declining state-level resources, thus prompting the discussions of
program closure. In the tradition of Slaughter (1993), Eckel (2003) analyzed suspected
reasons for program discontinuance, delving deep into the institutions’ culture via
multiple stakeholder interviews and pertinent document analysis. Moreover, Eckel
(2003) juxtaposed stated elimination criteria with suspected termination rules, revealing a
stark dichotomy between official communications and stakeholder messages.
Though mission centrality, quality, cost, and demand permeated the official
discourse on program discontinuance, this ostensible display of shared governance was
undercut by mitigating intra-institutional factors. Referencing the units targeted for
elimination, overwhelmingly liberal arts, education, and communications disciplines,
Eckel (2003) made the following observation:
The administrative leaders at these four institutions additionally worked to make
politically defensible decisions…The closed programs at all four campuses tended
to have low numbers of faculty, students, and alumni. The units did not have
champions on or off campus willing to take up their cause. Departmental
leadership tended to be novice or ineffectual; their alumni small or dispersed; and
their faculty disconnected from campus power circles. (p.114).
Eckel’s (2003) commentary underscores the internal politics and dearth of data-driven
decision-making during the programmatic elimination process. Unfortunately, recent
scholarship (Reed, Cooper, & Young, 2007) and spate of articles published by the
Chronicle of Higher Education (Carlson, 2011; Glenn, 2008; Wasley, 2008; Wilson,
2009), largely confirms the aforementioned trends. Forced to contend with declining state
revenues, public institutions of higher education are cutting departments, programs,
(Carlson, 2011; Glenn, 2008; Reed et al., 2007; Wasley, 2008) faculty, (Wilson, 2009)
and staff (Rosser, 2012) in earnest in order to compensate for unprecedented, state-level
budget reductions.
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Concluding Remarks on the History of Department/Program Eliminations
Though the social contract remains a powerful ideal in American higher
education, it is evident that conditions facilitating this once strong linkage have since
dissolved. While diverse scholarly productivity propelled the United States to economic
and cultural supremacy post-World War II, the perception of college campuses as
hotbeds of anti-government radicalism heralded the decline of this fortuitous union
(Cohen, 1998). As public perception shifted from admiration to suspicion, higher
education eventually became a means to an end, thus supplanting the fundamental
intellectual journey (Lazerson, 2007). With limited high-paying job opportunities,
students rebuffed the liberal arts, education, and communication disciplines in favor of
lucrative careers in STEM-oriented fields (Geiger, 2005). Prompted by state fiscal crises,
higher education administrators acceded to this trend, eliminating departments and
programs which did not have lucrative research potential, wealthy alumni, or powerful
external constituencies (Eckel, 2003). As a result of these changing political, economic,
and social circumstances, an unspoken disciplinary hierarchy now permeates American
higher education, jeopardizing the long-term legitimacy of general knowledge degree
programs.
Financial Background on Department/Program Eliminations
Though academic publications often distinguish between “public” and “private”
higher education, the increasing financial similarity between these two categories of
institutions is certainly cause for public concern. Buoyed by state subsidies, public
universities provide their services at a significant discount to consumers, underscoring the
assertion that an educated citizenry is a significant state-wide asset. However, long-term
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fiscal trends, exacerbated by economic recessions, point to “an increasing privatization of
higher education” (Massy, 2001, p. 458). Forced to compete with other civic priorities
for scarce shares of state revenue, public higher education has become progressively
tuition-dependent as a substitute for shrinking state appropriations (Delta Cost Project,
2009). In the state of Nevada, where structural deficits and inelastic revenue streams
dominate the fiscal landscape (Hovey, 1999), the most recent financial downturn has
aggravated these long-simmering national trends, resulting in the elimination of entire
departments and programs from its university system (Lake, 2011). Through the
examination of macro-level financial indicators in public higher education, it is apparent
that substituting tuition for state subsidy has and will continue to transform a not-forprofit entity into a profit-conscious enterprise.
State Funding Priorities
In order to comprehend the financial predicament facing public higher education
more fully, it is important to understand the relative distribution of state funding
preferences. Ranking atop the priority list are federally mandated expenditures on
compulsory education and low-income health care, comprising 40-50% of state
budgetary outlays (Zusman, 2005). As several authors have noted (Cheslock & Hughes,
2011; Ehrenberg, 2006; Hauptman, 2001; Jones, 2009; Layzell, 2007; McGuinness Jr.,
2005; Reindl & Reyna, 2011), K-12 and Medicaid spending will only increase in the
coming decades, as a result of demographic and economic trends.
Elaborating on this financial forecast, policy analyst Harold Hovey (1999) points
to the growth in school-aged and elderly populations as catalysts for state spending
decisions. As K-12 enrollments swell, the budget for this area must rise accordingly, as a
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means of accommodating additional construction, maintenance, and instructional
expenditures. While it is certainly within the purview of state decision-makers to refuse
to fund these additional expenditures, cutting compulsory education is a politically
unpopular option. The combined force of teachers, parents, and school board members
represents a powerful ideological constituency—and a voting bloc able to make or break
a political candidacy (Hovey, 1999).
In much the same manner as the K-12 community, senior citizens have become an
influential interest group in American politics. With the eminent retirement of the Baby
Boom generation on the horizon, the needs of the elderly will indeed become a driving
force in the state budgetary process. With savings accounts and retirement plans
decimated by the most recent recession (SHEEO, 2011), increasing numbers of senior
citizens have met the means-test for Medicaid eligibility (Hovey, 1999). Moreover, as
health care and nursing home costs escalate, the percentage of state expenditures
dedicated to Medicaid will assuredly continue to climb (Layzell, 2007).
Though corrections’ spending is not tied to federal mandates, multitudinous
factors contribute to its prominence on the state balance ledger. First and foremost, being
“tough on crime,” is a winning political posture, and enactment of strict sentencing laws
constitutes a campaign promise fulfilled. Furthermore, popular “Three Strikes and
You’re Out” bills have contributed to lengthened and longer-served sentences, driving
operating costs upward (Cohen, 1998). As a function of these punitive policies, the
number of inmates in state correctional facilities has increased annually by 5% since the
early 1990s (Hovey, 1999). With scores of new prisoners to house, feed, and otherwise
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maintain, it is no wonder that prison construction, staffing, and upkeep are outpacing
state funding for higher education (Okunade, 2004).
With roughly 60% of a state’s budget expended on K-12, Medicaid, and
corrections alone, it is evident that higher education is competing for a shrinking slice of
the state revenue pie. Considered a discretionary expenditure, higher education
represented approximately 11.8% of general fund spending in fiscal year 2005 (Layzell,
2007). However, these pre-recession figures do not account for the dramatic declines in
state revenue since 2008 (SHEEO, 2011). As articulated by Hovey (1999), higher
education’s funding levels are closely tied to the overall economic health of the nation.
Therefore, in a strong economy, higher education typically receives a substantial
appropriation relative to other state services. Conversely, during tough fiscal times,
higher education bears a larger brunt of the shared financial sacrifice. In this manner,
fluctuations in spending levels “stem from the use of higher education as a balance wheel
in state finance” (Hovey, 1999, p.19). Unwilling and unable to rely on an unstable
revenue stream, public institutions of higher education have increased their revenuegenerating capacity to account for these significant declines in state appropriations.
Furthermore, as states struggle to close major budget deficits, financial necessity will
force higher education institutions to hasten these alternative fundraising efforts
(Cheslock & Hughes, 2011).
Institutional Revenue Sources
In order to understand how reductions in state appropriations have impacted
public universities, it is imperative to examine the historical origins of higher education
revenue. In 1975-1976, the four largest revenue sources were state government (31%),
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tuition and fees (21%), sales and services (19%), and the federal government (16%).
Twenty years later, in 1994-1995, these revenue sources reflected the following
distributions: tuition and fees (27%), sales and services (23%), state government (23%),
and the federal government (12%) (Cohen, 1998). Between 1995 and 2006, the shift
from state subsidy to private burden became even more pronounced, as “the dominant
revenue pattern across public institutions was the growing dependence on tuitions as a
primary source of revenue” (Delta Cost Project, 2009, p.13). Some states, such as
Florida, have decided that tuition differentials that once allowed for enhanced academic
programs should instead supplant funds diverted from universities due to budgetary
shortfalls, tax cuts, or other incentives that place a growing burden on students. In 1990,
state funding covered seventy-one percent of the costs to educate students in Florida’s
public universities; twenty years later, that percentage dipped to forty-nine percent while
students shouldered the burden through tuition increases (USF Oracle Editorial Opinion,
2012).
In tandem with this escalating reliance on tuition revenue, public post-secondary
institutions are becoming more entrepreneurial in their quest to generate funds from
individual donors and private industry. As noted by Hauptman (2001), “fundraising is
increasingly part of the responsibilities of public sector officials,” as indicated by the
“growth of foundations at public colleges and universities” (p.119). In addition to more
frequent and aggressive capital campaigns, public institutions have become reliant upon
sponsored research as a substitute for state revenue (Massy, 2001). Driven to increase
their proportion of extramural funds, state universities have made substantial investments
in elaborate research parks in the hopes of attracting private corporations to campus
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(Cohen, 1998). Though many perceive this enterprising behavior as a positive means of
financial adjustment, the pressure to generate alternative revenue has recalibrated the
public mission of state institutions. Forced to behave like a business, the priorities of
public higher education have shifted accordingly.
Institutional Funding Priorities
In the new paradigm of higher education finance, public institutions will
disproportionately allocate scarce resources to activities that will generate the greatest
perceived return on investment. As indicated by the Delta Cost Project (2009), an
independent non-profit organization which tracks trends in college spending,
expenditures per student on instruction declined between 2002 and 2005 at public
institutions. Provided that classroom teaching does not produce revenue, and in fact
detracts from instructors’ ability to conduct lucrative research, this downturn in
instructional allocations is unsurprising (Ginsberg, 2011). As a result of this shift in
institutional policy, undergraduate time-to-degree at public institutions has lengthened
considerably, with students requiring an average of 5-6 years to complete a traditional
four-year degree (Hauptman, 2001).
While these overall decreases in instructional expenditures are common
knowledge within the higher education community, the patterns of decline amongst
specific academic disciplines are not nearly as prominent. Indeed, academic attrition
does not affect all departments and degree programs equally, as instructional allocations
generally follow the fiscal principles previously discussed. As noted by Zusman (2005):
…fields unable to tie themselves to market needs may be disproportionately cut.
Over the next decade, humanities and social science programs may be at risk if
institutions implement budget systems that require departments to generate
income equal to their costs (p.122).
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In times of economic downturn, especially, entrepreneurial executives may move
aggressively in this direction under the guise of financial necessity. According to Massy
(2001):
Administrators may harbor secret lists of programs that have outlived their
usefulness, but which would be politically difficult to close in normal
circumstances. A budget-cutting climate offers the opportunity to move against
these “targets of opportunity,” usually in the context of speeches about “making
hard choices” (p.450).
Unfortunately, these “hard choices” have come to redefine the academic landscape,
privileging market-oriented disciplines over less lucrative general knowledge and liberal
arts fields.
Concluding Remarks on Financial Aspects of Department/Program Eliminations
Though substituting alternative revenue sources for state subsidy has temporarily
stabilized higher education finance, it is evident that the long-term consequences of this
shift significantly outweigh the short-term benefits. Indeed, as the fiscal foundation of
state appropriations continues to erode, public institutions have less incentive to offer
services aimed at altruistic ends. As a tone of “let those who use it pay for it” (Cohen,
1998, p.453) pervades higher education, financial demands will place mounting pressure
on institutions to offer degree programs in line with this economic theory. As posited by
Massy (2001), the answers to two critical questions shall define the course of higher
education in the twenty-first century:
How will market forces affect that most fundamental objective of the classic
university—to nurture the community of scholars that since ancient times has
conserved and advanced mankind’s intellectual and cultural heritage? Under what
conditions will academic institutions be able to defend intellectual autonomy in
the face of privatization? (p.460).
Absent a renewed commitment to state subsidies to higher education, the comeback to
this call to action may not measure up to the desired response. By removing the “public”
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from public higher education, heightened tuition rates pale in comparison to the broader
intellectual repercussions on the imminent horizon.
Department Chair Roles/Responsibilities
Torn between the various responsibilities of faculty life and administrative
protocol, the position of academic department chair encompasses a plethora of related
roles and responsibilities. Likened to the Roman god, Janus, “with faces oriented in
opposite directions,” (Gmelch & Burns, 1993, p.260), academic department chairs must
balance the stresses associated with the duality of this position. Indeed, in a survey of
department chairs at 101 research and doctorate-granting institutions, Gmelch and Burns
(1993) found that an unmanageable workload ranked first in an analysis of serious
stressors affecting workplace productivity. In a more recent survey, Hendel and Horn
(2008) discovered an empirical link between workload overload, role conflict, and
employment at a public higher education institution. Furthermore, this conflict is
exacerbated by a lack of training programs (Friel, 2010; Wolverton & Ackerman, 2006)
designed to ensure a smooth transition to this hybrid position.
Provided the aforementioned parameters, it is important to outline the vast and
varied tasks associated with the department chair position. An under-researched segment
of scholarship, Tucker (1993) elevated the profile of department chairs by delineating
fifty-four discrete responsibilities associated with the position. Encompassing
governance, instruction, faculty affairs, student affairs, communication, budget and
resource allocation, office management, and professional development, Tucker’s (1993)
research illuminated the need for further empirical investigation. Tucker’s
contemporaries, Carroll and Gmelch (1992), complemented this field of study through
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factor analysis, discovering four typologies associated with effective chairperson
performance. Based upon a survey of one hundred department chairs at Carnegie
classified research and doctorate granting institutions, Carroll and Gmelch (1992)
identified leader-chairs, scholar-chairs, faculty developer-chairs, and manager-chairs,
associating task competencies with the respective positions. Far from a sinecure,
leadership at the departmental level necessitates knowledge of administrative
organization, resource management, faculty development, and effective cooperation
(Wolverton, Gmelch, Wolverton, & Sarros, 1999).
In more recent years, as a function of economic circumstance and stakeholder
expansion, the communicative aspects of the department chair position (Leaming, 2007;
Lees, 2006) have gained prominence. Indeed, as the public financial commitment to
higher education continues to decline (Hovey, 1999) and institutional budgets
accordingly constrict, chairs have had to become deft in the art of departmental advocacy
(Eckel, 2003). Expounding on this burgeoning trend, Lees (2006) underscores the
relationship between resource allocation and effective academic leadership, noting:
In some cases, programs may be eliminated. Such programs would likely be
identified by a cost analysis indicating that they cost far more than they generate
and by an academic analysis indicating that they are not likely to produce degrees
that will be in high demand…Chairs will play a critical role in articulating the
interrelationships among programs so that, if necessary, such reductions happen
in ways that allow the institution to emerge stronger (p.251).
In addition to working within the familiar landscape of academe, department chairs must
increasingly communicate with external constituents, including alumni, legislators, the
news media, and the general public, as a means of promoting the department’s
contributions to the community (Leaming, 2007). Indeed, the complexity of managing a
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contemporary academic department has even prompted the emergence of disciplinespecific scholarship (Aggarwal, Rochford, & Vaidyanathan, 2009).
Exemplifying a recent scholarly turn, Berdrow (2010) rejects the study of the
department chair in isolation in favor of a more nuanced understanding of the department
chair’s place in the larger academic hierarchy. Taking a 360º approach to the position,
Berdrow (2010) examines “the role of the department chair by analyzing it in the context
of the institution’s goals and expectations, the stakeholders affecting and affected by the
department chair, and the chair’s own capabilities” (p.499). Harnessing theories of
managerial human capital, managerial social capital, managerial cognition, organizational
complexity, and role socialization to frame her study, Berdrow (2010) conducted
interviews and focus groups with current liberal arts and business department chairs,
former department chairs, and institutional stakeholders at a private business university in
the Northeastern United States.
As a consequence of this study, Berdrow (2010) categorized department chair
roles as either managerial (faculty development, student development, communication
and representation, and operations and administration) or transformational
(catalyst/innovation and climate enhancement). Moreover, in addition to the myriad
demands encompassed in these six designations, Berdrow (2010) discovered a significant
“disconnect between stakeholder views of the DC role” (p.508). While department chairs
focused the majority of their energies on daily administrative and climate maintenance
functions, stakeholders voiced varied opinions on where department chairs should devote
the bulk of their time, demonstrating a lack of institutional understanding as to the nature
of this position. While Berdrow’s (2010) study of a single, private institution limits the

34

transferability of these findings, the scarce scholarship on department chairs supports a
broader incidence of department chair role ambiguity across academia.
The Department Chair/Faculty Relationship
The effectiveness of an academic department chair is often dependent upon the
successful cultivation of interpersonal relationships (Moye, Henkin, & Floyd, 2006). As
the “king among kings,” (Berdrow, 2010, p.508) the department chair’s rapport with
his/her faculty colleagues is among the most crucial of all academic interactions. Under
the auspices of servant leadership, department chairs bear responsibility for establishing a
positive working environment, empowering faculty members, and ensuring equitable
productivity (Wheeler, 2007). However, none of these objectives can be achieved in the
absence of frequent and effective communication (Leaming, 2007).
In a classic and highly cited piece on organizational socialization, Tierney (1997)
argued that the enculturation of faculty is of critical importance to academic
administrators. Applying dueling modernist/postmodernist perspectives as a theoretical
framework, Tierney (1997) analyzed three hundred interviews of tenure-track faculty in
eight four-year colleges and universities. Aggregating these responses into relevant
themes and conceptual categories, Tierney (1997) proposed “a schema for how we might
think about organizational socialization and how we might develop policies that
contribute to the successful socialization of faculty into the academy” (p.2). In this
manner, Tierney (1997) locates faculty socialization in the contestable culture of
academic life, whereby individual faculty members alternatively contribute to and are
influenced by the multifarious perspectives of other organizational colleagues.
Highlighting the importance of institutional context, Tierney (1997) underscores the
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“cultural act” (p.6) of socialization, through which faculty mediate the significance of
teaching, research, and service in their particular departments. Emphasizing the
department chair as a principal mediator of cultural norms, Tierney (1997) stresses
implicit expression as a crucial complement to explicitly communicated directives in the
organizational socialization of academic faculty.
Building on Tierney’s (1997) seminal work, Trowler and Knight (2000) applied
the concept of organizational socialization to an international context. In an effort to
generate a grounded theory of this complex process, Trowler and Knight (2000)
interviewed twenty-four new faculty members at ten Canadian and English universities,
in order to discover ways in which to improve transition into the academic profession.
Influenced by activity system theory, a conceptual framework rooted in the discipline of
psychology, Trowler and Knight (2000) conclude that the “discourses and practices”
(p.28) of a particular department is of paramount importance to a newly appointed faculty
member. Highlighting communication, especially department chair communication, as
“the key to the development of intersubjectivity,” (p.31), Trowler and Knight (2000)
further refine this process as “provisional and influenced by power relations” (p.32). As
such, activity systems, aka academic departments, are “highly permeable” (p.33) entities,
greatly influenced by the “micro-politics” (p.33) of academic life. An individual faculty
member’s “construction of personal and professional identity” (p.33) is therefore highly
dependent upon the dynamic social interactions facilitated by the leadership, mentorship,
and discursive style of the academic department chair.
Linking faculty work environment to perceived institutional “fit,” Lindholm
(2003) locates organizational socialization as a primary influence on “the nature and
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intensity of individual motivation” (p.126). In an effort to create “more socially
responsive” institutions (p.126), Lindholm (2003) qualitatively examined faculty
members’ perceptions of their institutional working environment. Using structural
contingency theory as a conceptual framework, Lindholm (2003) conducted a case study
of thirty-six tenure-track faculty in four departments at a public research university.
Employing analytic induction, Lindholm (2003) noted the following: “for the vast
majority [of faculty] the most salient layer in considering organizational fit issues is their
disciplinary department” (p.133). Building on this foundational assessment, Lindholm
(2003) uncovered the nexus among perceived institutional fit, individual motivation, and
departmental leadership. Addressing this phenomenon, Lindholm (2003) commented:
“Widely described as an “essential” factor in creating the structural conditions that
maximize congruence between faculty members’ needs and departmental realities, the
chair’s position was widely respected but rarely envied, given its “highly timeconsuming” and “largely thankless” nature” (p.141). Thoroughly researched and
convincingly presented, Lindholm’s (2003) study effectively demonstrates the substantial
role of the department chair in maximizing the physical and emotional resources of a
disciplinary unit.
Addressing this very issue, authors Norman, Ambrose, and Huston (2006)
assessed faculty morale at a small, Research I university from 2002-2003. Using
narrative theory to frame their study, Norman et al. (2006) conducted semi-structured
telephone interviews with one hundred twenty-three current and former faculty members
regarding work life satisfaction within their academic departments. They then hired a
playwright to review these transcripts, remove identifiable data, and compose teachable
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scenarios out of the composite narratives. These fictionalized accounts, encompassing
issues of collegiality, leadership, mentoring, and promotion, were then presented to
current faculty members by department chairs from other disciplines, which were trained
as facilitators for the purposes of this study. As a result of opening this communicative
avenue, Norman et al. (2006) discovered a cathartic avenue for both faculty members and
faculty leadership, with one chair commenting “that he was becoming a better department
head as a result of what he had learned” (p.362). While this study represents a unique
experience at a single institution, the rich, thick description of events coupled with the
inclusion of interview protocols and fictional scenarios, solidifies this study as an
exemplary instance of qualitative research.
Observing the critical mass of literature on emotions and educational leadership,
authors Zorn and Boler (2007) reviewed and analyzed the myriad publications pertaining
to this topic. Arguing that “emotions need to be understood as publically and
collaboratively formed”…and “leadership needs to be seen as an enacted, emergent
phenomenon” (p.137), Zorn and Boler (2007) situate their findings in the broader realm
of organizational theory. Emphasizing the importance of emotional understanding in
educational leadership, Zorn and Boler (2007) make the following observation:
It is only by foregrounding relations of power that define emotional experience
and communication that new research can resist the tendency to individualize or
universalize emotional experiences. It is not enough that educational leaders show
consideration for emotions and their social and organizational dimension. Within
education, as in the wider culture, emotions are a site of control and a mode of
political resistance (p.148)
As such, it is imperative that departmental leaders understand their role in mediating “the
emotions that motivate a person to change and which also make change discomforting
and something to be resisted” (Zorn & Boler, 2007, p.146). Indeed, in setting the tone of
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organizational discourse, department chairs play a formative part in framing the social
context of the departmental unit.
Connecting the increasingly entrepreneurial orientation of the modern research
university to issues of academic motivation, Hakala’s (2008) study incorporates themes
salient to the emergent topic of departmental and programmatic elimination. Though this
particular study takes place in Finland, the qualitative construct of transferability
(Merriam, 2009) invites parallels to similar cross-currents in American higher education.
Like many capitalist countries, Finland’s system of higher education has struggled to
balance “competition for external research funding, increased emphasis on efficiency and
contributions to economic and social development” (Hakala, 2008, p.174). This powerful
confluence has ushered in a new institutional paradigm, in which “the traditional
framework for understanding academic work and identity is rendered invalid by the
ongoing changes in academia” (Hakala, 2008, p.178). In an effort to explore the impact
of this new academic model on the future academic workforce, Hakala (2008)
interviewed a total of twelve Finnish Ph.D. students in four research-oriented disciplines
as to their sources of intellectual motivation. Finding a fundamental shift in the scholarly
profession, Hakala (2008) made the following determination: “The future academic is
primarily an expert who is able to produce new knowledge across disciplinary boundaries
and together with those who eventually use the knowledge” (p.177). Indeed, this
international clarion call to practicality has considerable ramifications for organizational
restructuring in American higher education. In a climate of diminished resources and
heightened accountability, departmental leaders must secure the survival of their
academic units by increasing their interdisciplinary orientation and partnering with key
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stakeholders in the surrounding community. By confronting rather than avoiding
academic uncertainty, departmental leaders have the ability to motivate their faculty to
embrace new conceptualizations of scholarly organization.
Conceptual Framework
In an effort to explicate the aforementioned phenomenon, this study will employ
the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia, Hobman, Jones,
Gallois, & Callan, 2004). A notable facet of organizational change, Milliken (1987)
defines uncertainty as “an individual’s inability to predict something accurately” (p.136).
As organizations respond to changes in both internal and external environments,
uncertainty assumes a central role in the lives of organizational employees. In the
bureaucratic context of a public university, where process, paperwork, and procedure
define the work lives of employees, a new and as yet unregulated undertaking can cause
the involved individuals to experience anxiety, hesitancy, and confusion (Morgan, 2006).
Given the relatively recent institutional paradigm of departmental and programmatic
eliminations, most institutions have not had the time to develop comprehensive
guidelines for achieving this aim (Eckel, 2003). In this procedural vacuum, the shadow
of uncertainty looms large, inserting a troublesome component into an already unpleasant
academic event.
As a means of describing the various types of uncertainty experienced during
organizational change, Bordia et al. (2004) developed a three-factor conceptual model
comprising strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty. Based on the approaches of
Buono and Bowditch (1989) and Jackson, Schuler, and Vredenburgh (1987), Bordia et al.
(2004) differ from their theoretical predecessors by focusing on the individual level of
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analysis, as opposed to a three-pronged approach encompassing organizational, group,
and individual levels of scrutiny.
Concentrating on “the subjective experience or appraisal of different uncertainties
by individuals in a changing organization” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.509), the research team
posited three overarching themes as the locus of organizational uncertainty. In this
regard, strategic uncertainty “refers to uncertainty regarding organization-level issues,
such as reasons for change, planning and future direction of the organization, its
sustainability, the nature of the business environment the organization will face, and so
forth” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.510). Furthermore, structural uncertainty “refers to
uncertainty arising from changes to the inner workings of the organization, such as
reporting structures and functions of different work units” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.510).
Finally, job-related uncertainty “includes uncertainty regarding job security, promotion
opportunities, changes to the job role, and so forth” (Bordia et al., 2004, p.511). Under
the auspices of this conceptual model, the three types of uncertainties interact “in a
cascade-like fashion,” whereby “strategic uncertainty is likely to lead to structural
uncertainty which, in turn, contributes to job-related uncertainty” (Bordia et al., 2004,
p.511).
Rooted in the traditions of psychology and human resource development, Bordia
et al. (2004) tested their conceptual model via a Likert-type survey at a state government
department in the midst of organizational change. Recently separated from another state
entity, the selected government department was dealing with the various ramifications of
a statewide election, including: funding ambiguity, leadership turnover, internal
restructuring, and a change in mission and business strategy. In order to assess the extent
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to which uncertainty prevailed in this environment, surveys were mailed to all 1,283
organizational employees; 877 employees returned the survey, achieving a response rate
of 68.4%.
Using regression analysis, Bordia et al. (2004) determined that the results
supported the predicted model, underscoring the empirical relationship among strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainties. Discussing this outcome, Bordia et al. (2004)
make the following observation:
The organization had recently completed a de-amalgamation and experienced
a change in government, both of which contributed to high levels of
organizational instability. This was characterized by uncertainty about the
business strategy, identity and role of the separate department, the new reporting
relationships within the department, and different task and job demands upon
employees. Employees were aware that the change in government signaled the
need for the department to realign its business strategy and reanalyze the
organization’s work processes. In this context of heightened ambiguity,
employees were experiencing all three types of uncertainties (p. 523-525).
In presenting the results of this research, the authors acknowledge the limited
generalizability of public sector studies to private enterprise, and additionally conceded
the drawbacks of self-reported surveys. However, for the purposes of the present study,
the findings elicited by the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework warrant further
application. Indeed, the similarities in organizational type (state government
organization), unit of analysis (the individual), and organizational context (change)
identify this study as a viable candidate for transference to qualitative methodology.
Though Bordia et al. (2004) adapted uncertainty reduction theory to
organizational change, Berger and Calabrese (1975) pioneered uncertainty reduction
theory as an explanatory model for understanding initial interactions between strangers.
Uncertainty reduction theory assumes that when “strangers meet, their primary concern is
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one of uncertainty reduction or increasing predictability about the behavior of both
themselves and others in the interaction” (p.100). This process of uncertainty reduction
proceeds in three phases: the entry phase, the personal phase, and the exit phase. In the
entry phase, communication content is limited to demographic data, as a means of
determining basic social information. The subsequent period is a personal phase,
whereby values, attitudes, and problems emerge as topics of conversation. Finally,
during the exit phase, the strangers determine the viability of future contact.
Elaborating on this theoretical construct, Berger and Calabrese (1975) posit
several axioms related to verbal communication and the reduction of uncertainty. For the
purposes of the present study, Axiom 3 serves as a guiding theoretical construct: “High
levels of uncertainty cause increases in information seeking behavior” (p.103). Due to
the heightened uncertainty of departmental and programmatic eliminations, this axiom
applies to both inter-unit communication and intra-unit communication. Thus, as
department chairs and faculty members communicate within their departmental unit to
discuss attrition procedures, they may also seek counsel from individuals outside this
bounded entity.
While Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) study stands as a classic theoretical piece,
the authors acknowledged the need for “broader boundary conditions” (p.110). Indeed,
Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) construct assumes a relatively benign interaction among
strangers. Provided this caveat, it is imperative to include tenets of Kramer’s (1999)
motivation to reduce uncertainty model as an ancillary to Berger and Calabrese’s (1975)
Axiom 3. In his response to the originators of the theory, Kramer (1999) makes the
following observation: “Berger and Calabrese (1975) present uncertainty reduction as an
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autonomous determinant of information seeking. However, communicators have
multiple, often conflicting goals or motives that they must balance rather than
maximizing any particular one” (p.309). Elaborating on this aim, Kramer (1999) points
out the competing desires of avoiding costs while maximizing benefits. In order to
reduce uncertainty under these constraints, Kramer (1999) posits a continuum of
information-seeking behaviors, stating: “There are obtrusive (solicit/overt request) and
unobtrusive (observe/indirect) ways of gaining information that range from passive
(unsolicited) to active (overt/indirect)” (p.310). For the purposes of the present study, the
relative balance of obtrusive information-seeking to unobtrusive information-gathering
will provide a theoretically-grounded means of analyzing interview transcripts.
Summary
Though scholarship on departmental and programmatic eliminations has yet to
reach critical mass, the few academic publications addressing this topic herald a
paradigm born of complementary historical and financial phenomena. Indeed, the
untimely confluences of curricular change, economic recession, and consequent revenuegenerating institutional orientation have combined to create the conditions necessary for
academic downsizing. Forced to contend with shrinking monetary resources, many
collegiate administrators now perceive a narrowed scope of academic offerings as the
only viable financial solution. Underscoring the importance of external environmental
pressures on the internal workings of a public-sector organization, this body of literature
exemplifies the critical function of contextualization in case studies of academic attrition.
While outside forces certainly constrain an institution’s decision-making capacity,
faculty advocacy constitutes a significant impediment to the implementation of

44

departmental and/or programmatic eliminations. A highly politicized process, the
successful defense of academic hegemony is highly dependent upon the actions (or
inactions) of the department chair. Elected by his or her disciplinary colleagues, the
department chair is expected to negotiate multifarious role orientations and interpersonal
interactions. The extent to which department chairs successfully execute these role
orientations and effectively communicate with their faculty colleagues is theorized to
contribute to the reduction and mitigation of strategic, structural, and job-related
uncertainties.
Chapter 3 will explicate the methodology utilized to explore department chair and
faculty perceptions of eliminating their unit or an affiliated program. Features of this
chapter include an outline of the chosen research design, in addition to the rationale for
site selection and the parameters for participant inclusion. In accordance with qualitative
case study protocol, this chapter also describes the various modes of data collection,
encompassing numerous primary and secondary perspectives. An explication of
analytical procedures follows this breakdown, leading to discussions of credibility,
transferability, consistency, and ethics. Meditations on a related pilot study conclude this
chapter, reflecting the highly emotional context of this qualitative inquiry.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
The lived experience of implementing departmental and programmatic
eliminations is a burgeoning area of research in American higher education. Chapter 2
provided an overview of the relevant literature on this emergent topic, highlighting the
historical, financial, and social developments which have precipitated this trend. Though
solid empirical scholarship is lacking in the field of academic retrenchment, a few
seminal works do touch on the organizational (Brint et al., 2005; Eckel, 2003; Kissler,
1997) and broader intellectual implications (Slaughter, 1993) of departmental and
programmatic discontinuance. As such, while Eckel (2003) remains the gold standard in
this domain, his suggestions for future research underscore the breadth of untapped
scholarly inquiry. Heeding Eckel’s (2003) call to “explore the impact of program
discontinuance more deeply” by “focus[ing] on similar questions at an individual level”
(p.166-167), this chapter presents the qualitative research methodology necessary to
achieve this aim.
Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions
Prior to discussing the mechanics of research design, I would like to take the
opportunity to share the ontological and epistemological assumptions which undergird
this study. In this regard, a foundation of qualitative inquiry is the existence of multiple,
subjective realities as opposed to a singular, universal truth (Creswell, 2007).
Furthermore, the relationship between the researcher and participants is collaborative in
nature, privileging research “in the field” over artificial laboratory settings (Creswell,
2007, p.18). As such, this study will juxtapose authorial characterizations and individual
quotations, as a means of reinforcing my choice of thematic constructs.
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In addition to these ontological underpinnings, I wish to disclose my personal
epistemological philosophy with respect to this project. As emphasized by KoroLjungberg, Yendol-Hoppey, Smith, and Hayes (2009), “epistemological awareness is an
important and informative part of the transparent research process that needs to be
addressed and communicated to readers” (p.687). Heeding their call, I identify this study
as constructivist in nature. In this regard, I aim “to describe individuals’ perspectives,
experiences, and meaning-making processes” with respect to the departmental and/or
programmatic elimination process (Koro-Ljungberg et al., 2009, p.689). When writing
from a constructivist perspective, it is the researcher’s duty to impart a detailed account
of the practice under study; as an individual with first-hand departmental elimination
experience (as a graduate assistant in an eliminated academic department), I believe I am
in a unique position to offer keen analytical insight into this under-researched
phenomenon.
Design of the Study
Utilizing the emergent, qualitative case study design advocated by Merriam
(1998), my intent was to gain an “in-depth understanding…of a single unit or bounded
system” (p.19). In this instance, the bounded system was four academic departments
impacted by departmental or programmatic eliminations at Mountain University during
the 2011-2013 biennial budgetary cycle. In an effort to illuminate this broader construct,
I examined four instrumental iterations (Creswell, 2007) of a departmental/programmatic
elimination: two units slated for elimination but ultimately saved, and two units
eliminated outright. Within these iterations, I interviewed the department chair and
anywhere from one to three faculty members, in an effort to understand the resultant
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individual experiences characteristic of these unique outcomes. According to Yin (2009),
a multiple, embedded case study has significant advantages over the traditional, single
case format. In this regard, “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more robust” (Yin, 2009, p.53).
In addition to the aforementioned structural attributes, I also elected to delimit
or “bind” the case study design via the unit of analysis and time period under
consideration (Creswell, 2007). As such, the exclusive focus on individual department
chairs and faculty members organizationally confines this study to the department, but
with an individual level of analysis. Furthermore, the chosen time period spans the initial
awareness of a possible departmental or programmatic elimination and runs through the
implementation of the official directive to close the department or program. In general,
this timeline encompasses a 1-2 year time period, with variations by participant, and
departmental iteration. For instance, individuals in the “saved” unit had a shorter
timeline, as they did not have to comply with a directive to close their unit. However,
individuals in the “saved” unit were invited to comment on how the specter of
elimination has or has not changed their individual orientation and the orientation of the
departmental leadership.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore department chair and
faculty perceptions of implementing a departmental or programmatic elimination.
Specifically, this study addressed the extent to which strategic, structural, and job-related
uncertainties prevailed during a departmental or programmatic elimination. This study
took place at a public, research intensive institution located in the western region of the
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United States (hereafter referred to as Mountain University), and focused on the events
leading up to and including the implementation of the state’s 2011-2013 legislative
appropriation for higher education.
Research Questions
Upon review of the relevant literature, it became apparent that the departmental
and programmatic elimination process is an under-researched topic of inquiry. As such, I
aimed to address the following research questions during the course of this study:
1. How do individuals experience a departmental/programmatic elimination?
2. To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest
themselves during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations?
3. How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainties?
4. How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between
saved and eliminated units?
These research questions flow from the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction
theory, highlighting the complex interaction between faculty members and department
chairs during a departmental/programmatic elimination.
Site Selection
The rationale for selecting Mountain University for this case study was directly
attributable to the institution’s fiscal predicament as a public institution. A microcosm of
the broader national recession, the extreme financial plight of Mountain state forced the
legislature to enact drastic cuts to the 2011-2013 Mountain University biennial budget.
According to the budget proposed by the state’s governor, Mountain University needed to
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eliminate $47.5 million from its operating expenses over the next two years (Lake,
February 16, 2011). As a consequence of this 29.1% reduction in state appropriations,
the executive leadership of Mountain University decided to cut $25 million in academic
affairs as a partial means of meeting the overall $47.5 million target (Mountain
University senior administrator, personal communication, February 15, 2011).
Furthermore, due to substantial budget reductions totaling $49.6 million for the
fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010, Mountain University faced the grim reality of financial
exigency (Mountain university senior administrator, personal communication, February
15, 2011). Akin to institutional bankruptcy, financial exigency is a legal declaration that
allows fiscal decision-making to proceed without regard to contractual obligations. At a
research intensive institution such as Mountain University, where salary commitments
encumber the majority of appropriated expenditures (Woodward, Burchell, Wagner, &
Knight, 2004), financial exigency generally refers to the ability to fire or substantially
reduce the salaries of tenured faculty members (Lake, February 16, 2011). Provided this
scenario, academic departmental and programmatic eliminations became the means by
which to reduce the substantial salary obligations of faculty members, placing Mountain
University at the forefront of this new paradigm in public higher education.
Selection of Participants
Selection of participants was based upon purposive sampling. Bernard and Ryan
(2010) encourage the use of purposive sampling “in the study of special and hard-to-find
populations” (p.365). Furthermore, “purposive sampling is based on the assumption that
the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must select
a sample from which the most can be learned” (Merriam, 1998, p.61). As the intent of
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this study was to examine the perceptions of department chairs and faculty members in an
eliminated department or program, the pool of participants that meet these criteria was
necessarily limited. Through a review of publically available Mountain University
institutional documentation, I was able to determine which departments/programs met
this criteria, and formed a contact list using the Mountain University electronic directory.
Individuals with whom I had contact on a personal or professional level were excluded
from this study; however, this represented less than 5% of eligible participants. All
individuals contacted and ultimately interviewed were strangers in the following sense: I
had never met or spoken to these individuals prior to the present study.
In this regard, I selected thirteen representative individuals: the department chair
and anywhere from one to three faculty members in four distinct departmental units (two
saved units and two eliminated units). All eligible department chairs received a physical
letter of contact inviting them to participate in this study. The willingness of the
department chair to participate in this study determined which units were ultimately
selected for inclusion. Faculty in units with participating department chairs were then
contacted for inclusion in this study. Responses to the physical letters of contact and a
subsequent electronic follow-up email yielded between one and three participating
faculty members per unit. As such, random selection was not employed as there were
never more than three faculty members in any of the four units who were willing to
participate. However, variations by gender and rank (assistant, associate, and full
professors) were obtained through this recruitment.
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Data Collection Procedures
Upon receipt of institutional review board (IRB) approval, data collection and
recruitment proceeded in earnest. Interviews were conducted in a natural setting
(Mountain University faculty offices), lasted between forty-five minutes and one and a
half hours, and were of the semi-structured variety. Though the intent of this interview
process was to ask the same (or highly similar) questions of all participants, Merriam
(1998) advised a more flexible interview format. Given the probability of mid-interview
adjustments, differences in organizational outcome, (ex: eliminated or “saved”) and the
prevalence of narrative variations, it was best to allow individuals the opportunity to
“define the world in unique ways” (Merriam, 1998, p.74). Interview guides, consisting of
7-8 broad questions, structured the interviews [see Appendices A-D for complete
interview protocols]. Furthermore, interviews were recorded both on audio cassette and
in digital format, in order to account for possible equipment failures (Yow, 2005).
Extensive notes were taken in lieu of recording for individuals who did not wish to have
their interviews taped; only two individuals out of thirteen declined to have their
interviews recorded.
Additional observation of pertinent public meetings (ex: Faculty Senate meetings,
governing board meetings, etc.) complemented the aforementioned formal interviews.
Furthermore, document collection coincided with and in many instances preceded the
formal interviews. In accordance with case study protocol (Merriam, 1998), document
collection encompassed “public records, personal documents, and physical material”
(p.113). Public records included newspaper accounts, identifiable internet postings,
television programming, meeting minutes (of Faculty Senate meetings, governing board
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meetings, etc.), and institutional publications (official Mountain University e-mails,
website postings, and accounting documents). Personal documents included private
written or emailed correspondence, anonymous internet postings, and confidential
internal documentation associated with the individual and/or department. The sum of
these documents represented the unobservable “paper trail”—a key facet of case study
methodology (Merriam, 1998, p.114).
Data Analysis Procedures
According to Merriam (1998), “data collection and data analysis is a simultaneous
activity in qualitative research” (p.151). In this regard, data analysis began with the
collection of the first public document related to the study, and began in earnest when all
relevant interviews and private correspondence were collected. Constant comparison and
analytic induction comprised the bulk of the data analysis, and was applied to documents,
interview transcripts, and observations (Merriam, 1998). To assist with data
management, I used the qualitative software program ATLAS.ti to organize my codes
and construct my categories (Lewins & Silver, 2004). Moreover, the conceptual
framework of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004) and Berg’s (2007)
concept of latent and manifest messaging aided in the identification of key themes for use
in the final written analysis (Merriam, 1998). Given the emergent nature of case study
research, additional thematic selections emanated from the personalized depictions of the
study’s participants [see Appendix E for a more detailed explanation of data analysis].
Furthermore, given the selection of a multiple case study design, within-case
analysis and cross-case analysis occurred in reference to this study. As delineated by
Merriam (2009):
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For the within-case analysis, each case is first treated as a comprehensive case in
and of itself. Data are gathered so the researcher can learn as much about the
contextual variables as possible that might have a bearing on the case. Once the
analysis of each case is completed, cross-case analysis begins. A qualitative,
inductive, multicase study seeks to build abstractions across cases (p.204).
In this regard, Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral (p.151) provides a visual
representation of the analytic process used to transform qualitative evidence into a
coherent narrative account.

Figure 1. Adapted from Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral
Moving from data collection to the management, description, and final representation of a
case, Creswell’s (2007) explanatory technique depicts the procedural methodology I
employed during the phase of within-case analysis. Upon completion of this
developmental aspect, I compared the two saved cases against the two eliminated cases in
order to determine similarities and differences among the various iterations of
departmental/programmatic eliminations. Essentially, the overarching goal of this crosscase analysis was to extend the literature on the departmental/programmatic elimination
process through the comparison of two unique outcomes characteristic of academic
downsizing.
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Credibility (Internal Validity)
A variety of methodological techniques can enhance the credibility (internal
validity) of case study research. As defined by Merriam (2009), qualitative credibility
“deals with the question of how research findings match reality” (p.213). In this regard,
three components of qualitative research deal directly with this concern: researcher as
data collection instrument, triangulation, and member checking. Thus, the subsequent
narrative addressed each component on an individual basis.
In a departure from quantitative research, qualitative inquiry supports the use of a
live investigator as an interpretive medium (Merriam, 2009). As such, the internal
validity of any qualitative study is inherently dependent upon the competence of the
individual analyst. In an effort to address this legitimate concern, I wish to disclose my
academic qualifications. From 2003-2009, I searched for qualitative truth via the
discipline of history at the University of South Florida. Having received undergraduate
and graduate degrees from this four-year research institution, I enrolled at the University
of Nevada, Las Vegas to complete my doctorate in higher education leadership. As a
condition of the program, I completed two advanced research courses to fulfill my
graduation requirement: advanced qualitative research and case study methodology.
Provided my longstanding affiliation with and affinity for qualitative research, I believe I
possessed the academic qualifications necessary to undertake and successfully analyze
the proposed study.
In addition to the aptitude of the research instrument, triangulation plays an
integral part in ensuring the credibility of a qualitative study. As defined by Creswell
(2007), “in triangulation, researchers make use of multiple and different sources,
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methods, investigators, and theories to provide corroborating evidence” (p.208). While
the dissertation process is by nature an individual activity, I made use of multiple sources
(ex: newspaper accounts, individual narratives, institutional documentation, etc.),
methods (ex: interviews, observations of public meetings, document analysis), and
theories (Bordia et al., 2004, and others as data warrants) in order to achieve this aim.
Recognizing that the strength of my conclusions is dependent upon the preponderance of
presented evidence, I provided confirmatory declarations from a variety of stakeholder
perspectives.
Having discussed research instrumentation and triangulation, I will now discuss
member checking as the final component of qualitative credibility. As defined by
Merriam (2009), member checking allows you to “solicit feedback on your emerging
findings from some of the people that you interviewed” (p.217). Predicated on the
principle of multiple lived experiences (Merriam, 2009), member checking ensures that
research findings are consonant with the narrator’s reality. Moreover, member checking
provides a clear avenue for clarification, as it is unlikely that all imparted terminology
and conceptual constructs will be interpreted by the researcher and narrator in the same
fashion. All individual participants were provided the opportunity to review their
interview transcript or interview notes in order to clarify their positions on emergent
research findings.
Transferability (External Validity)
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative studies do not claim applicability
to other situations. Indeed, the hallmark of a qualitative case study is its in-depth
description of a unique and bounded occurrence. Given this paradigmatic distinction,
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qualitative methodologists reject the notion of external validity in favor of transferability
(Merriam, 2009). In employing this qualitative construct, “the burden of proof lies less
with the original investigator than with the person seeking to make an application
elsewhere” (Merriam, 2009, p.224). As such, it was my obligation as the investigator to
provide a narrative account sufficient to achieve this aim. Thus, I presented detailed
descriptions of individual experiences with the departmental and/or programmatic
elimination process, providing the audience with the information necessary to determine
transference. As a goal of this study is to provide guidance to other individuals dealing
with departmental/programmatic eliminations, I adhered to the highest standards of
narrative description.
Consistency (Reliability)
In the same manner as external validity, reliability is not a stated aim of
qualitative inquiry. As highlighted by Merriam (2009): “Reliability is problematic in the
social sciences simply because human behavior is never static” (p.220). Thus, when
dealing with personal experiences, the crucial question is “whether the results are
consistent with the data collected” (Merriam, 2009, p.221). In this regard, I employed an
extensive audit trail by “describing in detail how data were collected, how categories
were derived, and how decisions were made throughout the inquiry” (Merriam, 1998,
p.207). In an expansion of this construct, Yin (2009) advocates the creation of “a formal,
presentable database, so that in principle, other investigators can review the evidence
directly and not be limited to the written case study reports” (p.119). In addition, I
included ample appendices as a means of enhancing the transparency of my actions.
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Ethical Considerations
Due to the emotional sensitivity and political implications inherent in
departmental and programmatic eliminations, participant anonymity was of paramount
concern. Considerable care was taken to safeguard the name of the department/program,
as well as those narrators who agree to participate in the study. As such, pseudonyms and
broad administrative terminology permeates my research findings. In this manner, all
participants (except for the pilot study) were assigned a nondescript pseudonym and
referred to using male pronouns in order to guard against gendered identification. I use
the term “department chair” throughout this study in reference to department chairs,
directors, and program chairs (Merriam, 1998). Faculty rank and other identifiable
demographic data were omitted from the findings in order to further ensure participant
anonymity. In order to guard against bias, I also took care to “switch back and forth
between the emic and the etic perspectives”--thinking critically and challenging findings
(Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p.110). Finally, as a means of reciprocity (Creswell, 2007),
participants received a copy of their interview transcript or interview notes, a copy of
their signed informed consent, an electronic audio file of their interview (where
applicable), a copy of the final dissertation, and a hand-written thank-you note. As
additional ethical issues arose throughout the course of this study, I discussed them with
my dissertation chair in order to arrive at an appropriate solution.
Pilot Study
As a means of testing the viability of the proposed project, I conducted a pilot
study of my eliminated department chair interview protocol on April 7, 2011. According
to Yin (2009), a pilot study is a formative exercise which assists the researcher in
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developing “relevant lines of questions—possibly even providing some conceptual
clarification for the research design as well” (p.92). In an effort to obtain this type of
methodological guidance, I contacted Department Chair X, the leader of a Mountain
University unit eliminated during the 2009-2011 budgetary biennium. As a means of
reinforcing the rationale for my proposed study, I detail the methodology, analysis, and
findings of the April 7, 2011 pilot study below.
Methodology of the Pilot Study
The foundation of this pilot study was a one-hour, semi-structured interview.
According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), semi-structured interviews are flexible entities,
designed to allow individuals to “speak out, in their own terms” (p.29). Though an
interview protocol guided this process, broad questioning provided the narrator with
ample opportunity to comfortably converse about this painful chapter in her academic
career. Examples of such overarching lines of inquiry included: “How is a departmental
elimination carried out?” and “What have you learned from this departmental elimination
process?” Gentle probes, mostly of the “tell-me-more” variety (Bernard & Ryan, 2010,
p.32), guided the conversation. Following the interview, I transcribed the conversation
verbatim, with the resultant text forming the basis for my data analysis.
According to Creswell (2007), the use of a natural setting is a key characteristic of
qualitative research, and a major component of studying an individual in context. In
keeping with this tradition, I conducted this interview in the department chair’s faculty
office. In order to account for possible equipment failures (Yow, 2005), I recorded this
session on a traditional cassette recorder as well as digitally via a Livescribe smart pen.
Utilizing Merriam’s (1998) advice for conducting effective interviews, I began with
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“relatively neutral, descriptive information” (p.82). As this first-order narrative
(Creswell, 2007) progressed, responses became increasingly personalized, and flowed
more freely than in the beginning of the conversation. Indeed, as the interview wore on,
the department chair’s narrative came to resemble a stream of consciousness, thus
obviating my need for continuous probes.
In the interest of full disclosure, I would like to acknowledge my professional
relationship with the department chair—she was previously known to me on a
professional level. Given this interaction, my rapport with the narrator was more relaxed
and collegial than it would have been had I discussed this situation with a complete
stranger. As underscored by Merriam (1998): “The interviewer-respondent interaction is
a complex phenomenon. Both parties bring biases, predispositions, attitudes, and physical
characteristics that color the interaction and the data elicited. A skilled interviewer
accounts for these factors in order to evaluate the data being obtained” (p.87).
Taking Merriam’s (1998) advice into account, I conducted this interview from the
perspective of a future higher education professional, seeking to understand the context
of a departmental elimination. A complex and convoluted process, the department chair
guided me through the cost-cutting drivers which precipitated the elimination, the
administrative reports which singled out the department as a high-cost program, and the
eventual realization that the department she had nurtured for twenty years would cease to
exist. Moving to the next phase of the interview, implementation of the elimination, it
was evident that her ability to maintain multiple leadership roles allowed her to combat
the strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties which characterized this process
(Bordia et al., 2004). Furthermore, the loss of this department was not without
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unintended consequences (Eckel, 2003), including loss of quality researchers, declines in
productivity, and an inevitable leadership drain due to the department’s inability to
provide continued training for students in this department.
Data Analysis
Using the conceptual framework of uncertainty reduction theory advanced by
Bordia et al. (2004) in conjunction with literature on department chair roles (Berdrow,
2010), I engaged in the process of analytic induction (Merriam, 1998). In this manner, I
followed the guidance of Creswell’s (2007) data analysis spiral, reading and re-reading
the transcript until I gained an acute awareness of the interview content. Reflecting on
the connections between the narrated account and the related scholarship (Berdrow, 2010;
Bordia et al., 2004), I began the process of open coding in ATLAS.ti, where I matched
the interview data with the major tenets of the research literature (Creswell, 2007). This
initial iteration yielded four codes: strategic uncertainty, structural uncertainty, jobrelated uncertainty, and department chair roles. In the subsequent axial coding phase, I
broke department chair roles into several discrete entities, encompassing the various
responsibilities associated with a departmental elimination. Upon completion of this
phase, I used the network view in ATLAS.ti to engage in selective coding, assembling
the various constructs into an interrelated explanatory model (Creswell, 2007). During
this process, I added new codes to strengthen the connections among the existing codes,
resulting in a visual representation of the department chair’s account of her unit’s
elimination.
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Findings and Conclusion of the Pilot Study
Reflecting upon the departmental elimination process—a practice steeped in
uncertainty—I asked myself the following question: “What is the root cause of this
unfortunate state of affairs?” After reading and re-reading the interview text, and staring
at the mish mash of codes in my ATLAS.ti network view, I arrived at the following
conclusion: a sense of urgency prompts the uncertainty, which in turn prompts the
department chair to concentrate on a specific set of roles unique to her position. Having
settled on this interpretation, I then asked myself the following question: “What would
diminish the sense of urgency precipitating this chain of events?” Looking to the
literature, I found guidance in Eckel’s (2003) seminal work on academic attrition. In his
case study of program discontinuance at four Carnegie classified research institutions,
Eckel (2003) expounded on the centrality of campus-wide planning to a sound and
rational decision-making process. Provided Eckel’s (2003) commentary, and the findings
elicited from Department Chair X, it is apparent that sound and rational decision-making
includes planning for the process of departmental and programmatic eliminations, in
addition to establishing a long-range vision for the reductions themselves.
Indeed, while Mountain University survived both the 2009-2011 and 2011-2013
biennium, the long-term consequences of this budgetary biopsy remain shrouded in
uncertainty. In her interview for this pilot study, Department Chair X warned of lost
research productivity, diminished morale, and a leadership drain as long-term
consequences of departmental eliminations. For Mountain University to remain
competitive as a research institution, and continue to attract top-notch faculty and
students, a long-term outlook must become part of the institutional culture. In order to
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diminish the sense of urgency prompting institutional decision-making, Mountain
University must codify and delineate a concrete set of criteria by which to make
institutional downsizing recommendations. Clearly, academic attrition is about more
than cost-savings on an institutional balance sheet. It is imperative that Mountain
University fulfill its obligations to the department chairs and faculty members who must
implement elimination directives, by providing them with the guidance necessary to
achieve these ends.
Now that I have illustrated the functional importance of the pilot data, I will
graphically display my plan for conducting the proposed qualitative study. The table
below explicates each of my research questions, the data sources I will use to answer
each question, and the techniques I will employ to analyze these data sources. The
results of this process shall be outlined in the following chapter, providing the reader with
a complete narrative description of the study’s findings. The addition of data sources and
analytical techniques may be required, as dependent upon the information elicited from
respondent interviews.
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Table 1
Data Analysis Plan
Research Question

How do individuals experience
a potential
departmental/programmatic
elimination?

To what extent do strategic,
structural, and job-related
uncertainties manifest
themselves during potential
departmental/programmatic
eliminations?

How does the department chair
affect faculty perceptions of
strategic, structural, and jobrelated uncertainties?

How does strategic, structural,
and job-related uncertainty
differ between saved and
eliminated units?

Data Source(s)

Proposed Analysis
Technique

-Interviews with
department chairs and
faculty members
-Observation of Faculty
Senate meetings
-Observation of governing
board meetings
-Public/private documents
-Public meeting minutes

Use of theoretical framework
(Bordia et al., 2004) via
analytic induction
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept
of latent/manifest messaging
via analytic induction
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in
construction of codes/categories
-Use of constant
comparison/analytic induction

-Interviews with
department chairs and
faculty members
-Observation of Faculty
Senate meetings
-Observation of governing
board meetings
-Public/private documents
-Public meeting minutes

-Use of theoretical framework
(Bordia et al., 2004) via
analytic induction
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept
of latent/manifest messaging
via analytic induction
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in
construction of codes/categories
-Use of constant
comparison/analytic induction

-Interviews with
department chairs and
faculty members
-Observation of Faculty
Senate meetings
-Observation of governing
board meetings
-Public/private documents
-Public meeting minutes

-Interviews with
department chairs and
faculty members
-Public/private documents
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-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept
of latent/manifest messaging
via analytic induction
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in
construction of codes/categories
-Use of constant
comparison/analytic induction

Use of theoretical framework
(Bordia et al., 2004) via
analytic induction
-Use of Berg’s (2007) concept
of latent/manifest messaging
via analytic induction
-Use of ATLAS.ti to aid in
construction of codes/categories
-Use of constant
comparison/analytic induction

Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology that will be used
to conduct this study. Topics encompassed a wide-range of methodological
considerations, including: epistemological and ontological assumptions, research design,
site selection, selection of participants, data collection procedures, data analysis process,
and discussions of credibility, transferability, consistency, and ethics. In an effort to
bolster my choice of qualitative methodology, this chapter also included a detailed
description of a related pilot study. In this regard, the findings of the pilot study support
my selections of uncertainty reduction theory (Bordia et al., 2004), case study design
(Merriam, 1998), and individual unit of analysis (Eckel, 2003) in this broader research
proposal. Aided by the analytical capacity of ATLAS.ti, I aim to expand the literature
base on departmental and programmatic eliminations by offering a rich, thick description
of lived experience (Merriam, 2009). Chapter 4 shall explicate the results of this
qualitative undertaking, with reference to each individual case and cross-case constructs.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Though periodicals and trade publications decry the burgeoning trend towards
academic downsizing, (Carlson, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2006; Lake, 2011) scholarly research
on departmental and programmatic eliminations is still in its infancy (Brint et al., 2005;
Eckel, 2003; Rosser, 2012; Slaughter, 1993). While no college or university is immune
from revenue declines, budget crises, and attendant discussions of institutional
retrenchment, public universities are particularly vulnerable to the political and economic
whims of their situated state (Hovey, 1999; McLendon et al., 2009; Tandberg, 2010).
Unlike other state functions such as K-12 education, Medicaid, transportation
maintenance, and corrections, higher education services are non-compulsory and have a
failsafe method of external finance in the form of student tuition. Legally committed to
providing these other essential services, state legislatures have placed public postsecondary institutions in the precarious position of choosing between substantial tuition
increases and scaling back their educational offerings. Recognizing the link between
declines in student enrollment and significant tuition hikes, higher education
administrators frequently blend the two approaches as a means of minimizing the impact
of state revenue reductions.
State Context
Reeling from the most recent national recession, Mountain State epitomized the
aforementioned trends in public finance. While the size of Mountain State’s population
precludes the exponential increases in correctional spending seen in other areas of the
country, the table below indicates that the percentage of the state budget devoted to
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Health and Human Services, K-12 education, and transportation increased from fiscal
year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, while the state’s commitment to higher education
decreased during this same time period (Mountain State Open Government Initiative,
2012). Plagued by double-digit unemployment, Mountain State’s Health and Human
Services department struggled to absorb the surge in welfare and Medicaid applicants,
forcing the state to devote additional portions of the budget to cover these services.
Though year-over-year population increases began to decline after 2008, Mountain State
had added nearly 800,000 new residents in the preceding decade (Governor, 2011). In
turn, the influx of these new families necessitated improvements to the existing
transportation infrastructure, as well as the construction of significant numbers of schools
at the elementary, middle, and high school levels. However, in keeping with Mountain
State tradition, these objectives were to be accomplished via existing taxes on sales and
discretionary services, and not thorough additional levies on personal or business income
(Governor, 2011).
Table 2
Mountain State Expenditures on Top Five State Functions as a Percentage of Total
Statewide Spending, FY 2008-2012
FY 2008
HHS: 27.06%
K12: 18.33%
TRA: 9.36%
HE: 9.17%
PEB: 5.54%

FY 2009
HHS: 27.01%
K12: 19.70%
TRA: 8.80%
HE: 8.73%
TRE: 6.15%

FY 2010
HHS: 28.52%
K12: 18.46%
TRA: 8.63%
HE:
8.30%
TRE: 6.90%

FY 2011
HHS: 29.31%
K12: 18.80%
TRA: 9.16%
HE:
8.21%
TRE: 7.33%

FY 2012
HHS: 32.14%
K12: 22.43%
TRA: 10.80%
HE: 6.10%
PEB: 5.97%

Note. HHS=Health & Human Services, K12=K-12 education, TRA=Transportation,
HE=Higher Education, PEB=Public Employee Benefits, TRE=Treasurer’s Office
Adapted from the Mountain State Open Government Initiative, Statewide Expenditure
Summary by Department, FY 2008-FY2012.
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Institutional Context
Delivered to the state legislature on January 20, 2011, the Governor’s executive
budget for the 2011-2013 biennium pledged no new taxes and significant cuts to state
spending. Reflecting on this decision, the Governor declared: “[Mountain State] families
and businesses have made do with less through three long years of economic downturn,
and it is my belief that state government must continue to do the same” (Governor, 2011).
Taking a closer look at the analytical profile of Mountain University, it is clear that the
national recession and shifting priorities of Mountain State had taken a significant toll on
the composition of this institution. A research intensive university located in the western
region of the United States, Mountain University is a relatively young, (less than 100
years old) urban commuter institution with an enrollment of approximately 27,000
students. Roughly 80% of the student body is undergraduate, with the remaining 20%
enrolled in graduate coursework. As of Fall 2011, Mountain University employed nearly
800 full-time instructional faculty members, defined as individuals at the professor,
associate professor, assistant professor, and lecturer/instructor levels (Mountain
University Institutional Analysis and Planning, 2011).
While the aforementioned figures represent an accurate snapshot of the institution
at present, a historical comparison of state funding allocations, faculty composition, and
student enrollment provides an enhanced characterization of Mountain University. As
the tables below indicate, Mountain University had undergone significant changes in the
years immediately following the 2007 recession and leading up to the 2011-2013
budgetary biennium. Like other institutions in the Mountain State System of Higher
Education, Mountain University had seen its share of state general fund support diminish
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over the past five fiscal years (ex: fiscal year 2008 occurred from July 1, 2007 through
June 30, 2008). As a means of offsetting these reductions in state support, Mountain
University proposed tuition and fee increases, as well as departmental/programmatic
eliminations (Mountain State System of Higher Education Approved State Budgets, FY
2008-FY 2012).
Table 3
Percentage of Mountain University Operating Budget Derived from State General Fund
Fiscal Year

Percentage

2008

64.16%

2009

58.80%

2010

36.53%*

2011

60.98%

2012

57.72%

Note. The FY2010 budget included the infusion of one-time federal stimulus funds
Adapted from the Mountain State System of Higher Education Approved State Budgets,
FY 2008-FY2012.
Recognizing that no budgetary action occurs in a vacuum, it is important to note
changes to the faculty and student profile of Mountain University during this same time
period. Though the most marked difference from Fall 2007-Fall 2011 is the significant
reduction in full-time faculty members as compared to the relatively constant number of
enrolled students, a closer examination of the institutional data yields additional
conclusions. From Fall 2007-Fall 2011, the percentage of faculty at the professor and
associate professor ranks increased, while those at the assistant professor level decreased
(Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning, 2012). As those individuals at
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the rank of assistant professor are generally untenured, this statistic is indicative of
Mountain University’s priority of preserving the positions of tenured faculty members in
the wake of departmental/programmatic eliminations. However, given the significant
reduction in overall faculty numbers relative to student headcount, it is clear that the
workload of these remaining full-time faculty members would have to increase in order
to make up for the loss of institutional colleagues.
Table 4
Full-Time Instructional Faculty by Rank, Fall 2007-Fall 2011
Rank

Fall 2007

Fall 2008

Fall 2009

Fall 2010

Fall 2011

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Professor

246

25.7

249

27.6

265

29.7

272

32.4

257

32.9

Associate

317

33.1

309

34.3

303

34.0

301

35.8

275

35.3

Assistant

300

31.4

263

29.2

241

27.0

191

22.7

171

21.9

Lecturer

94

9.8

81

9.0

83

9.3

76

9.0

77

9.9

Total

957

100

902

100

892

100

840

100

780

100

Note. Figures include tenured and non-tenured full-time faculty members. Adapted from
Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning.
In tandem with the shift in faculty composition, the student profile of Mountain
University had also changed as a result of state budget reductions. Though student
headcount had steadily increased throughout the preceding decade due to the population
surge in Mountain State, this trend reversed in Fall 2010 with the implementation of the
2009-2011 biennial budget. In addition to significant tuition increases, the 2009-2011
budget reductions resulted in the elimination of entire departments as well as
undergraduate and graduate degree programs. While undergraduate enrollment continued
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to climb, graduate enrollment had dropped precipitously by Fall 2011, perhaps due in part
to the greater economies of scale achieved in larger undergraduate courses.
Table 5
Total Student Headcount by Level, Fall 2007-Fall 2011
Level

Fall 2007

Fall 2008

Fall 2009

Fall 2010

Fall 2011

Undergraduate

21,962

22,149

22,708

22,538

22,138

Graduate

5,250

5,656

5,556

4,880

4,446

Professional

796

812

822

804

794

Total

27,988

28,605

29,069

28,203

27,364

Note. Adapted from Mountain University Institutional Analysis and Planning.
In the midst of these profound changes in institutional composition, I began to
wonder how individual faculty members dealt with potential strategic, structural, and jobrelated uncertainties. Furthermore, I wanted to follow through on the findings of my pilot
study with Department Chair X, in order to ascertain the effects of the department chair
in mitigating the uncertainty of faculty colleagues. Finally, I wanted to compare and
contrast these uncertainties as they pertained to “saved” and eliminated units. In a
conscious effort to humanize a process often characterized by financial projections,
balance ledgers, and other numeric depictions, I interviewed a total of thirteen faculty
members (four “department chairs” and nine tenured faculty members) as to their
experiences with departmental closure and programmatic elimination during the 20112013 budgetary biennium at Mountain University. These thirteen individuals represented
four discrete units: Units 1 and 2 dealt with the potential elimination of their units but
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were ultimately spared this fate, while Units 3 and 4 dealt with the actual elimination of
their units.
In the pages that follow, I will separately discuss each unit by providing a short
vignette of the “department chair” and affiliated faculty members, thereby answering my
initial research question: How do individuals experience a potential
departmental/programmatic elimination? Once I have accomplished this objective, I will
move to my second research question: To what extent do strategic, structural, and jobrelated uncertainties manifest themselves during potential departmental/programmatic
eliminations? Then, I will conclude each unitary overview with a discussion of research
question three: How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainties? Once I have accomplished these objectives, I
will compare and contrast the saved units (Units 1 and 2) and eliminated units (Units 3
and 4) in order to answer research question four: How does strategic, structural, and jobrelated uncertainty differ between saved and eliminated units? A summary of findings
concludes this chapter.
Unit 1
In this section, I present four vignettes, each outlining the participant’s personal
experiences with the 2011-2013 budget reduction process at Mountain University.
Though their unit was ultimately saved from elimination, this fate was far from certain
during the institution’s attempts to balance a decrease in state funding against outstanding
budgetary obligations [see Appendix F for a timeline of 2011-2013 biennial budget
process]. Interviewed approximately one year after this process unfolded, these faculty
members were asked to reflect on this tumultuous time in their professional careers.
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Dr. Smith: Chair of Unit 1
Cognizant of the legislative and gubernatorial rankling over the budget, Dr. Smith
braced himself for the very real possibility of having to defend the existence of his unit.
With fewer majors than many other units in the College, Dr. Smith recognized that
“we’re potential targets” during any budget reduction discussion. Though he had
anticipated this outcome as early as mid-February 2011 (consistent with the Provost’s
initial email directing Deans to make vertical cuts), confirmation of these suspicions
occurred shortly thereafter. Reflecting on these communiqués, Dr. Smith stated: “I heard
the first week of March…from a colleague who was at some kind of council where they
[Mountain University administrators] were talking that we were on the [cut] list there.
And so I heard from somebody else. And the Dean himself told me on March 8” (official
release date of first budget reduction proposal).
Determined to avoid the elimination of his unit, Dr. Smith conjured his
competitive spirit, describing himself as “just sort of consumed with it, as you would
expect.” Reinforcing this assertion, Dr. Smith recounted the following:
I would ask my [significant other], “Weren’t you in a line with Caroline Kennedy
one time, you know, where you guys were waiting…at the New York state fair,
and you were all excited to meet her? Do you think she’d remember you?” Like
every night, I would lie awake and think like “Who do I know who is influential?”
In addition to his sleepless nights, Dr. Smith’s experienced long, stressful days in his
Mountain University office. Concerned about the future of the unit, students turned to
Dr. Smith for academic advice. In describing these interactions, he stated:
I mean, I had students coming in every day saying “Should I change my major?”
Right? “I heard this was going to be cut, so what are we going to do?” And, I
mean, I told the students “this is not going to happen.” …And they’re like
“Why?” And I was like “I am not going to let this happen.”
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From March 8 through September 9, 2011, Dr. Smith endured four distinct
Mountain University budget reduction proposals, monitored the results of two crucial
governing body meetings [see Appendix F], and ultimately won the fight to save his unit.
Contemplating this triumph, Dr. Smith made this metaphoric comparison: “When it was
all over, it was kind of like people often describe a car accident. Like, you know, when
you’re in it…your adrenaline…and then after…[expression indicative of exhaustion].”
Though he suffered from ennui in the immediate aftermath, Dr. Smith began to reflect on
this experience, and his feelings toward Mountain University, during the intervening
year. In a telling exchange, Dr. Smith revealed his stance on the subject of institutional
loyalty:
I do think there is a kind of scarring that like, that’s not completely business as
usual. Kind of like…for instance, I have a lot of um…shirts, various kinds of
shirts, that have [Mountain University] logos. I won’t wear them. You know?
I just like…you can’t give that kind of connection to that university, and sort of
pride in it…like, “No. This is the university that said we’ll cut you if we have to.”
Like, yeah, I don’t want to wear them [the shirts]. You know, I don’t want to
wear anything with [Mountain University] on it, right? (Dr. Smith, personal
communication, February 16, 2012)
Dr. Xavier
Accustomed to the institutional culture at Mountain University, Dr. Xavier calmly
reacted to the news of potential elimination: “There wasn’t anything I could do about it,
so why should I get upset?” Employed as a “factory worker” at Mountain University for a
considerable length of time, Dr. Xavier was a seasoned veteran of the institution’s
“business model” of academic governance. While traditional university tenets espouse
shared governance between faculty and administrators, Dr. Xavier described his role in
the budget reduction process in the following manner:
I had no say, nothing. See, that’s the business model. The business model is
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people on the seventh floor administration building run the university. The rest of
us are employees.
Beyond the business model, Dr. Xavier had other reasons for maintaining
emotional equilibrium. Familiar with the lengthy legislative and bureaucratic processes
involved in implementing institutional layoffs, Dr. Xavier embraced the fluidity of the
situation, stating:
…the legislature still had six months before it would recess, and then any decision
made would be another year before it’d be implemented, so there are like 18
months between the time we found out we were slated for elimination and the
time anything would actually be done. In 18 months a lot can happen, so that’s
another reason why I wasn’t too upset about it.
In the interim, Dr. Xavier contacted the unit’s professional association, provided pertinent
information to an influential academic blog, and worked to convince internal and external
colleagues that the fate of the unit was far from sealed. Expanding on this last action, Dr.
Xavier recounted the tone of his electronic exchanges:
Whenever somebody wrote to me and said, “Oh, gee, I’m so sad to see them
eliminate the [unit],” I’d write back and say, “It hasn’t been decided yet.
Please write a letter to our president, our dean and the [governing body].”
Determined not to be bothered by something “so far down the road,” Dr. Xavier
took solace in the tenets of his discipline. Engrossed in his spring [2011] semester
teaching duties, Dr. Xavier began to re-read a foundational text he had assigned to his
students. Written almost two centuries prior, this scholarly monograph instantiated a
continuous cultural commentary as it related to his academic specialization. Reflecting on
this pivotal moment, Dr. Xavier believed “it really helped me to read this book.”
Pondering this change in perspective, Dr. Xavier summarized his feelings on the potential
elimination of his unit:
I wasn’t even disappointed. There was a time when I first got here I used to be
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disappointed about all these things. People didn’t consult me, decisions were
made and just handed down…Now I’m not even disappointed ‘cause I know
that’s the culture, that’s the American university culture, American state
university culture or American state regional university culture (Dr. Xavier,
personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Dr. Parks
Otherwise occupied at an academic conference, Dr. Parks received an email from
Dr. Smith confirming the news. The President had just released his initial budget
reduction proposal, and Unit 1 was on the list. Though Dr. Parks had heard rumors to
this effect nearly a month prior, the timing of the official release placed him in an
awkward spotlight. As word of the proposed elimination circulated throughout the
blogosphere, Dr. Parks took center stage at the scholarly convention. Commenting on his
newfound notoriety, he recalled:
So how did I feel about it? Well in very short order at the [convention],
everybody at the conference was, “Oh my God, what’s happening at [Mountain
University]? Is this true?” At the conference there was a resolution at the
conference—this is within a couple days of the proposal—a resolution amongst
the membership of the society to denounce it or to deplore it. And, you know, in
very short order I was one of the two [people] at the conference from [Mountain
University], “Oh those guys.” And everybody—but people really wanted to know
what was going on…
Returning from his travels, Dr. Parks played an active role in the defense of his
unit. In addition to blogging, Dr. Parks contacted related disciplinary associations and
high-ranking Unit 1 alumni, many of whom happened to hold senior-level administrative
positions at other institutions. Moreover, Dr. Parks also collected data on comparable
units across the country, and co-authored a response to the Dean with respect to the
proposed elimination of Unit 1. Asked to summarize this rebuttal, Dr. Parks replied:
…First of all that the metrics being used were inappropriate for our [unit] that has
a much larger service obligation. It teaches a lot of—a much greater proportion
of its classes to students outside of the [college]…you’re not taking cognizance of
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what we do, especially what we do with respect to other colleges. And we’re not
a small [unit] by comparison to other universities.
When I inquired as to the Dean’s reply, Dr. Parks remained silent; there was no response
to his missive.
Forging ahead in the midst of his unit’s uncertain future, Dr. Parks conceded a
noticeable change in his job performance. Articulating his split focus during the spring
2011 semester, Dr. Parks stated:
It was certainly a semester in which I was distracted. It did take away a bit from
my teaching. It also slowed down some of my writing as I was both, you know,
preparing defenses against the impending cuts and also obsessing over them a
little bit. So it did slow down both teaching and research.
Furthermore, though the unit was ultimately spared from elimination, Dr. Parks
experienced an attitudinal shift toward Mountain University. Echoing the sentiments of
Dr. Smith, Dr. Parks articulated his position during the following exchange:
Dr. Parks: I know that I do have less institutional loyalty.
Interviewer: How does that manifest itself? You know, how were you loyal
before and now you’re not?
Dr. Parks: Just by the way I represent the institution. First and foremost to my
colleagues in the discipline.
Interviewer: How did you used to represent it and how is it now?
Dr. Parks: You know, it was great to me. It was a great place to be. The
institution is very supportive of my research. It funds my travel, blah, blah, blah.
Now I’m a lot less of a booster. (Dr. Parks, personal communication, March 19,
2012).
Dr. Bradley
As the sole breadwinner for his family, Dr. Bradley experienced “a lot of worry”
during the proposed elimination. Though tenure had been recommended by the unit and
the dean, it had yet to be approved by the system-wide governing body. Describing this
all-important vote as “right in the middle” of the institutional tumult, Dr. Bradley
recounted his observation of the assemblage:
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At the [governing body] meeting during this time, one of the [board members]
said, “Wait, maybe we should just table these tenure decisions until we have this
budget thing sorted out.” And then some of the other [board members] said, “No,
forget it. We can’t keep these people on the line like that.” So that was—that
kinda got, basically, voted down or however you wanna put it. And they voted
then to grant all the people who the various institutions had recommended to them
for tenure—they granted them all tenure. So then I got tenure, not without a little
extra anxiety though.
Though he was now a tenured faculty member, Dr. Bradley recalled his preoccupation
during spring 2011:
So I would say yes, definitely that semester I didn’t really get anything done
besides worrying about this problem and trying to coordinate this or that. Getting
people to write letters and stuff like that. Trying to come up with arguments
about how the data didn’t support the idea that our [unit] was the best choice to be
eliminated and all this kind of thing.
While his research agenda was on “the back burner,” Dr. Bradley found that his
teaching commitments provided him with an emotional outlet. Indeed, focusing on class
preparation and paper grading allowed Dr. Bradley to uncover a valuable learning
opportunity for the students majoring in this particular area of scholarship. Dr. Bradley
described his unique assignment in the following manner:
To think about, as part of an academic exercise, to think about the nature and
value of the discipline that they are studying. So in that sense it provided
something of an educational opportunity. I think, you know, if you’re studying
a certain discipline the society’s showing that it doesn’t value it. Well, what is the
value of it and I asked them to think about that and discuss that.
Although this positive, classroom moment provided momentary catharsis, Dr. Bradley
provided candid advice to students wishing to pursue graduate-level education:
I guess it’s not a change in kind; it’s more of a change in degree. Like are you
sure that you’re willing to put up with this [the potential elimination of your unit]
‘cause this kinda stuff’s gonna happen in the future in other places too.
In a further illustration of this tumultuous time, Dr. Bradley expressed his dismay
over disparaging remarks in the local press:
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So obviously there’s supportive comments in the newspaper articles but I read a
lot of these articles and I read a lot of the comments. And it’s kinda, you know,
disheartening to be made out to feel like you’re some kind of parasite on the
system. I don’t—I didn’t feel like I was a parasite on the system but that was one
of the effects of floating these possibilities out there that ended up getting
retracted. I felt like why do I wanna be—why do I wanna live in the place where
a large amount of people feel like I’m stealing their money? That I’m like an
academic welfare recipient of some kind. Why would I want—I don’t feel that
that’s what I am, but that’s—if that’s how people feel about me in the community
it doesn’t really make me wanna be a part of the community (Dr. Bradley,
personal communication, March 22, 2012).
Strategic Uncertainty
As outlined in the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the initial phase of
individual uncertainty relates to organizational rationale. Simply stated, why has the
organization decided to head in this particular direction? Guided by the theoretical
components noted below, I aim to answer this very question.
Reasons for Organizational Change
As explicated at the beginning of this chapter, Mountain University faced a
significant financial shortfall as a result of the Governor’s proposed 2011-2013 biennial
budget for higher education (Governor, 2011). Recognizing the gravity of this reduction
in state support, both the President and the Provost issued emails to the campus
community detailing the seriousness of the situation. In a memorandum to the Deans, the
Provost summarized Mountain University’s dire fiscal predicament:
As you are aware, the budget proposal for higher education funding currently
before the state legislature reduces the [Mountain State] System of Higher
Education budget an additional 29.1 percent in the next biennium (2011-2013).
The [Mountain University] portion of this reduction is $47.5 million of our
current state appropriation. This proposed cut comes on top of the $49.6 million
that [Mountain University] has already reduced in the past three fiscal years. In
short, should this proposal be adopted by the state legislature [Mountain
University] will see a total reduction in its state support of almost $100 million
over the five years leading up to June 30, 2013. Past cuts have generally spared
Academic Affairs. Although academics make up approximately 75 percent of the
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budget, we have taken only about 25 percent of the cuts. Unfortunately, we no
longer have that option available to us; Academic Affairs will be required to
absorb more of the cuts in the next biennium (Provost, February 15, 2011).
In a further contextualization of these figures, the President provided his take on this
scenario, stating: “In my opinion, such a budget cut delivered by July 1, 2012, cannot be
administered without a declaration of financial exigency” (President, February 15, 2012).
Though the Mountain State System of Higher Education governing body ultimately
refused to make this declaration, the mere possibility of financial exigency, coupled with
the directives outlined by the President and Provost, colored Unit 1’s perceptions of
organizational change.
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization
In addition to outlining the rationale for Mountain University’s budget crisis, the
President and Provost provided financial targets and processual guidelines to the Deans in
their mid-February emails. As such, the Provost explicated the following budget
reduction philosophy:
Under this process each dean will be given a budget reduction target and asked to
make recommendations regarding how this target will be met in each school and
college. These recommendations are due no later than Friday, February 25. You
should work closely with your executive committees to develop these
recommendations. In making these proposals it is important to bear in mind that
the central teaching and research mission of [Mountain University] should be
protected as best as possible. To that extent, horizontal cuts should generally be
avoided as they do nothing other than ensure the mediocrity of all programs. Now
is the time that we must consider additional vertical cuts and the elimination of
academic programs and departments that are not core to our mission (Provost,
February 15, 2011).
Echoing the Provost’s sentiments, the President made the following declaration:
An administrative team will review the proposals and determine if there are
additional efficiencies we can gain through major organizational changes that
would reduce the cut impact on our teaching and research mission. The cuts will
not be equally applied to all units, and the possibility of elimination or
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condensation of colleges and schools will be considered along with departmental
eliminations and reorganizations. Our highest consideration will be preserving
our students’ education, the core strengths of our institution, and gaining every
measure of efficiency we can find (President, February 15, 2011). [See Appendix
F for the entirety of the institutional mission statement referenced by the Provost
and President]
Though the organizational planning process advocated by the President and
Provost referenced updated terminology, the strategy of institutional downsizing has
remained rather consistent. Largely a choice between across-the-board (i.e. “horizontal”)
or targeted (i.e. “vertical”) cutbacks, university administrators must decide which strategy
or combination of strategies will guide the future direction of the institution. In
describing the longstanding institutional preference for across-the-board reductions,
Eckel (2003) provides the following explanation:
This approach causes less stress than strategic, targeted cuts because it does not
require evaluative decisions among units difficult to compare or anyone to make
unpopular decisions; those responsible for managing the change are more
experienced with the processes to make across-the-board cuts, and, finally, the
shared nature of university decision-making makes targeted cuts difficult (p.5-6).
While Mountain University had charted this course during previous budgetary crises, the
executive administration believed that continued reliance on horizontal cuts would
weaken the institution as a whole. As prefaced by administrative leadership, Mountain
University would become “a smaller more focused institution” (President, March 30,
2011).
Heeding the charge of his superiors, the Dean of Unit 1 began to make the
evaluative decisions necessary to meet the Provost’s February 25, 2011 timeframe. With
only ten calendar days separating the directive from the deadline, the Dean had little time
to prepare his response. To this end, the Dean and his staff assembled a report which
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ranked each unit in the College; the report listed Unit 1 as “underperforming” (Dr.
Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Meeting as a group to discuss this account, the members of Unit 1 reviewed the
report for accuracy and appropriateness of inclusionary criteria, finding neither. When I
asked members of Unit 1 to elaborate on the Dean’s collegiate ranking system, I received
the following responses:
Dr. Xavier: “…we were penalized in part because of we don’t have any graduate
students. The reason we don’t have graduate students is we don’t have a graduate
program…It was based primarily on the number of majors. We didn’t have many majors
(personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Dr. Parks: “…the data they were using was a little dated, a little old. It didn’t keep track
of for instance the number of double majors that we had. And it didn’t keep track of
some relatively recent growth in the number of majors…What was not being recognized
was the amount of off college teaching that we do. (personal communication, March 19,
2012).
Though Unit 1 rebutted the perceived flaws in the ranking system, the truncated
timeframe did not permit adequate revisions or faculty consultation. Questioned as to
why the Dean submitted Unit 1 for inclusion on the initial March 8, 2011 cut list despite
their data-driven protests, the faculty provided the following comments:
Dr. Smith: Well…why it’s on the list is a big big mystery all around, because there’s—
there were several stages (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Dr. Bradley: So there are two answers, I guess, I have to that question. One is—the
general reason is because of the low number of graduating degrees. That’s the general
reason, but that’s not a complete explanation because there are other majors that weren’t
on the list that had fewer majors, fewer graduates, a lower graduation rate. So why were
we on that list? I don’t know. I can’t really say. (personal communication, March 22,
2012).
Dr. Xavier: Yeah, because of the small number of majors. Probably some of the feeling
was it would cause the least pain ‘cause we were a small [unit] and small majors, so they
just chopped it off. Nobody knows (personal communication, February 23, 2012).
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Dr. Parks: The dean was thrown into a lifeboat situation. Ok, and who’s going to be
piggy? You know, who’s going to get tossed out of the lifeboat?...That’s the dollar
figure. Yeah. I’m not saying that’s very creative but there you go and at least the dean is
able to preserve all of his graduate programs (personal communication, March 19, 2012).
Elaborating on this strategic ambiguity, Dr. Smith revealed an interesting
interchange with the Dean:
They [the Deans] were required to make vertical cuts. Ok. So what the Dean had
said is, “He was going to give them [the executive administration] the names of
three departments.” And what the Dean said to us is, “They’re never going to take
these, alright? But I’ve got to give them three names” (personal communication,
February 16, 2012).
Provided this context, the members of Unit 1 speculated as to the real role of institutional
data in the Dean’s decision-making process. Dr. Parks, in particular, had this to offer:
“You can generate metrics that can do whatever you want, well pretty much” (personal
communication, March 19, 2012). Unconvinced that facts and figures had resulted in
their potential elimination, a new theory gained credence amongst the faculty and the
local press. As articulated by a prominent newspaper columnist:
The plan to eliminate [Mountain University’s] [Unit 1] is so preposterous, so right
out of a “Simpsons” episode, that the cynic in me thinks it’s a devious – and
ethically suspect! – plan to draw attention to the Draconian budget cuts proposed
by [Mountain State Governor] (Coolican, 2011).
Augmenting this assertion, Drs. Smith, Xavier, and Bradley provided the following
feedback:
I think uh…the upper administration was thinking both “Huh…this is gonna be
really really bad p.r. (public relations) if we lose [Unit 1]. Legislatures don’t want
that kind of bad p.r. for their state, so they won’t do that. So we’ll put [Unit 1] up
there as a big target.” …So I think it was sort of a…part of a chicken game (Dr.
Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2012).
We knew it was a possibility that this was just a political ploy, but there seemed
to be some—there’s another fact—there seemed to be some reason to think the
administration was trying to create the most drastic scenario they could to scare
the legislature into not making cuts, so that was another consideration (Dr.
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Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Okay. Right, so that was—that seemed to be a motivation that if we cut
everything horizontally it’s gonna weaken everything in the university and no
one’s gonna notice because the manner of the cuts is to just weaken everything.
Whereas if you cut vertically and eliminate [units] that that is something
noticeable that you can just say in one sentence that we have to eliminate X, Y, Z,
[units]. And that’s a sound byte you can use rather than saying we have to
eliminate, you know, 10 percent or 20 percent of the budget from this—from
everywhere. That that’s gonna have all these little effects that aren’t as easy to
articulate (Dr. Bradley, personal communication, March 22, 2012).
Confused and angered by this perceived institutional strategy, concerned citizens
and academicians pushed back on the proposed elimination. Referencing Mountain
University’s plan to cut Unit 1, local resident Rose Rhine made the following economic
analogy: “I am astounded that our officials are so ignorant that one of the first things they
would propose to cut is the exact thing that [Mountain State], indeed the entire nation,
needs most to fend off this spiral” (Rhine, April 4, 2011). In addition to macro-level
arguments, outside scholars pinpointed underlying flaws in this peculiar proposal. In an
email to the President, Provost, and Dean, the executive director of Unit 1’s national
professional association provided arguments based on principle and practicality, stating:
“Eliminating [Unit 1] would be inconsistent with [Mountain University’s] Mission
Statement.” Furthermore, Unit 1 is a “low overhead discipline,” which instills “the kind
of skills most desired by employers.” Moreover, “one thing that is relatively unique
about [Unit 1] is that total [Unit 1] enrollments are typically quite high. This is in large
measure because students recognize that certain courses in [Unit 1] strongly augment
their other major courses” (Unit 1 National Association Executive Director, personal
communication, March 10, 2011).
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Though Dr. Smith lamented that “some of the people who I think would have
helped us and should have helped us didn’t give us much help, because they all said “this
is just a bluff,” (personal communication, February 16, 2012), significant opposition did
occur from within the institution. In a strongly worded letter to the Mountain University
Faculty Senate at-large, members of the General Education Committee (GEC) argued
against the proposed reform of undergraduate general education requirements during this
critical juncture. As advanced by eight of the nine voting members of the GEC:
The recently proposed cuts, which are themselves subject to change, make the
timeline issues as discussed in our March 4th report even more problematic.
Specifically, the university is proposing eliminating [Unit 1], among others, and
making significant reorganizations of major academic units. Since no final
decision will be made on these issues until at least July 2011, it seems to us
impossible to determine which courses will be available for inclusion in the core,
which units will offer them, and who must approve new courses and curricula
within these new units…The GEC asserts that the only thing that separates a good
General Education core from a bad one is purposeful and attentive appraisal of
both the content of the requirements, and the means by which students
satisfy those requirements (Mountain University Faculty Senate GEC, personal
communication, March 21, 2011).
Perhaps sensing the unease generated by the March 8, 2011 budget reduction list,
the chair of the Faculty Senate soon called a special meeting to discuss anticipated cuts
and proposed unitary closures (Mountain University Faculty Senate Chair, personal
communication, March 24, 2011). In addition to the executive administration, several
deans, and the entirety of the Faculty Senate, one hundred plus people filed into the
Student Union ballroom to hear the President speak on this important matter. Stressing
his commitment to campus bylaws and faculty consultation, the President emphasized
that “everything was based on predictions” and that a firm budget was not yet available.
Moreover, there were no satisfying set of quantitative metrics available to guide these
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cuts. However, the President did recognize the stress caused by this situation, and
offered the following explanation:
Budget cutting is a slow-moving form of post-traumatic stress disorder. There is
almost nothing I can do to alleviate your anxiety. We need to eliminate some of
the cafeteria selection on the menu (S. Donoff, personal observation of Faculty
Senate meeting, March 29, 2011).
Following the President’s exposition, several members of the Faculty Senate and
faculty at-large stepped forward to provide commentary on the elimination process.
Though many individuals plead the case for their particular unit, two consistent themes
reverberated throughout this institutional discourse. Challenging the President’s
professed commitment to shared governance, faculty stressed the need for consultation
and data-driven decision-making in the exercise of reshaping Mountain University.
Reinforcing these claims, a member of Unit 1 (who declined to be interviewed for this
study) protested the strategy of vertical cuts as damaging to the reputation and
educational quality of the institution, and demanded that the President provide a solid
rationale for the elimination process. Moreover, several faculty members from other
units urged organizational realignment, reassignment of tenured faculty, and the
discontinuance of a hotly contested new Ph.D. program as proposed alternatives to the
March 8th plan (S. Donoff, personal observation of Faculty Senate meeting, March 29,
2011).
In an email to the campus community the following morning, the President
announced a revised proposal which contained approximately $3.3 million in additional
cuts. Prompted by the legislative finance committee to provide cuts equal to the
Governor’s proposed budget, the President noted that he received this mandate on March
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22 with a response deadline of March 28. Elaborating on this proposal, the President
stated:
Clearly the short timeframe for submission of the additional cuts precluded
meaningful consultation, although they have been discussed with Academic
Council and Cabinet and Faculty Senate leadership. The additional cuts included
some additional subprogram elimination and an estimate of cost savings from
potential college and university level reorganization…I have been asked
repeatedly what principles were used to guide these cuts. I would like to remind
everyone that we aren’t aware of any other institution that has faced cuts of this
magnitude over such a short period of time. We are in uncharted territory. We
can no longer sustain the diversity of programs we have with the resources we
receive; thus we need to reorganize in each college and across the university to
focus on our core academic and research mission…We also have to consider that
we cannot significantly decrease enrollment revenue flow without driving further
cuts (President, March 30, 2011).
While the President’s reference to preserving Mountain University’s mission is consistent
with his February 15 letter to the campus, his interjection of concerns over enrollment
revenue presaged a new strategic component. While not explicitly stated in his next
email, this consideration was likely imparted privately to the Deans. Addressing this next
phase of academic attrition, the President opined:
Last month I released a list of possible program and department eliminations. The
list, put together very quickly to meet the [governing body’s] demand for detailed
cuts, has damaged morale and created an incredible amount of anxiety on our
campus. Please know that this proposal was preliminary and by no means final.
Now a more orderly analysis and process will take place, and you need to be
involved in it. I have asked all the deans to consult with faculty and staff to get
your best ideas about how we can meet budget cut targets for your unit. Each
college needs to engage in a thoughtful and thorough discussion about how we
can sustain our core mission and serve our students in light of limited resources.
After consulting with you, the deans will submit revised plans to the provost, who
will then review them in collaboration with the Faculty Advisory Committee. We
will fine tune the plans created in consultation with the faculty and have them
ready for full consideration in mid-May. I am deeply concerned about the
colleagues and programs we will lose because budget cuts are inevitable, and I
will do everything in my power to honor tenure whenever I can. I will work
collaboratively with the Faculty Advisory Committee to preserve as many
positions as possible (President, April 8, 2011).

87

Including the aforementioned assertions, the institutional strategy now consisted of the
following elements: preservation of Mountain University’s academic and research
mission, maintaining enrollment revenue, honoring tenure, and protecting positions.
Though the President publicly issued his directive to the Deans on April 8, it is
apparent that the Dean of Unit 1 had revised his proposal prior to this date. At a collegewide meeting on April 5, the Dean announced a new plan which preserved Unit 1, with
the exception of its non-tenured faculty members. Moreover, those non-tenured
individuals would have until July 1, 2011 to obtain tenure, or else they would be
terminated on June 30, 2012. In an email to college which was subsequently obtained by
the press, the Dean iterated that “the central rationale is to have as slight an impact on
student progress toward degrees as possible” (Corbin, 2011).
However, members of the public and Unit 1 challenged the Dean’s claim, and the
lack of consultation involved in achieving this revised proposal. In an internet comment
posted in response to the Corbin article, local resident Gina Sully offered the following
perspective:
The elimination of tenure-track faculty seems to me to be a move in the direction
of eliminating full-time faculty altogether and having as many classes as possible
taught by people who won’t receive any kind of benefits package. That’s a good
move (in case you can’t hear the dripping, that’s sarcasm). Part-time instructors
have to teach 10 classes a year to make $25,000—without benefits. Yep. That’ll
bring the best faculty in the country to teach here (Sully, 2011).
Commenting on the Dean’s unilateral decision-making process, members of Unit 1
provided the following criticisms:
Dr. Xavier: “The whole budget thing was handled by the administration with no
consultation of faculty, as far as I can tell” (personal communication,
February 23, 2012).
Dr. Bradley: “We got off the list not because they got more money, but for some other
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reason. So we were on the list and then off the list” (personal
communication, March 22, 2012).
Dr. Smith: “The big sort of last plan was the junior faculty were going to get cut. And
the Dean kind of making noises like that he didn’t think that was going to
happen, but I was like “I don’t care what you think.” It’s got…I mean, “I
want in writing, I want to know…” (personal communication, February 16,
2012).
Covering this change in strategic direction, student newspaper columnist Haley
Etchison pointed out the disparity among the President’s March 30th elimination
proposal, the Dean’s announcement of April 5th , and the President’s April 8th email to the
campus community. Commenting on this series of events, Etchison reported:
The [March 30] document, as presented to the [governing body], contains the
recommendation to eliminate [Unit 1], but since the [college] released a new plan
on Tuesday [April 5] detailing faculty reductions in place of that cut, [the
president’s] plan in likely to be amended. [A governing body member] attested
that he has received more communications asking for the preservation of [Unit 1]
than making any other request. [The Mountain University president] pointed out
that for one area to be saved, another has to be put in danger. “Every time I take
one program off the table, I have to put a program on the table,” he said. But, he
said that any administrative proposal for cuts must have “grassroots” support from
the faculty of the university in order to be effective and fair (Etchison, 2011).
A pivotal piece of journalism, Etchison’s account raises additional questions as to the
timing of and motivation behind this weeklong series of executive communications. At a
special meeting on April 8th, the Mountain State System of Higher Education governing
body questioned the President of Mountain University about his March 30th budget
reduction plan. Admitting that the governing body “did not have the background
information or depth of knowledge in cutting programs,” a member of this body “asked if
there was a way to preserve the course offerings in [Unit 1].” In response, the President
noted, “they are reviewing the process right now” (Governing body, 2011).
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Attributing this change in course to their letter-writing campaign, the members of
Unit 1 discussed the mounting pressure on Mountain University administration:
Dr. Smith: “Yeah, he [Mountain University President] keeps getting all these letters
saying, you know, “What’s wrong out there? Are you gonna do that
[eliminate Unit 1]? He mentioned in um some talks that, you know, uh…
some speeches he made about that he didn’t want to get another national
black eye” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Dr. Bradley: “And it wasn’t so much because of that letter [a letter from Unit 1 to the
Dean], I think, so much as external letters from the academic community
saying that it would be a big mistake to eliminate [Unit 1]” (personal
communication, March 22, 2012).
Dr. Parks:

“Of course, from within our field, it turns out that a lot of our…a lot of
people in [Unit 1] are well connected with higher administrators at other
universities and so we tapped our contacts there. Basically telling—we
contacted those folks in particular to talk to the higher administration here
at [Mountain University] to basically make it clear that if—that the
provost and the president of [Mountain University] did not want to be
known as the provost and president that killed [Unit 1] at [Mountain
University]. That basically if they wanted to advance their career any
further that it would not be in their interests to be known as the president
or the provost that did anything to [Unit 1]” (personal communication,
March 19, 2012).

Provided the inconsistency among the March 30th elimination proposal, April 5th
collegiate announcement, and the President’s April 8th governing body testimony, it is
apparent that March 30th-April 8th was a decisive week for Unit 1. Saved from outright
elimination, Unit 1’s non-tenured faculty lines were nonetheless featured in the May 3rd
and June 8th budget reduction proposals (Mountain University, 2011; President, 2011).
Interpreting this change in direction, members of Unit 1 offered the following:
Dr. Smith: “This went through several stages—right, as you know—lots and lots of
stages—and there were different proposals…and it never really completely
felt over until like, the next September [2011]. Right? I mean, even over the
summer it wasn’t completely clear, right, what was going to happen”
(personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Dr. Bradley: “There were multiple like “Here’s the first list, but this is only—this is only
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the plan A. This is the first iteration of our attempt to come up with a
budget.” So it was never the case that the legislature gave us this amount of
money and here’s the [Mountain University] budget. It was like “Here’s
our first pass and that included [Unit 1] on the list.” Then in the later pass it
didn’t include [Unit 1] on the list and that was—that came much later. So
yeah, there was kind of a lack of transparency and clarity as far as what the
university’s position was about what cuts were gonna be made” (personal
communication, March 22, 2012).
Dr. Xavier: “I think that could summarize a lot of the controversy in academia—most
people are used to dealing with necessary truths. A good administrative
position, they have to deal with contingent truths and they can’t handle it”
(personal communication, February 23, 2012).
In a further elaboration of these aforementioned constructs, the following section will
detail significant occurrences which impacted the short-term viability of Mountain
University and Unit 1.
Organizational Sustainability
Throughout the academic summer of 2011, a series of fortuitous events provided
Mountain University with additional, unexpected sources of funding. On May 2, 2011,
the Mountain State Economic Forum revised its December 1, 2010 forecast on future
state revenue, allocating an additional $274 million for public expenditures (Mountain
State Economic Forum, 2011). Charged with allocating these additional funds, the
Governor pledged “that the $274 million increase will go directly to public education”
(Spillman, 2011). Taking “public education” to mean K-12 education, the Governor
disproportionately allocated only $20 million to the Mountain State System of Higher
Education, with the remainder slated for compulsory schooling (Rindels, 2011).
Meanwhile, on May 9, 2011, the President announced the Tenured Faculty
Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (TFVSIP), which offered a one-time, lump sum
buyout of 150% of a tenured faculty member’s employment contract, contingent upon
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leaving the institution by June 30, 2011. As iterated by the President, “the goal of this
program is to offer a voluntary incentive buy-out option to help limit the need for
terminating tenured faculty. In short, the more tenured faculty who take this buy-out
option, the fewer other tenured faculty we will be forced to terminate” (President,
personal communication, May 9, 2011). Applications for the TFVSIP buy-out were due
on May 23, 2011, providing a two-week decision window.
However, just three days after the TFVSIP application due-date, the Mountain
State Supreme Court issued a pivotal judicial opinion. Radically augmenting the
additional $20 million allocation to the Mountain State System of Higher Education, this
ruling invalidated the legislature’s appropriation of $62 million in local fees for state
general fund usage (Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, 2011). Compelled to amend
his anti-tax stance, the Governor and the legislature came together “after five days of
round-the-clock negotiations” to reach a budgetary compromise (Spillman & Vogel,
2011). Issued on June 1, the 2011-2013 budget included $620 million in taxes that were
set to expire at the close of the 2009-2011 biennium, providing an infusion of funds for
the Mountain State System of Higher Education. Speaking to the local press about the
finalized budget, the President of Mountain University offered the following insight into
his new strategy:
We exist in a global marketplace, and we compete for top faculty…If you don’t
honor tenure, you get yourself in trouble…As far as program eliminations, a
significant number will still occur, but they won’t occur by relieving tenured
faculty of their positions (Lake, June 3, 2011).
Pressed by the same reporter as to which units would be eliminated, the President
provided the following response: “[Mountain University President] did not say which
departments would be cut. The deans of the various colleges are still finalizing details”
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(Lake, June 9, 2011). These “details,” outlined in a June 8th town hall meeting, provided
budget reduction figures for each college, but did not specify which units would be
eliminated (Mountain University, June 8, 2011). Though the President promised faculty
consultation on this matter (S. Donoff, personal observation of town hall meeting, June 8,
2011), Mountain University transmitted this proposal to the governing body for approval
at their June 16-17 meeting. In this budget reduction proposal, Mountain University
committed to adding back several “programs and services, significantly improving the
support for access and student success, as well a number of programs that directly
support economic development” (Governing body, 2011). Though their non-tenured
faculty lines remained a part of the budget reduction proposal, Unit 1 was listed among
these “add backs.” However, the following caveat underscored the entirety of the plan:
Note: The reductions specified above represent current plans, but these could
change based on many factors, including final cuts levels, action by the
[governing body], faculty/staff departures, support required for students in
impacted programs, the outcome of the curricular review process, the final
outcome of academic reorganizations, etc. (Governing body, 2011).
While tuition increases and across-the-board salary reductions closed a portion of
Mountain University’s $20 million budget gap (Lake, June 18, 2011), the buy-out
incentive noted above provided additional funds for the cash-strapped institution. As
such, forty-eight tenured faculty members accepted the TFVSIP package, freeing an
additional $6.34 million for the preservation of remaining faculty members (Formoso,
2011; Mountain University, June 27, 2011). Addressing this influx of funds, the
President opined that “the sacrifice made by tenured faculty accepting the TVSIP buyouts
allowed us to save tenured and non-tenured positions and they deserve our thanks”
(President, July 6, 2011). However, it was still unclear exactly who and what was
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“saved” in this latest scenario. In an August 18th email to the campus community,
Mountain University’s President updated his constituents:
As the summer winds down, I want to take a moment to welcome all of you back
to campus and update you on what we have been working on over the summer.
First, some of you have asked me when the budget cuts will be implemented. For
all intents and purposes the budget cuts are done and I am happy to report that no
tenured or tenure track faculty were terminated as a result of program elimination.
Clearly, several developments had occurred during the summer of 2011. With
three months in between the June and September governing body meetings, it is evident
that the administration worked to reconcile the elimination process, but with insufficient
communication to the faculty-- the majority of which are not on-campus during the
summer term. Though the plan referenced by the President would not be approved until
the September 8th meeting of the governing body’s Business & Finance Committee, the
decisions outlined in this report were made well in advance of this gathering (Governing
Body, September 8, 2011). While Unit 1 ultimately retained its non-tenured lines, faculty
members expressed concerns about institutional and organizational sustainability beyond
the 2011-2013 biennium. Commenting on the future of Mountain University and their
individual unit, Drs. Smith and Parks outlined their perspectives:
I think the university is in a weaker position, because, I mean, once you sort of uh
cross the line and get people to consider, “Here’s one place to cut,” um…if you
end up not, they can say the next time, “Well, you know, we didn’t last time, and
you know, it was clear that was one of the things we could have done—let’s do
that.” So, no, I don’t think the university…you know, in somewhat of a…you
know, give the President’s really made a big big effort to make it not happen
again, uh, that helps. But I think the fact that it came close before makes it weak
(Dr. Smith, personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Well, it’s very clear that in the exercise of ranking departments that the dean for
instance was willing to funnel resources into what were the perceived strengths of
the college. In particular the perceived graduate strengths of the college and that is
continuing. So for instance there are a number of new hires—a number of new
senior hires that are being made. And they’re not being made in [Unit 1] it’s yet
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more in [other units in the college]. And so this exercise of prioritizing programs
turned out to pick winners and the process of ranking programs, I’m afraid, is a
self perpetuating activity (Dr. Parks, personal communication, March 19, 2012).
Delving deeper into their stated concerns, the following section will detail the nature of
the business environment and its perceived effects on continued organizational and
unitary viability.
Nature of the Business Environment
As no organization exists in isolation from its external environment, it is
important to analyze the effects of these extrinsic variables. As addressed in Chapter 2’s
literature review, state institutions have suffered as a result of public disinvestment in
higher education. While departmental/programmatic eliminations, salary reductions, and
tuition increases are familiar budget reduction tactics, public universities also expend
considerable energies on external revenue generation. Hoping to replace state funding
with other stable funding streams, public institutions have increasingly turned to the
business community--and Mountain University is no exception.
Underscoring the current public sentiment, Drs. Smith and Xavier provided the
following synopses:
It’s long been recognized that some tasks are best coordinated by governments,
and that to succeed in these efforts, governments have to raise revenue from
citizens. Since colonial times, Americans have recognized that education is one
of the things that taxpayers need to support (and those were some lean times!).
Sadly, over the last several decades, Americans seem to have grown accustomed
to thinking that they can have roads, schools, fire departments, and Medicare
without fully paying for them. Now that such thinking has proven a fantasy,
taxpayers should have responded with a sensible, “We should have been paying
for these things, and perhaps we should start.” Instead they have clamored to cut
spending—usually on things that don’t directly concern them or whose immediate
benefits aren’t apparent (Dr. Smith, 2011).
That’s another problem that we have today in our society is that people are
reluctant to spend money on public institutions. They don’t wanna spend money
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on parks. You gotta pay. Parks used to be free. Now you gotta pay fees to get in.
They don’t wanna spend money on education. The less money they spend the
better. But, it’s very short sighted ‘cause public institutions benefit everyone
(Dr. Xavier, personal communication, February 23, 2012).
In a telling exchange, Dr. Parks and I spoke about the particular shift in the Mountain
State political climate:
Dr. Parks: I’m afraid—maybe this won’t happen next biennium but I’m afraid
that the tactic of using the budget as a weapon, as it was the last biennium, that
might recur. And if and when that recurs, we might be dangled over the fire.
Interviewer: That’s an interesting choice of words to say, “Use the budget as a
weapon,” what do you mean by that?
Dr. Parks: That is precisely what one of the political parties has been doing in
order to gain concessions in say in Wisconsin and Ohio. Gain concessions out of
public employee unions. I know that we’re not—
Interviewer: You’re saying in general this is a tactic? Ok, it’s not just—
Dr. Parks: That is a tactic that’s being used over and over again. And it’s a
relatively new tactic to [Mountain State] and it was very successful. And I’m
afraid that might become the new normal. That would make our lives—my life,
a lot less pleasant (personal communication, March 19, 2012).
Succinctly reinforced by the leader of their professional association: “This makes the
situation at [Mountain University] a particularly important threat to the discipline of [Unit
1] in a time when large numbers of universities face budgetary pressures from state
government” (Unit 1 National Association Executive Director, personal communication,
March 11, 2011).
Keenly aware of this shift in public priorities, the President has made efforts to
strengthen Mountain University’s “town and gown” relations. A recent addition to the
Mountain City chamber of commerce board of trustees (Velotta, 2011), the President has
also courted the Mountain State Development Authority and other prominent local
business leaders to assist with fundraising efforts. Speaking to the local press about the
importance of these occupational ties, the President declared:
The folks in those groups are major decision makers in our state. Working with
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them, bringing them to our campus, working collaboratively is really the key to
gaining the kind of support that we need so we can establish a reasonable revenue
flow that’s predictable and stable (Green, 2011).
However, securing a “predictable and stable” funding stream from private entities
is not without its own set of potential pitfalls. Indeed, as the business model becomes
instantiated in the academic psyche, it stands to diminish the role of the “public” in
higher education. Forced to compete with a growing for-profit sector, it is clear that
public institutions must adapt to an increasingly business-oriented marketplace.
Speaking to the [Mountain State] Business Journal about this phenomenon, University of
Phoenix representative Kathy Gamboa afforded the following explanation:
While the situation for public institutions is severe, Gamboa says University of
Phoenix’s biggest challenge right now is keeping up with the needs of the
community. “Being for-profit affords us the opportunity to move a little faster,”
she says. “An organization may come to us with an idea for a program, and we’re
able to work a little faster to put a program together.” She refers to the recent
development of a green and sustainable energy program, as well as an autism
certification program for teachers. “We try to fit into niches and help where we
can when we see programs being cut from the non-profit areas” (Santina, 2011).
In an attempt to provide the same level of service to the business community, the mayor
of Mountain City outlined a similar plan for Mountain University. In addition to his
ardent advocacy for the retention of Unit 1, the mayor espoused the following strategy:
[Mountain City mayor] also said the more “strategic alliances” that the city builds
with the university, the better off the community will be in terms of bringing in
new businesses and new jobs. [Mountain University President] is already
working to that end, he said. “If a business wants to come into our community,
and they happen to have a particular expertise as far as the work force is
concerned, they will actually design a course at the university, which will address
that,” [Mountain City mayor] said. “I think that’s pretty innovative…That’s a real
enticement for a business to have training at a university, which will be able to
have an educated work force provided to them” (Toplikar, 2011).
Summarizing the encroachment of private sector businesses into public higher education,
Dr. Xavier commented:
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Really somewhat very clever. See, on the one hand, they all support public
education, but on the other hand, they expect public educational institutions to
train their employees for them. Why shouldn’t they train their own employees if
that’s how they want? They’re externalizing some of their costs by expecting the
public education to graduate students who are job ready
(personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Having utilized a variety of sources to underscore Unit 1’s strategic uncertainty, I will
now rely solely on interview data to elucidate structural uncertainty.
Structural Uncertainty
In the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the second, concomitant phase
of individual uncertainty relates to organizational structure. Simply stated, what has
changed in terms of the inner workings of the unit? Guided by the statements of Unit 1
faculty, I relate their answers to this question below.
Reporting Structures
Despite the specter of elimination, reporting structures in Unit 1 remained
consistent during and after the budget reduction process. Refusing to condemn their chair
for these unfortunate circumstances, Unit 1 retained its leadership and organizational
structure in the wake of this potential elimination. Elaborating on this continuity, Dr.
Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) remarked:
And there wasn’t blame, I don’t think. People weren’t saying—people didn’t
think, for example, “Oh our chair, you know, he didn’t—it was his fault that
we’re on the list ‘cause he didn’t do his job.” There wasn’t talk like that.
While Dr. Bradley’s assertion spoke to Unit 1’s continued confidence in their chair, my
exchange with Dr. Xavier (personal communication, February 23, 2012) revealed the
informal coupling of the faculty:
Dr. Xavier: We don’t have much formal organization in this department.
Everything’s mucking along as far as I can see.
Interviewer: What do you mean? What’s “formal organization?”
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Dr. Xavier: Well, you know, roles and procedures and things like that. We don’t
have those. We just meet once in a while.
With few formalities in place prior to the proposed elimination, Unit 1 chose to
retain this structure at the unitary level. However, members of Unit 1 recognized the
crucial role of the Dean in the elimination process, and accordingly changed their tactics
in this reporting realm. Emphasizing this newfound advocacy, Dr. Parks (personal
communication, March 19, 2012) explained:
Dr. Parks: We will be squeaking constantly and hopefully sometimes the
squeaking wheel will get the oil, let’s hope.
Interviewer: How do you squeak?
Dr. Parks: Well, it’s the constant bid for positions or the reminder—it’s actually
also the constantly reminding, especially the dean, what he does have in this
[unit].
Hoping to prevent future inclusion on elimination lists, Unit 1 vocalized their concerns in
a more concerted fashion. In a further elaboration of this recent awareness, Dr. Parks
stated simply: “I think more of us now have a sense of the image we must portray to the
rest of the college, to the dean, to the administration” (personal communication, March
19, 2012).
Functionality of the Unit
While the members of Unit 1 observed only minor changes in reporting
structures, the potential elimination had more noticeable effects on their collective
functionality. Strikingly, the faculty members expressed a sincere sense of camaraderie
as a result of the struggle to save their unit. Commenting on this unity, Drs. Smith, Parks,
and Bradley noted the following:
Dr. Smith: The cohesion of the unit was sort of pretty good because it was…it
was all…um…this is a battle, like, and we’re going to sort of fight this, and we’re
sort of in this to win. It was not, there was never a kind of—when I’d talk to some
people in other units, of course, there was a kind of fatalism about it. Um…that
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was never us (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Dr. Parks: In that sense what we’ve been through has brought some of us—well,
it largely has brought the [unit] closer together (personal communication, March
19, 2012).
Dr. Bradley: If anything, it made us get along better. We saw more of each other
in all of these meetings and so forth. And we didn’t really have big differences in
opinion on what to do (personal communication, March 22, 2012).
Piggybacking on the military imagery utilized by Dr. Smith, Dr. Parks referred to this
solidarity as “a bunker mentality” (personal communication, March 19, 2012).
Preoccupied with saving their unit, Dr. Smith indicated that his faculty’s research
productivity declined precipitously during the spring of 2011. In conducting the faculty’s
annual evaluations, Dr. Smith (personal communication, February 16, 2012) noted the
following:
I imagine it will bounce back. But, I mean, you know, you build your research—is
built on the research you did before. And just the whole spring [2011] was kind
of lost doing this [dealing with the specter of budget cuts].
Quite interestingly, productivity actually increased in other aspects of the traditional
triad. Commenting on this unusual pattern, Dr. Smith continued:
So productivity really fell off, um, in terms of research productivity. Teaching,
people did as well…or better. Teaching, teaching did not fall off. I think people
really felt like, “Alright, we’re on the edge, we’re in the spotlight, you know,
we’re going to rise to the occasion.”
Mentioning that he received “the highest teaching evaluations I had in ten years” during
the spring of 2011, Dr. Smith speculated as to the motivations of his faculty:
Yeah, and I mean, you know, they, you know, people telling you, “You guys
aren’t worth anything.” We were like, “Yes we are. You know, this is really
important.” And so, yes, everybody did really good teaching, I think. So teaching,
you might have thought teaching got worse, you know, would get worse, people
saying, “I don’t care, they don’t care about us.” But no. Teaching got as good or
better. But research productivity just fell off, because people were doing these
other things.
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Furthermore, Unit 1 faculty focused on expanding the scope of their services to
students and the community, in the hopes of staving off future elimination proceedings.
Discussing their shift in recruitment strategy, Dr. Bradley (personal communication,
March 22, 2012) explained:
More focus on—in the lower division courses; the one-on-ones and so forth to
make sure we have our best teachers there. And that they are telling them about
the majors—about the major; thinking about different kind of versions of a minor
or major that might be attractive to more students.
In addition to conceptualizing these new academic tracks, public promotion became a
central tenet of Unit 1. Referring to the possibility of a new lecture series sponsored by a
prominent local company, Dr. Parks stated: “I think there’s a greater sense of we need to
be a little more involved in community outreach” (personal communication, March 19,
2012). Having discussed the effects of structural uncertainty on Unit 1, I will now turn to
specific aspects of job-related uncertainty.
Job-Related Uncertainty
In the Bordia et al. (2004) conceptual framework, the final phase of individual
uncertainty relates to provisions of employment. Simply stated, what has changed in
terms of the job they were hired to do? Guided by the statements of Unit 1 faculty, I
relate their answers to this question below.
Job Security
Perhaps the most prominent aspect of a potential elimination, members of Unit 1
expressed significant concerns regarding their continued employment at Mountain
University. Voicing his concerns to the local press, a faculty member (who declined to
be interviewed for this study) summarized his dire situation:
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[A faculty member in Unit 1] says he likes [Mountain City] and the life he’s made
for himself, but he will be forced to move away if he is fired. “I will have to try
to find a job somewhere else,” he says. “I will have to declare personal
bankruptcy, I will have to pack whatever I can fit into my car with my dog and go
someplace where I can teach [in Unit 1’s discipline], because [this discipline] is
my career. It’s what I do. In fact, it’s more than what I do—it’s who I am”
(Totten, 2011).
Admitting that his faculty “were worried about getting fired,” Dr. Smith (personal
communication, February 16, 2012) foreshadowed the anxiety of his colleagues.
Contemplating the potential of “forced retirement,” Dr. Xavier (personal communication,
February 23, 2012) pondered alternative options:
One thing I did do the first day, I went home and I looked up the cost of living of
[disciplinary units] in other cities. I was thinking maybe I’ll just visit…45
minutes on the internet just poking around to see if I could afford rents. I was
trying to decide where—since I didn’t have a job here [at Mountain University]—
where in the world, or mostly in the United States, where would I like to live, so I
just tried different places.
Upon hearing of the proposed elimination while attending a disciplinary conference, Dr.
Parks (personal communication, March 19, 2012) took this opportunity to announce his
future candidacy:
Dr. Parks: I told them that so far the proposal was to eliminate [Unit 1] and they
should look for my application next year.
Interviewer: So that was your first thought, was try to get another job?
Dr. Parks: Well that of course was—you have to prepare yourself against the
worst case scenario.
Reinforcing his co-worker’s claims, Dr. Bradley succinctly stated: “They were willing to
have my termination be part of this public plan. I didn’t feel valued; therefore it made me
wanna go” (personal communication, March 22, 2012).
However, while the non-tenured individuals in Unit 1 certainly had cause for
concern, one may wonder why Drs. Smith, Xavier, Parks, and Bradley—all tenured
faculty members—were so distressed by the potential elimination. Commenting on the
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employment protections at Mountain University, Dr. Xavier explained: “We don’t have
tenure here, don’t you know that?” (personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Checking into the legalities of this process, Dr. Smith (personal communication, February
16, 2012) recounted his disturbing discovery:
‘Cause one of the cases I wanted to make was, “you can’t do this.” Ok. And what
it is we find out is “yeah you can.” I mean, there is not the legal protections
everybody thinks there is. People really assume, “how can they fire tenured
faculty?” There’s lots and lots of arcane detail about this, that you can study, but
the long and short of it is…sure they can [fire tenured faculty]. There’s nothing of
that sort in the contracts. And I mean, it’s really sort of up to a judge to decide if
there are circumstances in which they can [fire tenured faculty]. There’s no clear
law that says you can’t fire tenured faculty members…Yeah, it’s really really a
custom that you don’t do this. But there’s nothing legally binding, anywhere, that
has that.
Anticipating the potential legal challenges that might arise as a result of
departmental/programmatic eliminations, the Mountain State system of higher education
governing body proposed significant changes to their regulatory code. In a telling email
to his institutional colleagues, a prominent member of the Faculty Senate offered his
assessment of these revisions:
I am alarmed by the Code changes submitted to the Code Review Task Force.
Among the more disturbing elements I note that
1. Administrators may carve out parts of departments for elimination.
2. No seniority protection is mandated in these Code changes.
3. [System] administrators may lay off tenured faculty in the absence of a
declared financial exigency.
4. Curricular review may now include “adverse financial conditions” as
sufficient cause to lay off a faculty member.
All Faculty need to know that the [governing body] is contemplating aggressive
action that undermines tenure…This is a potentially destructive policy change that
seemingly breaks tenure around any ill-defined fiscal crisis. Without a strong
tenure model, the classic three-legged stool of academia is shattered. Academic
freedom and shared governance will suffer (Mountain University Faculty Senator,
personal communication, April 28, 2011).
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Though the points referenced above were not incorporated into the system code as of the
time of publication, their very mention underscores the prevailing job security issues at
Mountain University, in aggregate, and in Unit 1, in particular.
Promotion Opportunities
Concerned with his potential for academic advancement at Mountain University,
Dr. Bradley contemplated his options at other institutions:
I’ve been thinking about alternatives. And while I was—while the [unit] was in
that timeframe when we were—looked like we were gonna be cut I did apply to
get another job. Now the way my discipline works, and maybe it’s the same
elsewhere, at that time of year there wasn’t really any permanent positions being
advertised or available. That’s just not how the market works. But I did apply and
get offered a job; a three year temporary job… (personal communication, March
22, 2012).
Explaining that “there are other sort of academic advantages too to be in a different place,
at a good university,” Dr. Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) strongly
considered leaving his tenured position for a non-tenured post at a more prestigious
university. Though the Dean had promised to re-hire him upon completion of the three
year term, Dr. Bradley admitted that fiscal considerations ultimately held him back.
Explaining his rationale for remaining at Mountain University, Dr. Bradley stated:
The final deciding factor was, I guess, the financial uncertainty of going. How
much was it going to cost to move and the cost of living. They were offering me
more money than [Mountain University] offers me, but in a city with a high cost
of living. And so how does that—how can I—am I going to be able to afford
this? Is this gonna be a big risk for me? (personal communication, March 22,
2012).
In addition to Dr. Bradley’s more individualized concerns, Drs. Parks and Smith
worried about promoting the unit’s reputation amongst the academic community.
Emphasizing Unit 1’s scholarly prominence, Dr. Parks stated: “One of the shocking
things about the proposed elimination was that this was viewed as a desirable place to be
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and as a place where very good [members of the discipline] had recently been attracted”
(personal communication, March 19, 2012). However, Dr. Smith believed that the
proposed elimination had jeopardized his ability to retain his faculty. Vocalizing his
feelings of foreboding, Dr. Smith explained:
Um…everyone in the sort of trade publications comes out—they have lists of
jobs, right—uh, I imagine a lot of people will sort of fantasize, say, “Uh…you
know, that would be nice…maybe someday I’ll apply for something like that.”
Now they’re like, “I think I will [apply for another job].” Right? You will have
A much more likelihood of applying to other places, looking at other places,
thinking about other places” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Moreover, recruitment of new faculty would prove challenging in the wake of the
proposed elimination. As articulated by Dr. Parks:
Well, we have identified senior faculty that we might like to hire. For instance,
when the president said, “Hey look, we want to make some high impact faculty
hires at the senior level” we thought it was important for us to be in that game.
And so we did identify one or two people. Just to make the case that, “Hey look,
even after what has happened, we can still attract high quality faculty.” That
we’re not crippled...But if we get into a so to speak bidding war with somebody,
I am afraid we would lose out (personal communication, March 19, 2012).
Changes to the Job Role
While the proposed elimination diminished opportunities for self and unitary
promotion, Unit 1 faculty perceived substantial changes to their Mountain University
working conditions. Specifically, Drs. Bradley and Xavier noted modifications to class
sizes, and the attendant effects on instructional quality. In the following exchange, Dr.
Bradley (personal communication, March 22, 2012) elaborated on his perceptions:
Interviewer: So you’ve noticed a workload increase?
Dr. Bradley: I think there’s a little bit more there, yeah. And then, also, just our
classes have upped the cap and so I have to grade more papers and stuff.
Interviewer: Who upped the cap?
Dr. Bradley: The administration made the class sizes bigger.
Interviewer: What were they?
Dr. Bradley: They were more like 30 I think. I think they were 30 and then they
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went up to like 36 maybe. That’s for a certain [introductory class]. And then for
other classes that, for the majors, they also went up to 32. They had been lower
maybe. Maybe 28 or something like that, I don’t remember.
Echoing Dr. Bradley’s sentiments, Dr. Xavier and I discussed the aforementioned
phenomenon:
Dr. Xavier: Well, as a response—not to this thing, but as a response to the budget
crisis, the provost unilaterally increased the enrollments in our courses 20 percent
without even talking to us. The university just said—they didn’t even tell us.
They just did it. We noticed—
Interviewer: You just showed up, you’re like, “Oh, my roster is huge.”
Dr. Xavier: Yeah, I’d see my roster, it’s got 20 percent more students than before
this happened. The chair doesn’t know. The dean knew. The provost did it
unilaterally. See, that’s what I’m talking about. I’ve just been a factory worker.
Interviewer: Okay. When you got this huge roster, what did you do? How did
you react?
Dr. Xavier: Could do nothing.
Interviewer: How did you react though? How did you feel when you saw this?
Tell me how. You see this roster and—
Dr. Xavier: I felt disrespected. I mean, I’m a Ph.D. and a professional and
somebody changes my working conditions unilaterally without even—did not talk
to me about it, didn’t even inform me about it, just did it (personal
communication, February 23, 2012).
In addition to feeling disempowered by the increase in class size, Drs. Bradley and
Xavier noted its negative impact on student learning. Expanding on this point, Dr.
Bradley noted:
I think there’s a point where the discussion becomes more difficult when you get
to like 28, 30, over 30. More students are gonna sorta fall through the cracks as
far as that aspect of the classroom experience (personal communication, March
22, 2012).
In a similar vein, Dr. Xavier made the following observation:
[Unit 1’s discipline] is just not something that people can learn, it’s something
people do, and they need practice. The way to practice is through classroom
discussion. If you have a bigger class, then people are more intimidated and you
don’t get to know each other as well and it’s hard to make your own
conversations (personal communication, February 23, 2012).
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Compounding the stress from increased class sizes, Drs. Parks, Bradley, and
Xavier commented on the lack of new hires and diminished university benefits. As
articulated by the faculty:
There was one loss. Somebody—one of our visiting assistant professors did bail
out and took a position elsewhere. Did bail out because of the budget situation
and we didn’t get a replacement for that person (Dr. Parks, personal
communication, March 19, 2012).
I mean we haven’t hired any new people and people have left which means
there’s the same amount of work as far as the service side of things. Same
amount of work distributed to fewer people (Dr. Bradley, personal
communication, March 22, 2012).
I’ve been furloughed six days a year. Plus my salary was docked 2.5% or
something. Then I got furloughed, which is another 2.5%. Six days a year I’m
not supposed to work without pay [Laughter]. That’s loosey goosey. Of course I
had no say about that either…The healthcare benefits are terrible. The out-ofpocket expenses if you’re in a family, if you have a family, it’s $7800 a year outof-pocket expenses. That’s almost $8000 for healthcare. Most people find it’s
very difficult to pay that. Benefits are going down (Dr. Xavier, personal
communication, February 23, 2012).
In addition to his faculty’s striking commentary, Dr. Smith confided the new
reality of his chairmanship, stating: “You know, there’s a little bit more sense that part of
your job is to make sure they don’t eliminate you” (personal communication, February
16, 2012). Elaborating on this assertion, Dr. Smith remarked:
Um, the one thing I guess I am different is I’ve looked more toward outside
funding than I ever would. This is just not something you learn about in grad
school or think about when you’re thinking about doing [Unit 1’s discipline]—
“Oh, how are you going to find people in the community who would donate?”
Right? I do spend some time looking for them [donors] and trying to find them.
And that—that’s different. And that’s probably the biggest change is seeing what
I can do (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
As a companion to his fundraising efforts, Dr. Smith discussed new collaborations and
pre-professional tracks as an integral part of his role as chair, explaining: “Now we’re
really sort of pushing that, because it, you know, it will help us get more people
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involved” (personal communication, February 16, 2012). In the following section, I will
delve deeper into the specific actions of Dr. Smith, and how they impacted the faculty’s
perception of the proposed elimination process.
Effect of the Department Chair
As the official, designated leader of an academic department (Leaming, 2007), the
department chair is in a prime position to influence faculty perceptions of strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s (2007)
concepts of manifest and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 1’s
department chair, Dr. Smith, below.
Acquiring and Communicating Information
Gathering and disseminating accurate information to affiliated faculty is a critical
aspect of effective departmental leadership (Berdrow, 2010; Tucker, 1993). In this
manner, Dr. Smith made a concerted effort to keep his faculty abreast of developments
during the potential elimination. In addition to sending out “a state of the union message
at the beginning of each semester” (Dr. Smith, personal communication, February 16,
2012), Dr. Smith made frequent use of electronic correspondence. Corroborating this
claim, two members of the faculty recalled their initial awareness of the March 8th budget
reduction proposal:
Dr. Xavier: “The chair sent out an email that said that we were gonna be
eliminated” (personal communication, February 23, 2012).
Dr. Parks: “I got an email from the department chair saying, “Yep, we’re on the
list” (personal communication, March 19, 2012).
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In addition to communication via email, Dr. Smith called bi-weekly meetings to
update his faculty—a decisive break from the usual monthly gathering. Describing this
initial meeting, Dr. Bradley stated:
Well, I don’t remember the exact dates but it was in the spring of 2011. And the
chair of [Unit 1] just called a meeting and said that there was some kind of budget
cuts on the horizon and he was—there were kinda rumors that our [unit] was
gonna be one of the [units cut]…after that first meeting there was no letter [to the
administration], there was just the chair wanted to talk to the—he was gonna sorta
verbally talk to the dean and people. I don’t know exactly who—to try to get
more information and try to make some kind of a case [not to eliminate the unit]
(personal communication, March 22, 2012).
Committed to clarity, transparency, and unity, Dr. Smith explained his rationale:
We were having more frequent [meetings]—because we, you know, there were
always questions about who we were going to send letters to and why. And what
our response would be to the Dean and what our response would be to the
President. A lot of what I had to do was have people do nothing, at times when
they wanted to do stuff, right? ‘Cause there were all kinds of counter-productive
things people could have done, right? Various kinds of stuff that I think would not
have helped (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Elaborating on his staunch avoidance of counter-productive activities, Dr. Smith
succeeded in setting the departmental tone.
Setting the Tone
As the face of Unit 1, Dr. Smith assumed responsibility for delineating the
departmental demeanor. Conscious of his faculty’s negative attitude toward the
administration, Dr. Smith refocused their energies in a more positive manner. Describing
this turnaround, Dr. Smith stated:
I mean, there were a lot of, uh, you know, angry feelings toward the Dean and the
Provost and the President. And I was like, “No. They’re our buddies now. I
mean, even though they’re doing this [putting us on the cut list], they have to be
[our buddies]. They’re the only ones who can sort of save our bacon here”
(personal communication, February 16, 2012).
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A self-described “general,” Dr. Smith explicated his disposition, and its attendant effects
on his faculty, as follows:
This is everything I’m going to do, and I’m absolutely bound and determined not
to let this [the elimination of Unit 1] happen. And um, I had that attitude, and the
faculty sort of picked up that attitude too. They weren’t gonna, sort of, let this
happen. So it was a lot of an attitude of, “Ok, what can we do to stop this?” Um,
they might have been a little more frustrated than me, ‘cause I actually felt like I
was in a position of doing stuff all the time. Right? So all day long, every day,
I was sending emails, and fielding calls, and doing stuff like that (personal
communication, February 16, 2012).
Though Dr. Xavier described Dr. Smith as “totally panicked” and “just dithering
away,” (personal communication, February 23, 2012) it was evident that he devoted
considerable time and indefatigable effort into his departmental leadership. Encouraging
his faculty to consider alternatives to Unit 1’s elimination, Dr. Smith included a critical
caveat:
Like, I’d assign everybody, “How would we make up this dollar amount?”
Right? “If it didn’t come from [Unit 1], where could it come from?” Without
trashing other colleagues. “You can’t do that,” I said (personal communication,
February 16, 2012).
Furthermore, Dr. Smith took pains to prevent his faculty colleagues from further
jeopardizing their precarious position. Describing a particular incident, Dr. Smith
recalled:
Some students came to us with a bunch of signatures for the President that we,
you know, we need to cease and desist this nonsense now. You know? Kind of
like…and I was like, “No. Students should not be doing that. That will have no
effect, one, and it’ll have a negative effect, two” (personal communication,
February 16, 2012).
In an attempt to shield Unit 1’s students from the potential elimination, Dr. Smith crafted
an inclusive, multi-point plan to save his unit.
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Strategy Formulation
During the course of our conversation, Dr. Smith described the three-pronged
strategy he developed to combat the elimination of Unit 1. As summarized by Dr. Smith
(personal communication, February 16, 2012), this approach entailed:
1. Reasons why the university couldn’t legally eliminate Unit 1
2. Reasons why the university shouldn’t eliminate Unit 1
3. Alternative funding sources/cost saving measures that would generate revenue
equal or greater to the amount that would be saved by eliminating Unit 1
While discussions with outside legal counsel undercut his first point (see pages 102-103
for more detailed information on the tenuous legal protections afforded by tenure), points
two and three remained viable options. Choosing to focus on his second aim, Dr. Smith
explained his rationale:
The main thing was kind of the p.r. (public relations)—don’t make it [the cut].
Whatever you do, don’t do this. Um…you will look like a silly university if this
is the cut you take. And that was sort of the message that I wanted them to hear
over and over again. And, I mean, I talked to people in the President’s Council.
They said, “Yeah, he [the Mountain University president] keeps getting all these
letters saying, “You know, what’s wrong out there? Are you gonna do that?”
He [the Mountain University president] mentioned in um some talks that, you
know, uh…some speeches that he made about that he didn’t want to get another
national black eye, like we did, you know, threatening to cut [Unit 1]. Right?
So, I mean, he’s hearing it from everybody. And I was making sure he heard
from everyone (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
Furthermore, Dr. Smith recruited his faculty colleagues in the execution of this second
point. Elaborating on this camaraderie, Dr. Smith stated:
So it was all going to be about, sort of, public pressure. And the public pressure
was going to come from every quarter, sort of every conceivable quarter that it
could. I mean, I uh…in department meetings, right? Um, I would say, “Like, ok,
who do you know?” Right? And you know, one of my members would say,
“Well, I once played golf with Alice Cooper.” And I’d say, “You have to call
him” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
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Though the fulfillment of point number two soon overshadowed the third point, Dr.
Smith did make an effort to explore this option. Describing cost-saving and revenuegenerating possibilities, Dr. Smith remarked:
Don’t say, “Cut it from this, you know.” But uh, say it like, “Here are the things
that, um…this certain…find out how much this electricity takes…and how much
we’d save by not having this building on for this many hours.” So I’d assign
people like, “Find out that.” And then um…we can put this in a kind of letter at
some point, right? Or um, “Here’s who you could talk to about fundraising,”
right? Or um, “I know that you know this person. Can you contact—like I know
you were friends with this university president.” Like uh…or, you know, I would
get people to give me lists of people they know. And then I would give them
assignments of who to call and what to say, and stuff (personal communication,
February 16, 2012).
As alluded to in the aforementioned statement, Dr. Smith recognized the importance of
enlisting outside assistance in the fight to save Unit 1.
Recruiting Outside Assistance
Underscoring his personal philosophy of strength in numbers, Dr. Smith implored
his faculty to alert anyone “in some kind of position of power” and get them to write in
favor of saving Unit 1 (personal communication, February 16, 2012). In this vein, Dr.
Smith answered over 400 emails, many of which were similar in tone, saying: “You
know, we heard about you, is there anything we can do?” Replying to each one in turn,
Dr. Smith said: “Yes, here’s something you can do. You know, here’s a list of these
people to write” (personal communication, February 16, 2012).
In his attempts “to convince legislators, administrators, and community members
that eliminating [Unit 1] is a poor way to help solve the state budget crisis,” Dr. Smith
alerted Unit 1’s national professional association to the unfortunate situation at Mountain
University (Dr. Smith, 2011). Believing that all members of Unit 1’s discipline had a
“vested interest” in preventing the elimination, Dr. Smith’s appeal unleashed a torrent of
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correspondence from his colleagues across the country (Unit 1 National Association
Executive Director, personal communication, March 10, 2011; Unit 1 Pacific Division
Membership, personal communication, March 14, 2011). Looking closer to home, Dr.
Smith also “tried to make sure that we had support from other units; that they would be
able to speak up for us” (Dr. Bradley, personal communication, March 22, 2012). While
the rationale for removing Unit 1 from the cut list was never fully explained, it is likely
that Dr. Smith’s rallying cry for assistance contributed to the eventual salvation of Unit 1.
Summary
Bonded together by the shared phenomenon of potential elimination, the members
of Unit 1 nonetheless acknowledged their unique experiences in dealing with this
unforeseen situation. While the unit in its entirety only remained on the chopping block
from March 8-May 3, 2011—a mere two months—the ramifications from this event
reverberated well beyond this stated timeframe. Indeed, consequences of the proposed
elimination included the development of a “general” in Dr. Smith and a “bunker
mentality” in the rest of the unit. As such, the frequent use of military imagery in
describing this traumatic process underscores an underlying war between Unit 1 and the
Mountain University administration—a battle that could re-emerge during future
budgetary crises. Provided the diminished institutional loyalty and research productivity
that arose as a result of these proceedings, it appears that Unit 1 lost more than it gained,
despite its obvious success in self-preservation. Turning to other faculty in a similar
predicament, I will now explicate their attempts to save their unit.
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Unit 2
Like their counterparts in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 struggled with the
accompanying uncertainty of a potential elimination. Though they too were ultimately
successful in self-preservation, members of Unit 2 experienced the budget reduction
measures in a much different manner. Indeed, in the individual vignettes and
departmental explications to follow, I discovered a unit torn apart, rather than brought
together, by the process of advocating for their unit’s salvation. In keeping with the
aforementioned case structure, I present profiles of the chair and each faculty member,
followed by an analysis of strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty. Finally, I
conclude this section by examining the chair’s role in affecting faculty perceptions of
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties.
Dr. Hayes: Chair of Unit 2
The Dean spoke of “making sacrifices” as he informed Dr. Hayes of the potential
elimination. Called to his office on March 7, 2011—a day prior to the release of the
initial budget reduction proposal—Dr. Hayes was blindsided by this devastating
announcement. Returning to his office, Dr. Hayes absorbed more bad news; his
counterpart at a neighboring state institution had received a similar directive. Within the
span of a few hours, Dr. Hayes’ entire world had changed; how could Mountain State
contemplate the wholesale elimination of this discipline?
Placed in this unenviable position, Dr. Hayes immediately informed his faculty of
this new reality, urging them to mobilize all of their available resources in support of Unit
2. Meanwhile, Dr. Hayes alerted Unit 2’s national association, hoping to spread the word
throughout the disciplinary community. With the support of colleagues across the
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country, Dr. Hayes and his faculty spearheaded a “huge grassroots undertaking” within
Mountain University and the surrounding populace. Highlighting the scope of services
provided by Unit 2, Dr. Hayes spoke with local media outlets and researched creative
means of generating new sources of revenue.
Believing that you “don’t have to cause terror” in order to save money, Dr. Hayes
worked tirelessly to develop a counter-proposal to the elimination of Unit 2. Examining
tuition rates at nearby private institutions, Dr. Hayes recognized an untapped source of
revenue. Rather than rely on the whims of the Mountain State legislature, why not create
a self-sustaining unit? Utilizing his accounting and managerial skill sets, Dr. Hayes
developed a differential tuition strategy with rates significantly below those of nearby
private universities. Though he never received any formal, written notification of Unit 2’s
salvation (only an informal conversation with the Dean), Dr. Hayes knew that this
alternative tuition plan had made a significant impact. While he believes that there is less
negativity now that the 2011-2013 budget process has concluded, Dr. Hayes still works to
solidify Unit 2’s political connections in case of future fiscal crises (personal
communication, March 1, 2012).
Dr. Miles
“He got you. He got you!” Walking around campus the day after the March 8th
proposal, Dr. Miles could not escape the friendly taunts of his institutional colleagues. An
outspoken critic of Mountain University, Dr. Miles believed that his most recent
publication had thoroughly incensed the executive administration, resulting in Unit 2’s
placement on “the official hit list.” Undeterred by this unfortunate development, Dr.
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Miles recognized if “you’re gonna be a pain in the ass, you’re gonna pay the price.” But
he was certainly not willing to concede defeat.
“Accustomed to conflict,” Dr. Miles “put together a whole bunch of students” as a
means of organizing against the potential elimination. With a turnout of “something like
50, 60 students” at the initial meeting, Dr. Miles envisioned a letter-writing campaign
which would generate “thousands of letters, literally thousands.” However, this bold
vision never materialized, as “some of the students allowed their competitiveness to take
over their good sense.” Lamenting this missed opportunity to “work it politically,” Dr.
Miles commented:
You know, I couldn’t do it. It’s gotta all be worked through the students, so you
have to teach students to perform appropriately in organization. That took weeks,
but eventually she [the head of the student steering committee] handled it well.
By that time, there were ten students who were working on the thing, and even
they weren’t doing what they should’ve been doing.
Though disappointed by this setback, Dr. Miles knew the difficulty in rallying a
community that is “actively hostile to education.” Perceiving Mountain University as “an
expression of cultural values,” Dr. Miles offered the following explanation:
The community has a vocational sense of higher education, not an educational
sense of higher education. That’s what starts to explain [Mountain University].
It’s almost designed to be weak. It doesn’t aspire to be strong. It’s never gonna
get the money from the state.
A seasoned social advocate, Dr. Miles linked the decline of the labor movement to
waning support for community institutions. Absent collective organization by and for
“working folk,” societal systems will reflect other, more powerful inclinations.
Summarizing this “anti-intellectual” ethos, Dr. Miles reflected:
It’s almost antagonistic to the university when you listen to comments. The
community votes down almost every single bond issue. They voted down for the
police. They voted down for the libraries. You know all this. Right? What do
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you expect from the university? (personal communication, February 24, 2012)
Dr. Frye
“It was a very weird time,” Dr. Frye recalled. And he could certainly judge,
having worked at Mountain University for more than a decade. News of the proposed
elimination had ushered in a new phase in his long academic career; the entire university
was up in arms. Fortunately, Dr. Frye’s scholarly specialization had prepared him for this
fight.
Recognizing a teachable moment in this intellectual milieu, Dr. Frye gave his
students a civic-minded assignment—engage the community in support of Unit 2.
Aiding this cause in an ancillary capacity, Dr. Frye personally wrote letters in support of
his unit’s activities, and also served as an informational resource for the faculty. A
regular at on-campus budget meetings, Dr. Frye frequently debriefed colleagues who
were unable to attend. Steadfast in his belief that you “can’t cut what’s important to the
community,” Dr. Frye often alluded to the practical, workforce-related need to retain Unit
2. Ultimately successful in achieving this aim, Dr. Frye appeared hopeful that “we are
going into recovery now” and that the next budget will not be as devastating (personal
communication, March 13, 2012).
Dr. Grant
“What could I do next that might help somewhat here?” Pondering his prospects,
Dr. Grant described Unit 2 as “quite on our toes all during that period of several weeks or
a couple of months.” While others wrote letters and organized student opposition, Dr.
Grant took a different tack: “I just take my own initiatives and one of them was to start a
discussion with the president.” Energized by conflict, Dr. Grant complemented this
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executive dialogue with local media exposure, offering a compelling, statistically-based
rationale for the retention of Unit 2.
Though he felt secure in his standing, Dr. Grant “was sad and more concerned for
the younger faculty.” Without tenure, these junior colleagues would surely bear the brunt
of the elimination, should it come to pass. A visible presence in the local community, Dr.
Grant tapped into Unit 2’s extensive alumni network in a further contributory effort.
Describing his activities, Dr. Grant stated:
You know, when I go around the city, and if I step into the [related agency]
department office or if I go around the [more economically depressed] area where
those agencies are, I always run into graduates of [Unit 2]. So we wanted all of
them to know what’s going on, you know, and gain their support here.
While he was “proud of [Unit 2], all of us for doing what we needed to do,” Dr. Grant
was troubled by the administrative reaction to the fiscal shortfall. Summarizing his
thinking, Dr. Grant opined:
I believe there’s always a moment of truth that comes along that you could say,
“Oh, it’s too bad the budget crisis came along.” Well, but the question is, “How
are you going to deal with it?” Let’s watch how you deal with this. And I think
that it was dealt with rather incompetently here (personal communication, March
26, 2012).
Strategic Uncertainty
Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 dealt with mounting uncertainty
as it pertained to Mountain University’s strategic direction. Though a reduction in state
support undoubtedly precipitated this chain of events, the members of Unit 2 wondered
why their department appeared on the March 8th budget reduction proposal. In the
sections below, I discuss their impressions of strategic uncertainty, and why they believe
their unit was ultimately saved from elimination.
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Reasons for Organizational Change
Shocked and dismayed by their proposed elimination, Dr. Hayes immediately
requested an emergency meeting with the Provost to discuss this decision. Unable to
attend, the Provost offered the following response:
[Dr. Hayes], unfortunately I am leaving first thing tomorrow for the [governing
body] meeting in [Mountain State capital] and will be unavailable for the rest of
the week. At the same time I have to tell you that a meeting is not going to be a
particularly good use of my time or that of your faculty. I know the value of
[Unit 2] just as I know the value of all of our programs. If the Governor’s
recommended cuts come and the money is not there, then it’s not there. I would
suggest instead that your faculty and students contact the Governor and
Legislature since our fate is in their hands (Provost, personal communication to
Dr. Hayes, March 8, 2011).
Unsatisfied with the Provost’s explanation, Dr. Grant directed his inquiry to the Dean of
Unit 2: “The president has said that his proposed cuts were based on the
recommendations of the deans. Did you in fact recommend that [Unit 2] be eliminated?”
(personal communication, March 21, 2011). In response, the Dean provided the
following reply:
Please remember the President and the Provost both indicated that Deans would
make recommendations and that they would modify those recommendations. No,
I did not recommend the elimination of [Unit 2]. I recommended the elimination
of some faculty positions in [Unit 2] based on a recommendation to do away with
[a certain degree program in Unit 2]. I have indicated in a College meeting and at
an Executive Committee meeting that I, as a Dean, must and will support those
decisions. Any disagreements with the recommendations will be between myself
and the Provost & President and you will not hear about it…I would suggest that
you and your colleagues work at getting the legislature to understand how
valuable [Unit 2] and the University are for the state. They need to restore funds.
(Unit 2 Dean, personal communication, March 21, 2011)
Discontented with the Dean’s reply, Dr. Grant turned to the Mountain University
President. In this regard, the President responded:
For starters I suggest you talk to [the Provost] and [the Dean], but in a nutshell,
we are facing an unprecedented set of cuts, and we cannot afford to lose student
enrollment or the cuts will be deeper. [Unit 2] is an expensive program and the
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student production rate is low. Further, [Unit 2] has little impact on the rest of the
educational activities of our students. That’s it in a nutshell. (President, personal
communication, March 28, 2011).
Though Unit 2’s communications with the Provost, Dean, and President did not
yield a straightforward response, all three individuals cited the legislative appropriations
process as the key factor in the unit’s fate. However, while the legislature did “hold the
purse strings,” it was the responsibility of the Mountain University administration to
present a budget reduction proposal which met these legislative targets. Pushing back
against their inclusion, faculty in Unit 2 questioned their elimination as it pertained to the
planning and future direction of Mountain University.
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization
Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 attempted to uncover the
rationale for their proposed elimination. Corresponding with the Dean, Dr. Hayes
challenged the appropriateness and accuracy of the metrics used to evaluate the
productivity of each collegiate unit. In this manner, Dr. Hayes stated that “there is some
speculation there is some inflation as to what counts as a true scholarly publication.”
Furthermore, Dr. Hayes believed that the Dean’s “presentation was not helpful by way of
presenting why programs were targeted for elimination, did not present essential
information re: graduate FTE’s, external funding as particularly reflected by [Unit 2] (Dr.
Hayes, personal communication, March 10, 2011). Indeed, of the $7.8 million in external
funding received by the College, $5 million had been awarded to Unit 2 (Totten, 2011).
External funding aside, members of Unit 2 mentioned other points of
departmental pride. A large unit with substantial undergraduate and graduate enrollment,
Unit 2 seemed like an unlikely target for potential elimination. Furthermore, the diversity
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of students and faculty in Unit 2 enhanced the institutional mission of Mountain
University [see Appendix F]. Dismayed at these contradictory aims, Dr. Hayes brought
these discrepancies to the attention of the Dean, stating: “I do believe information will be
made public in the near future regarding the incredible disparities regarding the number
of women/minority faculty who will be eliminated by such a move in the College” (Dr.
Hayes, personal communication, March 10, 2011). As reinforced by Dr. Miles: “There’s
no inherent weakness given [Mountain University] in this program. To the contrary, we
get all sorts of points for diversity and all the rest” (personal communication, February
24, 2012).
Confounded by the lack of concrete data, Dr. Grant summarized the feelings of
his faculty colleagues:
What criteria were you using? It should be transparent what your cutting is,
how it proceeds. And yet, if you don’t have any criteria, it’s not transparent.
You’re just saying that such and such a program, such and such a department will
be eliminated, but we don’t know how you got there. Because according to us,
when we looked at any measure that was commonly tossed around at the
university, scholarly productivity or enrollment in the program, whether it be our
[undergraduate] program or the [graduate] program, we compared well. We
compared very well with the rest of the university. So therefore, it became—it
was a mystery. How do you choose such departments? (personal communication,
March 26, 2012).
Furthermore, the absence of explicit metrics invited “all kinds of speculation” as to why
Unit 2 appeared on the chopping block (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26,
2012). Like the members of Unit 1, several faculty in Unit 2 believed that the March 8th
budget reduction proposal was perhaps a means by which to gain public support. As
articulated by the faculty:
Dr. Hayes: Did the [Mountain University] administration decide on a “sky is
falling” strategy in order to garner legislature support for funding the university?
(personal communication, March 1, 2012)
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Dr. Frye: The proposed eliminations threw the entire campus into a panic. I’m
not sure if it was a purposeful panic, designed to get the community stirred up to
support the university. (personal communication, March 13, 2012)
Dr. Miles: “What are the alternatives? Well, maybe you say what the President is
trying to do is pick programs to eliminate that are gonna bring the community
together in support of the university. Well, if that was true—he’d go after [some
high profile professional programs], but he didn’t do that. They were held
harmless.” (personal communication, February 24, 2012).
In addition to these persistent rumors, interviewed faculty also perceived a
devaluation of their discipline and its attendant contributions to Mountain University.
Concluding that Unit 2 was “on the periphery,” Dr. Frye acknowledged that scientific
disciplines are deemed more rigorous and thus have greater prestige on campus (personal
communication, March 13, 2012). Seconding this claim, Dr. Miles stated: “You know,
they keep talking about stoking up the sciences here and the rest” (personal
communication, February 24, 2012). Referring to his department as one of “the most
devalued units” at Mountain University, Dr. Grant found it “difficult not to despair, not to
give up on [Mountain State], and not to give in to overgeneralizations” (personal
communication, March 9, 2011).
Moreover, Dr. Hayes found himself “frustrated and dismayed by the overall
strategy of cutting and gutting this University” (personal communication, March 9,
2011). Believing that revenue diversification and creative thinking were the keys to
financial solvency, Dr. Hayes declared that you “don’t have to cause terror” in order to
save money (personal communication, March 1, 2012). Indeed, Dr. Hayes was not the
only member of Unit 2 to consider alternative solutions. In an email to faculty colleagues,
a member of Unit 2 (who declined to be interviewed for this study), offered the following
fix:
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As I said in the meeting with [the Dean], why aren’t we considering the
elimination of the [entire College] as a viable resolution. Programs aren’t the
only things that should be considered for elimination. We would pick up an
immediate half-million dollar cost savings with the elimination of the Dean’s
office. (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 8, 2011)
Furthermore, it appeared as though Mountain University was expending its
limited funds on athletic facilities and technological enhancements, as opposed to
restoring faculty salaries. Commenting on these “mixed messages,” Dr. Hayes
wondered: Why is our priority building a stadium over rewarding faculty? Are we a
research institution or a teaching institution? (personal communication, March 1, 2012).
As reinforced by Dr. Miles:
To build a great university is an extraordinarily expensive thing, and almost
invariably, it arises in a very traditional way out of the sophistication of a
community. The great universities in the world grew out of great urban centers
of intellectual ferment, even when they weren’t in the cities like Oxford, which is
a little bit north of London. Great universities are not pastoral pursuits (personal
communication, February 24, 2012).
Summarizing the uncertainty surrounding Mountain University’s future direction, Dr.
Grant captured the moment as such:
This president put out, I mean I don’t know it was two, three or four proposals,
get on my, you know, this long list. One differing from the previous one and the
next one differing from the previous one. And so you put the university in a state
of panic… (personal communication, March 26, 2012).
However, the Dean offered the following consolation: “Remember, the budget cuts listed
are part of a process and as they say in hockey the game is not over until the fat lady
sings” (Unit 2 Dean, personal communication, March 21, 2011). Indeed, the members of
Unit 2 would take this suggestion to heart, taking pains to preserve their organizational
sustainability.
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Organizational Sustainability
Hamstrung by the political process, Mountain University administration cycled
through a series of budgetary proposals designed to meet ever-changing funding targets.
While the entirety of the institutional budget lay in legislative hands, Unit 2 found a
powerful political ally waiting in their corner. Raised in the Mountain City community,
this influential state senator recognized the invaluable contributions of Unit 2, and
subsequently became their legislative “champion” (Dr. Hayes, personal communication,
March 1, 2012). At a critical budget subcommittee hearing attending by the President,
the Senator publically questioned Mountain University’s plan to eliminate Unit 2 (Ryan,
2011). In response, “the president reportedly said it would be re-reviewed” (Mountain
University Faculty Senator, personal communication, March 22, 2011). Three days later,
Dr. Hayes reported that the graduate program, and consequently, the entirety of Unit 2,
had been spared elimination. The undergraduate program, however, was still in jeopardy
(Dr. Hayes, personal communication, March 25, 2011).
While Dr. Hayes’ announcement was certainly a positive revelation, Dr. Grant
remained skeptical of the executive administration. In an email to Dr. Hayes, Dr. Grant
expressed his concerns:
In regard to the [graduate] program, we have received nothing in writing, there
have been no explanations offered, the president has made no public
announcement, and he has not officially retracted what is in writing in his
proposed budget cuts statement, which is the most recent official word on the
matter. I do not trust these statements and I do not like the hidden nature of the
process (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 28, 2011).
Responding to a similar set of sentiments by another member of Unit 2 (who declined to
be interviewed for this study), the President replied:
Putting the [graduate program] back cost another 12-15 of our faculty their
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positions. All these choices are bitter, but if we are to survive, we can no longer
be all things to all people, and we must keep as much tuition as we can to avoid
even deeper cuts. My job is horrid, in that I have to try to find a way to lose 350
faculty and staff and still keep us functioning. There are no good alternatives
left…It is a sad time, and we can only hope that our appeals will be heard and the
cuts will not be as deep as the proposed executive budget. While I recognize the
anger people feel to me, your efforts are better spent contacting your
legislators. (President, personal communication, March 28, 2011).
Though the President’s March 30th budget reduction proposal did in fact spare
Unit 2’s graduate program from possible elimination (President Email, March 30, 2011),
significant damage had already occurred to the department. Indeed, the mere mention of
Unit 2’s potential demise set a chain of inopportune events in motion which adversely
affected student enrollment. As articulated by Dr. Grant:
And so, he (the President) shouldn’t have made such a big deal out of the first
proposal knowing it’s going to be changed down the line. But yet, on the basis of
that first proposal, he said, “Well, I would advise students who are applying for
the programs that are proposed to be cut, that they don’t apply for those
programs.” So here is a classic blunder. I mean, it’s a sign of real incompetence
on the part of a top administrator because you never go—knowing how many of
these things work out in the end; you never kill the program before it’s actually
officially killed. And this was what his comment was leading to, was going to do.
If you say, “I’d advise our students not even to apply to this program,” well, then
you’re going to kill the program, shut it down, even though it’s only in a proposal
stage (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012).
Speaking along these same lines, Dr. Hayes conceded that College advising center staff
were encouraging students to choose another major. Extremely displeased with this
counsel, Dr. Hayes found this to be counter-productive to efforts to save Unit 2 (Dr.
Hayes, personal communication, March 1, 2012). Moreover, dwindling student
enrollment would negatively impact local employers who depended on Unit 2’s programs
to prepare their workforce (Dr. Frye, personal communication, March 13, 2012).
Recognizing the unintended consequences of preemptive proclamations, the members of
Unit 2 also discussed the attendant effects of Mountain State’s anti-educational ideology.
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Nature of the Business Environment
Echoing the sentiments of Unit 1 faculty, members of Unit 2 alluded to the
sweeping changes effecting public higher education. Increasingly sensitive to industry
demands in the wake of declining state support, Dr. Grant longed for the academia of
yesteryear “when there were a lot of tenure-track positions and so forth in the states.”
Expounding on these sentiments, he asserted:
You know, the university has been turned into a marketplace. So this is why they
talk in terms of student productivity rates that we read before. You know,
production, it’s like a—what is this a factory or a market? Students are
considered consumers…This is all a private enterprise model for the university.
And we have higher administrators who have gone along with all this leading, to
me, to the destruction of a great university system in the United States. There’s
been the withdrawal of public money, of state money. So I’ve taken to calling the
public university as we used to call a place like [Mountain University], a public
university, a charity university. We depend upon people, billionaires or multimillionaires giving us charity, and they could give the charity for what they
choose. They want to build up the business school, or they want to put another
building on campus. You know, it’s no longer a public university. I tell my
students how I went to a college that was one of the best in the country, and it was
free. Free! It was truly a public college, [a college in the Northeast]. And
nowadays, we don’t see the importance of having truly public universities
(Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012).
Building on this concept, Dr. Miles offered a comparative assessment of the Mountain
City populace:
As a large metropolitan area, we’re the most underserved in higher education by
an enormous amount. Buffalo, which is so much poorer than this community, has
almost twice as many per capita higher education slots than this place. This is it
in university education here, and yet it is such a deficient, underfunded thing. It’s
underfunded by the public, and it’s enormously underfunded by the private sector
(Dr. Miles, personal communication, February 24, 2012).
Moreover, the potential elimination of Unit 2 would make Mountain City the only
major metropolitan area in the United States without this particular disciplinary
specialization. Indeed, as intimated by Dr. Frye, the closure of Unit 2 would force
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interested students to seek schooling in a nearby state, for this would be the closest
commuter option available to them (personal communication, March 13, 2012).
Speaking to a local media outlet, Dr. Grant repeated Dr. Frye’s assertion. When
questioned as to what constitutes a “major city,” Dr. Grant retorted that “every city with
over 500,000 population has at least one or more [options to study the discipline of Unit
2]…You know, how was this ever figured into the process here?” (personal
communication, March 26, 2012). In the midst of this strategic uncertainty, the faculty of
Unit 2 struggled to maintain their departmental cohesion, discussed in-depth in the
following section.
Structural Uncertainty
Like their colleagues in Unit 1, faculty in Unit 2 dealt with changes in reporting
structures and departmental functionality. However, the declarations of faculty members
in this particular unit differed significantly from the statements of Unit 1. In the sections
that follow, I contextualize Unit 2’s perceptions of structural uncertainty, providing a
stark contrast to Unit 1.
Reporting Structures
While Unit 2 was similar to Unit 1 in that the faculty did not blame their chair,
nor seek a new one, following the elimination experience, there is little congruence
beyond these points. Compounding the specter of potential departmental elimination,
Unit 2 also coped with the possibility of college-wide restructuring. As outlined by Dr.
Hayes in an email to the faculty:
The president has also begun to make plans for possible re-organization of
Colleges and programs. It seems that he plans to eliminate one college, and
consolidating others. He did mention that [Unit 2] may be placed in [another
unit]…[The College] may [be renamed] with a different configuration of
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programs. None of this is set in stone but the beginning talking points of what
may happen. Then again, nothing may happen (personal communication,
March 25, 2011).
Though these structural changes had not come to pass by the time of publication, it
should be noted that institutional reorganization is generally a gradual process—
consistent with the overall pace of academic permutation (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). As
such, it is quite possible that the aforementioned plans (or a version of them) could still
come to fruition.
Functionality of the Unit
In clear contrast to Unit 1, members of Unit 2 did not discuss downturns in their
teaching, research, and service obligations. Indeed, despite persistently low morale,
faculty “didn’t use this [situation] as an excuse” to shirk their scholarship (Dr. Hayes,
personal communication, March 1, 2012). Reinforcing this claim, Dr. Miles spoke of
finishing a book during this tumultuous time, and furthermore maintained his
commitment to original lectures, stating: “I have the time to do it and I put a lot of effort
into it” (personal communication, February 24, 2012). While this is not to imply that
faculty in Unit 1 shirked their obligations, it is noteworthy that the proposed elimination
did not affect Unit 2 faculty in a similar manner.
Moreover, faculty in Unit 2 did not exhibit the camaraderie characteristic of Unit
1. As summarized by Dr. Hayes:
This elimination process has pitted junior faculty against senior faculty. In some
respects, junior faculty resent the more expensive senior faculty. The perspective
of the junior faculty is that senior faculty placed our unit in the “expensive”
category which then singled out our unit for elimination. Junior faculty resent
making less, taking a pay cut, and possibly being the first to be fired while senior
faculty are more cushioned from these financial blows (personal communication,
March 1, 2012).
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Correspondence obtained from a faculty member in Unit 2 indicated a high degree of
animosity amongst faculty members. Responding to colleagues, a member of Unit 2
(who declined to be interviewed for this study), made the following statement:
This is not the time to turn the guns inward and send hurtful one-liner emails out
to each other. We are [disciplinary affiliates of Unit 2]. This is a problem. We
solve problems (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 8, 2011).
Several days later, another member of Unit 2 (who declined to be interviewed for this
study) shared similar sentiments:
Again I ask that we please don’t make negative assumptions and public attacks on
one another in that we are presently all in this boat together; although it seems
that some of us have more to lose as folks start throwing people overboard from
what they perceive as a sinking ship. But hopefully, the [disciplinary] principles,
values, and skills that we teach students will be utilized with each other in the
coming weeks, months, and hopefully years ahead. I also hope and ask everyone
to keep up the good fight and uplift each other’s spirits because if we don’t we
can’t expect others to join and stay in this battle with us (Member of Unit 2,
personal communication, March 17, 2011).
While members of Unit 2 did praise Dr. Grant for his local media efforts, it was evident
that these accolades were the exception, rather than the rule.
Perhaps a contributing factor in this intra-unit animosity, several faculty members
mentioned the negative toll of hiring freezes on their collective functionality. Admitting
that “we’re a skeleton of a faculty,” Dr. Frye noted that retirements and departures had
forced them to replace full-timers with part-time instructors (PTIs). Furthermore, all of
the PTIs had Master’s degrees, while Dr. Frye believed “that to have a good department,
you need to have full-time Ph.D.s working” (personal communication, March 13, 2012).
In addition, Dr. Grant expressed concerns over being “shorthanded” and “not permitted to
hire” (personal communication, March 26, 2012). As explicated by Dr. Miles:
They owe us three faculty lines they’ve taken away from us over the years. Our
undergraduate program is largely taught by part-timers here, you know that teach
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a course here from the community, which is not a good thing, because it’s a very
new community. There’s no depth of [Unit 2] scholars here. Many of our
graduate courses are taught that way. We’ve got full-time junior faculty here,
who will never be on a tenure-track. They don’t have doctorates. They don’t
publish. No, the university owes us three full-time lines. If you wanna be fair
about the thing, when you consider student-faculty ratios across the college, they
owe us five lines, if not six (personal communication, February 24, 2012).
Likewise, Dr. Hayes discussed the increase from twelve to sixteen PTIs as a doubleedged sword. In summation:
In one sense, PTIs can be hired quickly (no search required), and they have realworld experience (currently practicing in the field). However, students may feel
“short-changed” when they have so many PTI instructors in the program (as PTIs
are not as accessible/available as full-time faculty). I believe there is a trend
“toward hiring more transient-type faculty” at this institution, whether it is PTIs
or visiting professors. PTIs and visiting professors cost less than full-time faculty,
and they are more flexible in their assignments (personal communication, March
1, 2012).
Piggybacking on Dr. Hayes’ assertion, Dr. Frye also expressed anxiety over the effects of
PTIs on student learning. Noting the importance of receiving theoretical knowledge, Dr.
Frye believed that Unit 2 was doing a disservice to its students by employing so many
part-timers. Moreover, students in Unit 2 had approached Dr. Frye with concerns about
the considerable part-time composition of the department (personal communication,
March 13, 2012).
In a related vein, Dr. Hayes perceived significant changes to the departmental
support structure. Commenting that “this university is being run by students,” Dr. Hayes
offered the following synopsis:
Before the budget crisis, I had two administrative assistants. As part of shared
sacrifice in the college, I allowed one administrative assistant to take what I
thought was a short-term assignment in another office which had no
administrative support. It has since become apparent that this administrative
assistant will not be returning to our unit. I have hired student workers to
supplement our one remaining administrative assistant, but student workers have
a limited skill set. As such, travel documentation, PTI hire paperwork, and other
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basic administrative duties have not been completed in a timely fashion (personal
communication, March 1, 2012).
As underscored by the aforementioned summary, unitary functionality extends beyond
the faculty core, encompassing support staff and student workers. Though this situation
may be more obvious to Dr. Hayes given his position as chair, the substitution of
professional assistants for student workers is indeed a troubling trend—one worthy of
further investigation.
Job-Related Uncertainty
Much like the faculty in Unit 1, members of Unit 2 experienced considerable
employment-related changes both during and after the proposed elimination process.
However, while Unit 1 faculty were skeptical about the university’s tenure protections,
Unit 2 faculty were split as to their faith in this longstanding institutional tenet.
Interestingly, both faculties expressed similar concerns regarding increased class sizes, as
one of many unwelcome changes in working conditions. Detailed explications of these
facets of job-related uncertainty appear below.
Job Security
Perhaps unable to sleep due to the shocking news of the potential elimination, Dr.
Hayes spent the evening of March 7, 2011 emailing his faculty. Perturbed by their lack
of response to his earlier communiqué, Dr. Hayes wondered whether “everyone is just
updating their CVs & logging on to higheredjobs.com” (Dr. Hayes, personal
communication, March 7, 2011). Borne out of frustration, Dr. Hayes’ comments
underscored an interesting departmental dynamic. While the untenured faculty in Unit 2
certainly had cause for concern, and directly cited their lack of tenure as the main reason
for not speaking to the press (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 11,
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2011), there was a decisive split among the four tenured members of Unit 2 interviewed
for this study.
Clearly confident in the protections of tenure, Dr. Miles (personal
communication, February 24, 2012) made the following comments throughout the course
of our interview:
I’m a very senior professor. I even think if they closed [Unit 2], they wouldn’t
have been able to get rid of me. They would have put me in another department
someplace…I’m protected…I’m very senior…Tenure’s a big deal. Being a full
professor is, too…I can retire, or they’ll kill me.
Moreover, Dr. Grant offered the following assessment of his job-security:
Because, you know, at this point in my career, I’m pretty secure in terms of being
a tenured full professor and having enough financial resources that I could resign
or retire, as they say, anytime I want (personal communication, March 26, 2012).
Conversely, Dr. Frye began searching for alternative employment almost immediately
following the release of the March 8, 2011 cut list. Believing there is “no support for us
in administration,” Dr. Frye admitted that “I don’t feel that secure staying here” (personal
communication, March 13, 2012). Furthermore, Dr. Hayes conceded that “my phone was
not filled with conciliatory messages from the power tower” following a press appearance
by one of his faculty. After listening to these voicemails, Dr. Hayes informed the Dean
that “I would be in my office today dusting off my cv,” but “never heard from him”
(personal communication, March 15, 2011). Provided these conflicting perceptions of
tenure, it is apparent that full-time faculty no longer feel confident in this once
impervious protection.
Promotion Opportunities
Referring to merit pay distributions as “an issue of loyalty,” Dr. Miles lamented
the institution’s promotional pay scale. Forthright in his criticism of Mountain
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University, Dr. Miles interpreted his financial snubs as punishment for these critiques,
stating:
It’s cost me over the years in merit pay. You know, I’ve written a lot…At the
beginning, I got the full merit pay for the book, but not the last four books. I
wrote a book with Rowan and Littlefield, who’s a hell of a publisher. They gave
me $1500 for it, not $4500, which is the maximum in merit pay. $1500 is what
you get for delivering a paper at a conference, but this was a sole-authored,
scholarly monograph from a very good publisher, and they gave me $1500.
Every year my merit was cut afterwards, so when I take a look at professors,
who I know—who have done comparable, actually less than I’ve done, they’re
making about $30,000 a year more than I, but it’s alright
(personal communication, February 24, 2012).
A seasoned scholar, Dr. Miles could remember the university’s “golden age,” when merit
pay was a given; up-and-coming professors were not so lucky. Indeed, in a powerful
statement to the Mountain University president, an untenured individual pondered his
academic future:
I honestly felt this was “my dream job” here at [Mountain University], now when
I still reiterate this people literally laugh when I say this…I still am trying to have
blind faith that things will work out. But when I read your statement, “[Unit 2]
has little impact on the rest of the educational activities of our students.” what I
felt this communicated was a de-valuing of my profession. Unless I interpreted
this statement incorrectly this saddens me and makes me really question whether
the reputation of our department will be so tarnished and disrespected in our own
[Mountain University] community that my hopes of building a career here are not
realistic (Member of Unit 2, personal communication, March 28, 2011).
While the aforementioned account is but one individual’s perspective, the profound
sincerity of this message underscores the need to investigate the elimination phenomenon
from both tenured and non-tenured standpoints.
Changes to the Job Role
Consistent with faculty in Unit 1, members of Unit 2 decried the one-sided
implementation of increased class sizes. Affirming the new instructor/student ratio in
undergraduate classes as 1:35 (was 1:25) and graduate classes as 1:15 (was 1:12), Dr.
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Hayes acknowledged that Unit 2 has cut back on the number of admitted students in
order to reduce these ratios (personal communication, March 1, 2012). Shocked at this
turn of events, Dr. Grant offered the following situational assessment:
I’ve had the highest numbers in my classes that I’ve ever had in my whole career.
So, you know, what brought that on? How did that come about, the highest
numbers? Maybe, I don’t know, maybe some people wanted to show efficiency,
so instead of—for example, one of my courses should have been two sections and
yet it was just one section so I had a much larger class than usual (personal
communication, March 26, 2012).
Yet, like all academic changes, the increased class sizes did not occur in a
vacuum. Indeed, Dr. Frye likened this growth to decreased productivity in other areas of
the traditional triad. While Mountain University “claims to be a research university,” Dr.
Frye believed that the 3/3 teaching load was far too heavy to produce substantial amounts
of research (personal communication, March 13, 2012). Moreover, the teaching load was
inconsistent amongst the various colleges, leading to an imbalance in research
productivity across campus (Dr. Grant, personal communication, March 26, 2012). As
reinforced by Dr. Grant: “Well, for one thing, it’s a lot more work for me in grading
assignments. I couldn’t get to any of my research last semester” (personal
communication, March 26, 2012).
In addition to increased class sizes, new administrative assignments presented
further challenges to the maintenance of a robust research agenda. As previously noted,
Unit 2 had experienced a decrease in full-time faculty, an increase in part-time faculty,
and a loss of administrative support staff. This confluence of events, coupled with the
potential elimination, created a very unusual working environment for the department
chair and faculty alike. As summarized by Dr. Hayes:
If my administrative assistant is out of the office and our student workers are not
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available, I have to spend time intercepting visitors at the reception desk. This is
burdensome and takes time away from other duties I must perform as leader of
this unit (personal communication, March 1, 2012).
Furthermore, the overreliance on PTIs prompted Dr. Hayes to institute a separate training
manual/orientation process for transient faculty, due to their ever-increasing numbers
(personal communication, March 1, 2012).
On top of these considerable changes, Dr. Hayes shouldered the responsibility for
“unlearning the negative publicity” that had resulted from the potential elimination
process. While the institution and the press advertised the dissolution of Unit 2, there
was no reciprocal response to the department’s salvation. As such, Dr. Hayes and his
faculty had to re-stimulate interest in the unit’s programs (personal communication,
March 1, 2012). As buttressed by Dr. Grant:
Some of my colleagues tell me that there seems to be a perception out in the
community amongst some people that, indeed, our [undergraduate] program has
been shutdown, that there is no [undergraduate] program. So now, we have an
[undergraduate] committee that’s trying to overcome this: sending out letters to
[influential leaders] in [Mountain City], you know, so as to notify them, “Hey,
our program is still here. It’s up and running” (personal communication, March
26, 2012).
As previously discussed, Unit 2’s graduate program received a reprieve merely three
weeks after its inclusion on the March 8th cut list. Meanwhile, the status of its
undergraduate program remained uncertain well into the summer and early fall of 2011.
Appearing as part of the institutional budget reduction proposal at the June 16-17
governing body meeting, the undergraduate program faced an uncertain fate (Governing
body, 2011). However, at the next governing body meeting, held from September 8 -9,
there was no mention of the undergraduate program elimination on the agenda
(Governing body, 2011). Furthermore, Dr. Hayes acknowledged that he never received
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any formal, written notification that the undergraduate program had been saved; an
informal conversation with the Dean was deemed sufficient (personal communication,
March 1, 2012).
Effect of the Department Chair
Much like Unit 1’s Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes influenced his faculty’s perceptions of
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s
(2007) concepts of manifest and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 2’s
department chair below.
Acquiring and Communicating Information
Similar to Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes expended considerable energies in the acquisition
and communication of pertinent information. Upon speaking with the Dean and his
counterpart at another state institution, Dr. Hayes immediately relayed this news to the
Unit 2 faculty, offering his availability for individual consultation (personal
communication, March 7, 2011). In addition, Dr. Hayes also attempted to convene a
meeting with the Provost to discuss the potential elimination, though this gathering did
not come to pass (personal communication, March 8, 2011). Furthermore, Dr. Hayes
forwarded all supportive communications he received to his faculty colleagues, keeping
them abreast of current developments (personal communications, March 15 & 17, 2011).
Moreover, Dr. Hayes also embraced faculty consultation prior to communicating
with the Dean, offering them the ability to “review and make suggestions” on a
department-wide productivity report (personal communication, March 21, 2011).
Finally, upon hearing of their victory in preserving Unit 2’s graduate program, Dr. Hayes
offered the following assessment: “I think we need to continue our efforts to save the
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[undergraduate program], but be relieved that our graduate program will continue”
(personal communication, March 25, 2011). A powerful and exemplary communication,
Dr. Hayes took pains to set the tone in the department’s efforts to preserve its programs.
Setting the Tone
In his initial email to faculty colleagues, Dr. Hayes emphasized the importance of
determination during these tough times:
In the coming months we need to go about our business that we will still be here
for the years to come—however, we will need to take this threat seriously and
draw attention with the legislature, governor, and [governing body], as to the need
and importance of our program. All of us will need to work hard mobilizing such
support (personal communication, March 7, 2011).
Resolute in his commitment to these principles, Dr. Hayes involved and encouraged his
faculty to fulfill appropriate roles. Believing Dr. Grant to be “a great representative” for
Unit 2, Dr. Hayes presented him with the opportunity to partake in a high-profile media
event (personal communication, March 10, 2011). In addition to praising Dr. Grant for
his work on behalf of Unit 2, Dr. Hayes also extended accolades to other faculty for their
specific contributions, stating: “I want to personally thank those of you who have helped
focus the students and community” (personal communication, March 17, 2011).
However, while Dr. Hayes was quick to give credit where due, he also refused to tolerate
intra-unit criticism. When scuttlebutt emerged regarding Dr. Grant’s selection as a media
representative, Dr. Hayes stepped in to halt these “attacks,” refocusing the faculty as to
their collective purpose in preventing the elimination (personal communication, March
11, 2011).
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Strategy Formulation
Like Dr. Smith, Dr. Hayes spent considerable amounts of time formulating a
strategy to save Unit 2. Similar to his institutional colleague, Dr. Hayes recognized the
utility of political connections, and worked to realize their full benefit. In addition to
becoming point-person for press contacts, Dr. Hayes endeavored to gain “support within
the business community” as well within the university (personal communication, March
11, 2011). In this manner, Dr. Hayes convened a new Unit 2 advisory board. Designed
as a networking system, this fifteen-member panel included prominent alumni, local
agency directors, and government relations personnel. Commenting on this approach,
Dr. Hayes declared: “Having those political connections is not going to hurt us at all”
(personal communication, March 1, 2012).
However, while the establishment of strong political ties remained a viable policy,
Dr. Hayes’ principal tactic was to “make money for the University” (personal
communication, March 9, 2011). As such, Dr. Hayes mapped “the internal logic of
closing [Unit 2] and came up with all sorts of ways to save it” (Dr. Miles, personal
communication, February 24, 2012). In contrast to Dr. Smith’s efforts to devise
institutional cost savings in lieu of departmental elimination, Dr. Hayes reformulated
Unit 2 as a revenue-generating dynamo. In an email to the Provost, Dr. Hayes
proclaimed:
As a [unit], we have the lowest graduate tuition of the western states, and are even
lower than [our in-state competitor]. If we are afforded the opportunity of
establishing our own differential tuition, and also plan to offer online degree
opportunities we would not need to rely on the legislature, its whims, and formula
funding to have a robust, viable program with over 400 students
(personal communication, March 9, 2011).
In a subsequent email to the Dean, Dr. Hayes made the following observation:
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The reality is that many of our programs will have to follow such a course of
action, given these times. I think we can serve as a successful model
(personal communication, March 10, 2011).
As a result of diligently researched budgetary projections, Dr. Hayes was able to
convince the Dean that this differential graduate tuition strategy “would allow us to
continue the [undergraduate program] and bring in an additional $500,000-600,000 in
revenue for the University” (personal communication, March 11, 2011). An example of
the creative thinking espoused by Dr. Hayes, this successful strategy made a significant
impact on the salvation of Unit 2.
Recruiting Outside Assistance
As mentioned in the previous section, Dr. Hayes recognized the value of having
well-established political connections. In one of his first attempts to save Unit 2, Dr.
Hayes “made the situation known to all the [Unit 2’s] in the country” (Dr. Grant, personal
communication, March 26, 2012). Utilizing Unit 2’s national professional association
listserv as a means of disseminating information, Dr. Hayes urged disciplinary affiliates
to write to the President, Provost, and governing body members as to the importance of
preserving Unit 2. Moreover, Dr. Hayes encouraged his faculty to “give me names of
folks you think would be helpful. I need people who can “reach out” to others who can
make things happen” (personal communication, March 11, 2011). Perceiving political
pressure as paramount, Dr. Hayes’ expended considerable efforts to shield his unit
through political activism—a trend that is likely to continue.
Summary
Though far from bound together by the shared phenomenon of potential
elimination, the members of Unit 2 were nonetheless forthcoming in their perceptions of
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the potential elimination. While the unit’s graduate program remained on the chopping
block from March 8-May 30, 2011—a mere twenty-two days—the fight to preserve their
undergraduate program continued well into the summer months. Listed as a proposed cut
at the June 16-17th governing body meeting, the differential tuition policy proposal was
not accepted until a later date, and was only conveyed to Dr. Hayes via an informal
conversation. While the use of military imagery was not as pronounced in Unit 2 as it
was in Unit 1, Dr. Hayes did reference his faculty’s fight against “this siege” (personal
communication, March 11, 2011). Though members of Unit 2 made no mention of
diminished institutional loyalty, it appeared as though intra-unit loyalties were strained as
a result of the proposed elimination. Turning to other faculty in a very different
predicament, I will now explicate their experiences in dealing with the outright
elimination of their unit.
Units 3 & 4
In this section, I present five vignettes, each outlining the participant’s personal
experiences with the 2011-2013 budget reduction process at Mountain University.
Located in the same college, it would be redundant to expand upon strategic, structural,
and job-related uncertainties in separate sections. Therefore, I will begin with individual
vignettes, followed by a combined discussion of strategic, structural, and job-related
uncertainties. Upon completion of this objective, I will return to separately analyze the
department chair effect in Units 3 and 4.
Though their units were ultimately eliminated, a strategic planning process
foreshadowed this outcome. Implemented July 1, 2011, the Dean endorsed this nodepartment, single program structure as a way to eliminate scholarly “silos.” Shielded
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from eliminating tenured faculty as a result of high numbers of collegiate TFVSIP
participants, the Dean’s changes reflected a corporate vision of university governance.
However, the elimination of a traditional academic configuration in favor of a businesslike governance model engendered considerable structural uncertainty. Interviewed in
the midst of this transition, I relate the faculty’s experiences with this change process
below.
Dr. Roberts-Chair of Unit 3
But, you know, I make it work, because I believe in this college and I believe in
this university. So I have to make it work. I make it work with enthusiasm.
(personal communication, March 7, 2012)
With his exuberant personality and forward-thinking philosophy, Dr. Roberts embraced
the sweeping changes to college and unit. Prompted by the appointment of a new, nonacademic dean, these adjustments reflected the business model of private industry (Lake,
2011). Though the new dean did not hold a terminal degree, the President removed his
interim status after a one-year probationary period. Announcing this appointment, the
President declared:
The upward trajectory of the [college] has been so potent. The [college] has
given their interim dean one of the most resounding endorsements of leadership
that I have ever witnessed (Lister, 2011).
Clearly, Dr. Roberts numbered amongst the adherents. Viewing the college as “a
partnership,” Dr. Roberts offered the following analogy:
It’s a partnership, the same as you’d have a legal practice, a medical practice, a
bunch of physicians together, a bunch of lawyers, an engineering practice—it’s a
partnership. You’ve got people—professionals, who are partners; so when you’re
admitted to tenure, you become a partner. You don’t buy your way in the way
you do in an accounting firm, but you buy it in with six years of blood, sweat, and
tears to become a partner—so it’s sweat equity that makes you a partner—and
you have responsibility when you become a partner (personal communication,
March 7, 2012).
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To Dr. Roberts, part of this responsibility included buying in to the new collegiate
leadership model, despite differences in opinion between himself and the dean. Believing
that the wellbeing of students transcended college and departmental politics, Dr. Roberts
outlined his perception of the academician’s purpose:
The university to me, is the crucible of thought, of care, and of preparing future
generations. The work we do—I really believe this—is some of the most
important work on the planet; because if the human race is going to advance, and
if we’re going to move to the omega point, whatever we think that is—it’s up to
us to see to it that what happened in the past is linked to what happens in the
future (personal communication, March 7, 2012).
Committed to this philosophy, Dr. Roberts encouraged his former faculty members to
press “full speed ahead” in pursuit of this new agenda—a bold move in the face of such
transformational change (personal communication, March 7, 2012).
Dr. James
At odds with the new Dean over changes to the college and the erosion of
academic governance, Dr. James summarized his position: “I was for the old structure. I
was for the department chairs” (personal communication, February 27, 2012). Employed
at Mountain University for a considerable period of time, Dr. James had seen the college
grow and flourish throughout the preceding decades. However, with this latest change in
leadership, Dr. James perceived the new “corporate mentality” as an unwelcome
academic encroachment. Indeed, Dr. James was not the only faculty member to express
these concerns. Alluding to conversations with his colleagues, he offered the following
assessment:
I really think now there’s a very strong, simmering discontent because of the
associate and assistant administrators who are unilaterally making decisions
without consulting with the faculty. That’s really gotten people—it’s this water
cooler mentality. Around the water cooler they’re all fired up. It takes a lot to get
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them to move on something but we’re getting close to the boiling point
(personal communication, February 27, 2012).
A precursor to this “boiling point,” Dr. James discussed his attempts to address
the “whispers” of departmental elimination with the Dean:
I can’t remember exactly but he made it sound like, “Well, we’re considering it.
There’ll be some changes. I’m not quite sure yet what it’ll be but the strategic
plan calls for us to change things.” Then, just before the meeting—like a couple
weeks before—we heard of the new structure he was going to propose at the
meeting (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
Announced at a May 2011 faculty meeting, the Dean’s new department-less structure
would go into effect on July 1, 2011. Calling this pronouncement a “fait accompli,” Dr.
James lamented the appointments, proclamations, and re-votes that had replaced
traditional faculty elections, bylaws, and autonomous decision-making. Close to
retirement, Dr. James admitted that “if it got too bad I could just throw in the towel.” Too
tired to continue fighting against “those things I don’t agree with,” Dr. James decided “to
go along with it” in the interim (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
Dr. Adams
Employed at Mountain University for nearly two decades, Dr. Adams had
experienced his fair share of institutional change. But this time was different. With a
new Dean, a new reporting structure, and the loss of significant numbers of colleagues,
Dr. Adams felt a heavy weight resting on his shoulders:
So the combined stress of all that has, you know, set morale and everything back
to where, you know, it’s been one of the most stressful times, you know, since
I’ve been here at the college and I’ve been here goin’ on [several] years now. It’s
starting, you know, just like the university saying, “Oh, the budget’s gonna get
better,” things like that; starting to see some light (personal communication, April
10, 2012).
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Optimistic about the future but realistic about the present, Dr. Adams perceived a
decisive shift in administrative discretion as it pertained to this collegiate overhaul:
I’m finally getting to the job I should have had years ago [Laughter], but wasn’t
eligible because of the university rules for administrators having had Ph.D.’s and
having gotten tenure, which does make it personally very interesting then that
those rules apply to everybody, except for our dean [Laughter]. But, it is what it
is (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
Using humor to cope with an otherwise difficult situation, Dr. Adams discussed
the short-term effects of this new reporting structure during the following exchange:
Interviewer: Have the silos gone away? Is there more camaraderie in the college
with this new structure?
Dr. Adams: No.
Interviewer: Is there less or has it stayed the same?
Dr. Adams: It’s about the same, yeah, there’s pockets of the people that talk to
each other and hang out. There’s still lots of gossiping, lots of back fighting, lots
of who said what about what and that has not quite—it has not gone away. You
know, it’s starting to get a little better (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
Despite entrenched loyalties and enmities, Dr. Adams did notice the Dean’s efforts to
engender greater collegiate community. Recounting a recent visit to a newly opened
performing arts complex, Dr. Adams noted:
We had a faculty meeting down at the [performing arts complex] and we got to
take a tour and everybody got—you know, and that was just something nice to do
together and to talk about things. At the time, there was a few controversial
things [Laughter] he wanted to, you know, meet about, but you know, things like
that really help (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
Eager to experience the progression of this new leadership model, Dr. Adams appeared
amenable to change—an important characteristic for an aspiring academic administrator.
Dr. Covey-Chair of Unit 4
Commenting on his brief tenure as leader of Unit 4, Dr. Covey made the
following declaration: “I was brought in to chair that department and to build a master’s
and a doctorate program as well as a graduate program. We barely got started when we
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were eliminated.” Though he lamented the plans that never came to fruition, Dr. Covey
was a “survivor” and not a defeatist. Outlining his position, he offered an evolutionary
analogy: “I can mutate, migrate, or die. I’ll be honest with you I made a decision to
embrace it.” Open to the new governance model, Dr. Covey believed “we’re stronger
because we’re not fractured by departments. I think that moving to a single degree for
this college was absolutely the right thing to do” (personal communication, February 22,
2012).
Though many of his tenured colleagues disagreed with this assessment, Dr. Covey
was more concerned with the fate of his students and non-tenured individuals. Describing
the classroom demeanor during the institutional turmoil, Dr. Covey noted “the haters and
attitudes from stress; giving up; their helplessness and anger…They felt like they were
abandoned by the university.” Moreover, “it was our junior faculty I felt worst about
because they really felt like they had just been thrown out. One day they’ve got a job, the
next day they know they’ve got a year.” While he “felt a tremendous amount of pressure
and frustration” during this time, these feelings paled in comparison to those facing
imminent unemployment (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Characterizing the aftermath of institutional and collegiate upheaval as “a
grieving process,” Dr. Covey acknowledged his ambivalence toward the minutia of
academe:
Matter of fact, one of my buddies last night sent me an email…He says, “What
department are you in?” I said, “I’m not. I just put down [the full name of the
college].” That’s what my business card says. That’s what I’m doing
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).
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Identifying himself as “a round peg that’s been squared off,” Dr. Covey nonetheless
discarded the “woe is me” attitude: “Too many people retire a place in anger. I won’t see
that happen” (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Dr. Kingman
Discussing the issue of institutional loyalty, Dr. Kingman decried the lack of
“humanism” as it pertained to the budgetary changes sweeping Mountain University. For
nearly twenty years, Dr. Kingman “gave this university everything I had…1000 percent
to my classes, you know, served on committees on the college level.” Hedging against
potential termination, Dr. Kingman signed up to claim the TFVSIP package, pulling back
at the last possible moment. Though he ultimately remained at Mountain University, Dr.
Kingman described this process as follows:
I went over there [to Human Resources], and I expected some—it was an
emotional process to be looking at signing your papers to leave, especially
since it hadn’t been a choice to leave. And the absence of any sensitivity to
what the VSIP people might be going through, you know, nothing about “I’m
really sorry you’re in this position where you had your unit eliminated or
whatever.” It was so kind of mechanical and so non kind of humanistic and
relational, I was very disappointed (personal communication, February 28, 2012).
While dismayed at his treatment by Human Resources, Dr. Kingman was even more
disheartened by a lack of professional collegiality: “There were very few people from the
administration, many of whom I’d known for a long time, or even from across campus
that would just, you know, send an e-mail and say…“How are you holding up?”
(personal communication, February 28, 2012).
Despite these emotional setbacks, Dr. Kingman expressed “gratitude for what I do
have in life.” Knowing “how lucky I am to have a job in this economic environment,” Dr.
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Kingman believed “that every experience in life makes you wiser.” Expounding on this
philosophical outlook, Dr. Kingman explained:
And every test, I just—it comes back to every test that I’m given, I just want to
become a better person, having gone through it. And I think that I have been.
You know, a certain level of acceptance—you know, you can’t determine what
life gives you. All you can do is decide how you’re gonna respond to it
(personal communication, February 28, 2012).
Though he “would not wish what I went through on anybody,” Dr. Kingman found solace
in this particular life experience:
I think that the best judgment of a situation is to use it to grow was a human
being. Who are you on the other side of it? And, you know, I learned a lot of
things I think were good for me to learn as a human being going through this
process (personal communication, February 28, 2012).
Strategic Uncertainty
Engaged in faculty-driven strategic planning sessions in 2006 and 2009, these
discussions had stalled due to a lack of scholarly consensus. Upon arrival at the college
in the Fall of 2010, the new dean decided to restart the strategic planning process once
more, in order to make “explicit the Vision, Values, Mission, Goals and Strategies of the
College. ” A framework for 2011-2015, this plan would “serve as a “road map” to guide
and direct the major efforts of the College for the next three to five years” (Mountain
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011). In the sections below, the faculty of Units 3 and
4 discuss the arrival of the new dean and the effects 2010-2011 strategic planning
process.
Reasons for Organizational Change
From October 2010 through June 2011, the new Dean directed the efforts of the
collegiate strategic planning process. As a means of gathering “broad and comprehensive
feedback from all major stakeholders,” an outside facilitator gathered information from
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“students, faculty, professional and clerical staff, advisory board members, alumni,
industry leaders and other individuals and groups involved in the College.” Using
“surveys, interviews, questionnaires, and focus group discussions,” the facilitator
developed “an environmental scan examining political, economic, social and technology
factors (PEST) and strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)” (Mountain
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011). The full text of the PEST and SWOT analyses
appear as appendices H and I.
In addition to the aforementioned analytic tools, the strategic plan included goals
and achievement strategies, each outlined in succession. The seven goals of the strategic
plan were as follows:
1. Help students learn and grow through rigorous academics, relevant
professional experiences and engaging social opportunities.
2. Support and enhance faculty/staff professional development, collaboration and
performance.
3. Significantly increase resources to support and reward research, teaching and
service.
4. Develop strong relationships and improve communications with the alumni,
industry and community.
5. Enhance and expand facilities, resources and amenities to create a highly
professional learning environment.
6. Establish a strong and sustainable financial structure to ensure stability and
long term success.
7. Improve the organizational and operational effectiveness of the College.
(Mountain University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011)
Two to four strategies followed each goal, with simple, bulleted points serving to guide
faculty and administrative actions. Including appendices, the strategic plan totaled thirtyfour pages, reading as more of a PowerPoint presentation than an academic narrative.
Commenting on the rationale for this undertaking, the faculty were fairly
consistent in their understanding. Prompted by the Provost’s budget reduction directive,
the Dean adhered to the collegiate mission:
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Develop students into leaders of the [disciplinary] industry, contribute to the
advancement of the profession and provide service to the community by having
an outstanding faculty, challenging curriculum, innovative research, supportive
culture and wide range of professional experiences; all in the context of one of the
most exciting cities in the world (Mountain University [Units 3 & 4] College,
2011).
As substantiated by Dr. Kingman (personal communication, February 28, 2012):
The Dean was told he had to cut, I don’t know, $1 million, $1.5 million from the
budget and that it was equivalent to about ten lines. At that point, he just looked
for the faculty or the degree programs that weren’t central to the mission of the
college, in his mind. That’s how the faculty were let go.
Focused on preserving the college’s essential functions, the Dean implemented business
practices to achieve this end. As outlined in the following interchange, the Dean drew on
his private sector training to lead the college:
Interviewer: Why do you think that all the departments were eliminated?
Dr. Covey: We got a new dean and he comes out of the corporate sector and he
looked at this and he says, “This doesn’t make any sense.” What he was looking
at it was from a corporate perspective and also from a [Mountain City] industry
perspective. He said, “If I’m going to go out and I’m going to sell the college,
I can’t sell it as four dispersed and disparate departments.” We had 10 or 11
degrees at that point; I lost count (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Furthermore, “He’s trying to make sure that we’re turning out a product—which is our
students—that best serves the needs of the [disciplinary] industry and specifically looks
at the [Mountain City] marketplace” (Dr. Covey, personal communication, February 22,
2012).
Acting on institutional data, Dr. Adams presented demonstrable evidence in favor
of collegiate consolidation:
Over 80 percent of our students were still getting our—even though we offered all
these other majors and things, 80 percent of our students were still getting their
degree in [a specific major]. So we decided to go back and just offer that one
degree. That it was too confusing and that our industry and employment partners
really didn’t care whether students had all these other separate names on their
diplomas (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
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As explained by Dr. Roberts, this academic integration had been long in the making. In
summation of this decision, he stated: “Concurrently, with the budget whittling, we
decided—and this had pre-dated any problems we had—to redo our curriculum; so we
had one streamlined curriculum we were getting to, to replace several minors, majors not
listed” (personal communication, March 7, 2012). Though the reasons for collegiate
change were relatively clear, perceptions of the strategic planning process and its
implementation varied by narrator.
Planning and Future Direction of the Organization
A private sector businessman, the Dean approached the aforementioned planning
process in the manner most familiar to him—a course of action which promoted factbased decision-making over personal sentiment. Solidifying his status as an academic
outsider, the Dean operated on personality as opposed to politics, providing a concise,
logical rationale for the college’s strategic direction. Commenting on this candor, Dr.
Kingman offered the following assessment of the Dean:
I guess the thing—you know, even though—and this is a really strange thing, is
that even though [the Dean] eliminated our degree program, he did it in such a
way –first, like I said, he fought for us. You know, he fought really hard for us
when he first became Dean. He was always respectful, and he was always kind.
And even when he sat us down and said, “I’m cutting your degree program and
your lines,” there was a sense that he did it—and I told him this to his face—he
did it honestly, and he did it respectfully and he did it ethically. He didn’t wanna
be in that position, but that was the position he was in (personal communication,
February 28, 2012).
Reinforcing Dr. Kingman’s assertions, Dr. Covey provided a similar description of this
pivotal event:
He brought us all in together and sat us down as a faculty, and he explained his
rationale and why it had to be done and he said, “I’ll do whatever I have to do to
help any of you be successful.” He was real compassionate about it and I think
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that was really important. It didn’t take the frustration away. It didn’t take the
anger—the anger’s just a kneejerk reaction (personal communication, February
22, 2012).
Though few doubted the Dean’s sincerity, several faculty members expressed
concerns regarding the erosion of shared collegiate governance. A decisive leader, the
Dean tended to trust his instincts, often taking bold action with limited faculty input. In a
telling exchange, Dr. Roberts discussed his impressions of the college’s new
organizational structure:
Interviewer: And this is all based off of a strategic plan, correct?
Dr. Roberts: Yeah. I mean, it was one of the things discussed in the strategic
plan. And it was based on a study that a faculty committee—former faculty
committee did two or three years ago. They came up with several options of how
we could reorganize the college. We’re always looking for constant quality
improvement, but, you know, this is—I’m not sure this is the right path for us to
be taking (personal communication, March 7, 2012).
Seconding Dr. Roberts’ claims, Dr. Adams elaborated on the limitations of faculty
influence during the strategic planning process:
There was a consultant that—we had two different consultants. One was the
original strategic planning process and then a different one in this second strategic
planning process and they did present a, you know, concluding report of, you
know, what was found during the process and it was after that concluding report
that the new structure was shown to the faculty saying, “This is what we’re
doing” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
Despite these hesitations, Dr. Adams did acknowledge that this heavy-handed decisionmaking was a consequence of longstanding leadership deficiencies. Expounding on this
caveat, he explained: “Part of the problem is there was never a clear consensus on what
the faculty wanted to do” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
As the strategic planning process came to a close and implementation
commenced, Dr. James took issue with the college’s new bonus program. Designed to
incentivize high-quality research, this program provided monetary rewards to faculty
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members who published in top-tier academic journals. However, only seven academic
journals qualified as top-tier. Questioning this outcome, Dr. James stated:
This is part of the new structure. The publishing people had their advisory
committee of five people and the associate dean of research said that it came from
that committee. “That committee advised me this is the seven publications.” One
person who sat on that committee had never heard of it (personal communication,
February 27, 2012).
Expounding on his displeasure, Dr. James offered a supplemental explanation:
It really wasn’t so much the money but again, they do dumb things because now
even the publishers are slick. “Well, if you publish there [in one of these seven
journals] you’re going to get money.” Then, those who feel that they excel more
at teaching than other areas or service, there’s no incentive there. So you’re going
to teach a larger class and there’s no incentive there (personal communication,
February 27, 2012).
Perceiving this inequitable bonus program as a source of faculty tension, Dr. James
alluded to the pitfalls of a two-tiered academic system: “It doesn’t become an incentive; it
becomes a disincentive because your colleague could write and put out the same effort
you do and make money and you don’t” (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
Organizational Sustainability
While personal financial incentives became a hot-button issue, the fiscal health of
the college and institution loomed large in the faculty’s collective psyche. Recalling his
perceptions of Mountain University’s early retirement program, Dr. Kingman
remembered when the President “started talking about—brought out the VSIP program,
and he said that if enough people elected to leave, where they could make the budget cut
they needed, that his hope was he wouldn’t have to let tenured faculty go” (personal
communication, February 28, 2012).
Provided this uncertain campus climate, Dr. Adams admitted “that it’s been very
hard to find someone [a Dean] to come here” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
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Unable to lure top academic talent as a result of this negative publicity, faculty members
acknowledged the core strength of their new leader. As succinctly stated by Dr. Roberts:
“He’s a business leader, a very successful one, and a huge fundraiser, he does a good job
with that. And he’ll be the first one to say he doesn’t understand academics” (personal
communication, March 7, 2012). Referencing a failed capital campaign, Dr. Adams
endorsed his wealth of experience in that particular arena, stating: “That was one of the
main reasons why our dean was hired from [the private sector], was to—once the, you
know, budget got straightened out a little bit, to get that project back off the ground”
(personal communication, April 10, 2012).
In addition to concerns about Mountain University’s financial stability, faculty
members expressed qualms regarding the demographic and academic orientation of their
college. Relating his perspectives on these matters, Dr. Covey made the following
observations:
I think overall the college is stronger. I think from a research perspective that
remains to be seen until we see what we—we have two people right now left on
tenure track. That means everybody else is an associate professor or—if you look
at the average age of this college, this university, it scares me. I look around the
college and I’d say it’s probably in the 50s—the average age of the college. I
mean, we’ve got faculty in their 70s, you know (personal communication,
February 22, 2012).
Referring to Mountain University as an “immature” research institution, Dr. Covey
further contextualized his position:
Our research resources here are just pitiful. Our dean is committed to making
those changes. That’s one of the reasons he reorganized—but the college, as a
whole here, doesn’t yet have a—there’s folks who do really good research in the
college, don’t get me wrong. But as a whole, in many ways, we’re still a teaching
college (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
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Believing that “if we’re not going to bring folks in that can do solid research, we’re just
shooting ourselves in the head,” Dr. Covey underscored the college’s conundrum. In
summation, he offered the following prediction:
I think over the next five to ten years that’s going to change in this college as
we’re bringing better and better people into the college. If they don’t come in
with a research orientation—if we don’t change the way we do graduate studies
in this university—we’re never going to be a research-intensive university. They
can say that to the world. A bunch of crap (personal communication, February
22, 2012).
In addition to these esoteric concerns, faculty members touched on more eclectic,
practical matters. A visionary thinker in this vein, Dr. Covey questioned why
administrative consolidation was not pursued as an alternative to faculty termination.
Commenting on this curiosity, Dr. Covey recalled:
I did note that no college was eliminated through this whole process and they
easily could’ve gotten rid of two or three colleges. I would’ve gotten rid of—
I would have combined [two specified colleges]. I would’ve combined [two
additional colleges] but I think there’s enough clout in the community—[the
first two colleges]—they have a lot of power. We’ve got a lot of power.
[Another college] has got some power; not as much (personal communication,
February 22, 2012).
Alluding to the intangibles of university politics, Dr. Covey recognized that it was much
simpler to eliminate individual faculty members than to consolidate “turf.” However, the
overall loss of college colleagues due to retirements, departures, and dismissals had taken
its toll on the student body. As summarized by Dr. Kingman: “There’s no way that the
quality of the education they got was the same” (personal communication, February 28,
2012).
Nature of the Business Environment
Offering his perspectives on Mountain State and the fate of his unit, Dr. Covey
made the following observation:
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Do I wish it had gone a different way? I sure do. I think we could’ve built a
really, really strong program here. What’s my take on [Mountain State]?
[Mountain State] as a state does not value higher education. Had I known that
[when I came to work here], I might’ve rethought it but I was ready to move
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Though disillusioned with Mountain State’s educational philosophy, Dr. Covey found
Mountain University’s academic direction to be equally disconcerting. Panning the
institution’s treatment of its graduate students, Dr. Covey opined:
Most doctoral students on state funds have to teach three courses—two courses a
semester I think it is. You cannot build a graduate program and graduate students
that are going to be competitive in the marketplace by having them teach that kind
of a load (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
As evidenced by faculty commentary, it is clear that the strategic planning process had
engendered significant controversy—debates which soon escalated into extreme
structural uncertainty.
Structural Uncertainty
A product of a department-less governance model, structural uncertainty pervaded
the college of Units 3 and 4. Without a department chair to turn to, faculty members
struggled to determine the appropriate chain of command. Absent clear hierarchical
lines, academics expressed consternation at the wide span of control and limited points of
confluence. Commentary on specific aspects of structural uncertainty appears below.
Reporting Structures
Perceiving academic departments as “competitive units” or “silos,” the Dean
conceived a new collegiate reporting structure in Spring 2011 (Dr. James, personal
communication, February 27, 2012). Substituting a corporate model for the college’s
thirty-year-old reporting structure (see Figure 2 below), this new hierarchy (see Figure 3
below) engendered widespread uncertainty amongst affiliated faculty. Against the advice
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of Dr. James, Dr. Roberts, and the units’ Organizational Structure Report (2009), the
Dean eliminated all departments—replacing traditional department chairs with associate
and assistant deans.

Figure 2. College Reporting Structure, 1980s-June 30, 2011

Figure 3. College Reporting Structure, July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012
While the 2011-2015 strategic plan did call for “improve[ing] the structure of the
College to function in a more efficient and professional manner,” the move to eliminate
all departments did not flow from nor sit well with members of the faculty (Mountain
University [Units 3 & 4] College, 2011, p.27). Indeed, Dr. James offered the following
assessment of the new model:
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Now that we have the single structure, he [the Dean] has eliminated the silos
but has created an “Us against Them” mentality. “Us” being the people in the
administration—him, the three associate deans and assistant dean—against
“Them” the faculty. Since then they have roughshodded rules like, “Okay, this
is the new rules.” “Well, who made these rules?” “The executive committee
and there’s no rebuttal” (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
Alluding to the faculty’s sentiments, Dr. Adams revealed: “There’s definitely discussion
that, well, you know, four or five years down the line if we, you know, have a new dean,
then we’d go back to having departments” (personal communication, April 10, 2012).
Tangential to these assertions, Dr. Roberts alluded to the central issue of
communication in a department-less college. Contending that “there was no home for
people” in this new structure, Dr. Roberts railed against the “hearsay and bullshit” of
hallway chatter (personal communication, March 7, 2012). In further explication, Dr.
James declared:
When you have a span of control that wide you need to break it down. The
original dean—when we had 12, 14, 16 faculty—treated it more like a large
department. He could interface with 16 people. When you get to be 61
[college faculty members] you need to break them into units so that—several
reasons I thought it was effective. Number one, you chose your department
chair so the department chair had a stake in listening to you. It also worked
against you, too. I mean, if you didn’t want to be popular you might lose your
job so there’s an understanding of that. But also, they got to know the faculty
better and could place them, I think, in positions that were more effective for
teaching. I think they also understood where the faculty strengths were. Some
were in publishing, some were in service, some were in teaching. And reward
them accordingly. Now, we have 41 faculty and literally one person. I just
think the span of control is not effective (personal communication, February
27, 2012).
Clarifying his original position, Dr. Roberts stated:
But what I mean, what I’m saying is that, instead of having faculty meetings
by department where you could talk about issues, there’s no place to do that
now. Sure, there’s faculty meetings. How are you going to talk about issues
in a faculty meeting with 41 people in it, how are you going to have a
meaningful discussion? (personal communication, March 7, 2012)
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Exemplifying Dr. Roberts’ foreboding, collegiate faculty expressed
consternation in regard to the annual evaluation process. Formerly the purview of
department chairs, this new procedure called for a three-way evaluation among the
Associate Deans. Intended to enhance the robustness of annual evaluations, this method
instead resulted in the opposite outcome. Commenting on this academic anomaly, Dr.
Covey asserted: “I’ve been in higher education for 40 years and I’ve never seen this
model” (personal communication, February 22, 2012). Confusing and chaotic, Dr.
Adams described the process as follows:
And, you know, I haven’t heard any real complaints—hadn’t heard any
complaints that people were upset about the fairness of their evaluation or
anything bad. It was just really un-wieldy and a little bit more time consuming
process for the Associate Deans since they were all evaluating. [Laughter]
I know the Associate Deans didn’t care for the process too much, you know,
because they had 38 different applications they had to evaluate
(personal communication, April 10, 2012).
In the following exchange, Dr. Roberts (personal communication, March 7, 2012)
provides additional insight into procedural shortcomings:
Dr. Roberts: And there illustrates the problem, because when I was chair of
[Unit 3], and let’s say you were in my department. Donoff, is your name?
Interviewer: Susan Donoff, yes.
Dr. Roberts: You forget to tell me that you worked on Three Square meal
thing, community service, and you forget to put it down [on your annual
evaluation]; because I talk to you every day, I know that maybe you’re an
airhead sometimes and you didn’t put it down there, but I know what you did.
So I’ll go ahead and add it in for you, and then I know what you did and I can
rate it properly. See what I’m saying?
Interviewer: But now you’re kind of removed?
Dr. Roberts: Correct. I’d also know if you’re B.S.ing me, too.
Interviewer: And now you don’t really—well…
Dr. Roberts: No idea.
While faculty evaluations certainly left much to be desired, Dr. Adams
(personal communication, April 10, 2012) discerned further structural deficiencies:
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You know, what it messes up is those lines of reporting and that clarity of
who you go to, both the faculty and the student lines that people were used
to for that. You know, for the students, you know, it’s now that the associate
dean and the assistant dean, you know, are handling most of the student issues
there. You know, the students don’t notice a difference as much, because they
probably never really understood the departments either. The other interesting
part of it is that we still—all our classes are still listed under the prefixes of
these different departments. [Names relevant prefixes], because in the process
of all the common course numbering and things for the entire system, like [the
local community college] uses those same course numbers and things like that.
So, you know, there was a question about [going to one uniform prefix]. Now
we can’t—we wouldn’t even be able to do that, because then that would mess
up [the local community college] after they made a bunch of changes six, eight
years ago, so their stuff would comply with ours, because we had departments.
Aware of the numerous issues that arose during the first year of implementation, the
Dean announced a modified structure at the February 2012 faculty meeting. Taking
effect July 1, 2012, the new reporting hierarchy (see Figure 4 below) sought to remedy
the aforementioned structural weaknesses. In a stroke of academic irony, Dr. Adams
described the new “assistant dean for operations as basically everything a department
chair would have been doing anyway” (personal communication, April 10, 2012). Eager
to return to their longstanding departmental structure, faculty members moved to recreate
this same position under a different title.
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Figure 4. College Reporting Structure, July 1, 2012-present
Functionality of the Unit
Adjusting to the new department-less structure proved challenging for college
faculty members, resulting in many of the same outcomes as individuals in “saved” units.
Though departmental advocacy did not take the same forms as in Units 1 and 2,
academics in Units 3 and 4 did express concerns about scholarly productivity. While Dr.
Covey “found that I had—I got the lowest teaching scores I’ve ever gotten in my life last
semester,” (personal communication, February 22, 2012) Dr. Kingman admitted “that if I
hadn’t had some things kind of in the hopper that my research productivity would’ve just
almost dropped off completely” (personal communication, February 28, 2012). A
function of stress, Drs. Covey and Kingman allude to one of the unintended
consequences of departmental restructuring.
Continuing in this vein, Dr. Kingman explained: “this whole process brings out
the worst in people, you know, very much—at least that was our experience in the [name
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removed] College, very much people trying to protect themselves” (personal
communication, February 28, 2012). Acknowledging the importance of jockeying, Dr.
Roberts admitted that “the view as the lead horse is a lot better than the view from
behind that lead horse” (personal communication, March 7, 2012). Unwilling to fight the
rising tide of corporatism, faculty members looked for new opportunities in this
contemporary reporting structure. Admitting his fascination with this atypical hierarchy,
Dr. Covey declared: “I think we’re stronger because we’ve come together and we’re
better able to focus our resources and our energies. Do I think it will last? Who knows?”
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Job-Related Uncertainty
Like faculty in “saved” units, academics in eliminated units discussed key
components of job-related uncertainty. While these departmental eliminations were for
ideological rather than financial reasons, faculty members expressed similar sentiments
as it pertained to this realm of inquiry. Faculty commentary on aspects of job-related
uncertainty appears below.
Job Security
Though TVSIP program participation spared tenured faculty, non-tenured
individuals in the college were not as fortunate. Speaking about this very subject, Dr.
Kingman offered a troubling caveat, stating: “Unfortunately, our junior faculty, they were
told straight up, look ‘em in the eye, “Don’t worry. You know, I’m telling you, you don’t
have to worry about it” (personal communication, February 28, 2012). Piggybacking on
this assertion, Dr. Covey noted the following:
We had made a couple of really good hires. Three of us came in—two of us at the
same time and the next year we got another person it—and they were good leaders.
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They were going to be solid researchers; they were going to move us in the
direction we needed to go and do the kinds of things that needed to be done
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).
In addition to the loss of promising tenure-track faculty, Dr. Kingman recounted the
collegiate climate during this tumultuous time:
The junior faculty were saying, “Well, if we bring in tenured faculty and our
college takes another cut, the first people to go are the untenured faculty, so we
don’t want more tenured faculty here.” So they were looking at colleagues from
across campus that were potentially losing their jobs and saying, “I’m putting my
needs first.” I had faculty members that said, “You know, I’ve got three kids to
feed, and I will do anything it takes not to lose my job, including sacrificing a
colleague” (personal communication, February 28, 2012).
Unwilling to accommodate their institutional colleagues, Dr. Kingman offered a macabre
metaphor: “I mean, so, you know, there’s kind of dead bodies scattered all over the
place, as far as, you know, what happened to people” (personal communication, February
28, 2012).
Though non-tenured faculty members clung tightly to their positions, long-time
Mountain University academics conveyed no such fears. Underscoring these sentiments,
Dr. James acknowledged: “Me, personally, it doesn’t make a difference. I’m close to
retirement” (personal communication, February 27, 2012). In a similar vein, Dr. Covey
stated:
I’m a tenured, full professor and there’s nothing they can do to me without
removing tenure from the university. It would take them six years to fire me and
I’m going to do my job and I’m going to do it well. But I’m going to research what
I want to research (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Despite hard-hitting financial challenges to the college and university, tenured faculty
members in Units 3 and 4 expressed no doubts about their continued employment.
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Promotion Opportunities
Perhaps the most hot-button issue amongst faculty members, a new “pay for
publishing” program had touched off intra-collegiate rivalries. As framed by Dr. Covey:
He [the Dean] announced at our last faculty meeting that if you publish in a
top-tier journal we’ll pay you for it. $3,000…There was a group out there that
was absolutely opposed to it because they don’t publish in those particular
journals (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Among the opponents of this enticement, Dr. James offered a compelling counterassertion:
Well, the journals they listed seemed to favor a certain part of the people because
they tried to publish in there and the others are going, “Look, I’m publishing in
what I feel to be top journals in my area but there’s no financial incentive here.”
That really pissed people off. Then the people who teach and do service say,
“Why is it so important? These people are getting course releases to publish—
that’s their job—so why are you rewarding them with more money?” I mean, we
have things like teacher—from within the college—teacher of the year, publisher
of the year, service person of the year. You get extra money for that; one in each
category. But this is like if you publish you’re going to get money
(personal communication, February 27, 2012).
In addition to this burgeoning controversy, faculty members expressed concerns
regarding advancement opportunities both within and outside the college. Discussing the
former, Dr. Adams questioned his ability to move up in the current institutional
environment:
So we’ll see what happens with that over the next couple years and there will
be room, because some of the people that are in the associate dean positions and
things, you know, are probably only gonna be here another couple years before
they retire. So hopefully there will be room to move up from there
(personal communication, April 10, 2012).
In a related vein, Dr. Covey explicated his scholarly stagnation:
I’m not going to retire and I’m not at a point in my career where people are going
to want to hire me. I always thought that age discrimination was a bunch of
nonsense; maybe it’s a personal thing (personal communication, February 22,
2012).
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Despite limited promotional opportunities at Mountain University, faculty members
accepted the security of their current employment rather than take their chances at
another institution.
Changes to the Job Role
As a result of budgetary-induced retirements and departures, collegiate faculty
members dwindled from a high of sixty to an all-time low of forty. A reduction of this
magnitude, occurring over a mere three-year time period, caused considerable changes to
the job roles of remaining faculty members. Discussing this phenomenon, Dr. James
made the following observation:
Well, as we lost faculty they arbitrarily increased the size of the classes
immensely. Normally, we taught like a 60-size classroom because that’s
where our structure is. Our original dean set up for about 60 to a class, which,
having taught at 60, was maybe I just got used to it. It was a pretty ideal situation.
Now, you can walk in with 150 in your class. 200 sometimes. And while it might
lend itself to certain classes—maybe you could with 200—teachers were put in
classes they were ill prepared for. They said, “Well, if you can teach 40 why can’t
you teach 150?” Well, unless you’ve taught you don’t know the dynamics of a
150 class versus a 40 class (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
In addition to Dr. James’ assertions, Dr. Kingman conveyed the burden of increased
service obligations:
Yeah, graduate committees. Yeah, and it, you know—I chaired a lot of graduate
committees, and I don’t know if I chaired more, but it meant that since there were
only [a few] of us left, that we had to serve on all of the committees. You know, it
was kind of a member of a committee if not the chair of the committee. And so, I
mean, we just became the group that was responsible for just making it go
(personal communication, February 28, 2012).
Faced with a loss of a third of their faculty colleagues, members of Units 3 and 4
struggled to balance teaching, research, and service. As expressed by Dr. Adams:
And everybody’s gone from teaching two to three classes or three classes to four,
teaching large size classes and then you have, you know, that many fewer people
to spread around all these committees. You know, so now, you know, where you
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used to just go to a department meeting, now you’re on one of these advisory
committees and, you know, everybody’s still on their other curriculum
committees, college-university committees and things (personal communication,
April 10, 2012).
While amplified teaching and service responsibilities represented the lion’s share
of faculty commentary, members of Units 3 and 4 also discussed a decrease in shared
governance. In the following monologue, Dr. James outlines one aspect of this trend:
He [the Dean] uses them [the college bylaws] when they’re at his convenience
and when they’re not at his convenience he says they’re not in sync with the
university’s bylaws; therefore, at this time we can’t use them. Other times he uses
them. When he first got here they wanted to…I forget what it was but we had a
vote. According to our bylaws the vote did not pass but he wanted it so he said,
“Listen, I really want this so I’m going to move that way.” Everybody was hunkydory at that time, saying, “Well, okay. You’re new. Fine.” We should have
never—we should’ve held our ground right from the beginning, which we didn’t
(personal communication, February 27, 2012).
Furthermore, Dr. Roberts offered another example of circumscribed faculty input:
Well, the one issue that came up is the [name removed] course, there was a
discussion on one of these. Somebody in the college, a senior person, wanted
it gone. So they did convene an ad hoc committee of people they thought would
be interested in [this particular aspect of the college], and they discussed whether
we should do away with [this particular] course, and they decided to. But the
conversation was not a focused conversation by all the people who should have
been there having this conversation. It should have started with the people who
are, in one way or another, involved in either teaching that course or using the
students’ skills who have taken that course in the other courses. And then it can
go to the college level; because normally, you’d have the discussion like this in
the department, the department makes a course proposal or a change proposal.
That’s standard throughout any university (personal communication, March 7,
2012).
Moreover, “the faculty never voted on the decision to totally eliminate the
departments,” in spite of contrary assertions advanced to the governing body (Dr. Adams,
personal communication, April 10, 2012). As reinforced by Dr. James:
I think one thing that was discouraging is when the president presented it to the
[governing body] that there’s a new structure in the [name removed] college and
we were told by someone in attendance—because none of the faculty were at the
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[governing body] meetings—that this was passed with a vote of the faculty of the
college. No vote was ever taken (personal communication, February 27, 2012).
In a tangential vein, Dr. Covey cited the erosion of core principles of faculty governance:
We’re bringing in five faculty—one senior—and we’re bringing in four people for
interviews. We’ve got five positions. One’s a senior faculty—who would come in
as a senior faculty member and we’re bringing in three other folks—all who got
their Ph.Ds. here. To me, that doesn’t speak well. You don’t do that
(personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Relieved to no longer be a chair, Dr. Covey underscored a positive aspect of the zerodepartment structure:
I used to get here at 6:30, 7:00 in the morning. I come in at 8:30 now. I get up in
the morning and sort of dink around. If I want to stay home like I did yesterday, I
stayed home and wrote all day long. I couldn’t do that as an administrator. I had
to be here. It’s been liberating for me in a way because I rediscovered how much
fun it is to be a faculty member (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Effect of the Department Chair: Unit 3
Though acting in a different capacity than a “saved” department chair, the
academic leader of Unit 3 nonetheless affected perceptions of strategic, structural, and
job-related uncertainty. Using analytic induction and Berg’s (2007) concepts of manifest
and latent messaging, I interpreted the actions of Unit 3’s department chair below.
Positive Personality
Unable to change the Dean’s mind as it pertained to departmental elimination, Dr.
Roberts elected to “put a positive spin” on the college’s new direction. Recognizing the
utility of being “a cheerleader,” he outlined his leadership philosophy as follows:
It is what it is. You have to—students are why we’re here. We’re here for the
students, that’s the number one reason. We’re not here to design organizations,
we’re not here to write memos, we’re here for the students.
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Refusing to “be a sourpuss,” Dr. Roberts underscored his “collaborative style” and
“willing[ness] to make tough decisions” as hallmarks of an effective chair. Elaborating
on this leadership methodology, he explained:
You gain a lot more with a teaspoon of honey than you do with a gallon of
vinegar, and that’s just the way it is. And I think people want to know the
truth, people want to know—for you to be firm with them; but you have to
be firm, you have to be fair, you have to be consistent. That’s true in the
classroom and it’s true in management. I think that, for me, the style then
is to look at this as a partnership of professionals.
Resolved to move with rather than against the tide of collegiate leadership, Dr. Roberts
embraced these administrative challenges, and encouraged his former departmental
colleagues to do the same (personal communication, March 7, 2012).
Effect of the Department Chair: Unit 4
Similar to Dr. Roberts, Dr. Covey affected faculty perceptions of strategic,
structural, and job-related uncertainty through his unique leadership style. While not as
exuberant as Dr. Roberts in his endorsement of the college’s direction, he nonetheless
moved with, rather than against, the new Dean.
Realistic Outlook
A sensible and pragmatic leader, Dr. Covey summarized his position: “First goal
was to save the department. Second goal was to save the program. Third goal was to
survive.” Concerned with preserving the employment of his departmental colleagues, Dr.
Covey conveyed his stance: “Look, we’re going to die anyway. Let’s see if we can save
the program.” Straightforward in his delivery, Dr. Covey’s words struck a chord with his
faculty. Recapping his message, Dr. Covey recalled:
It doesn’t do any good to whine. That’s what I used to tell my kids. “We
don’t whine in this house.” We fought a good battle and I came here to a
very bright future. It didn’t work out that way. It’s okay. I go home at
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night, sleep good. I go home, some nights I go home and whine, but [my
spouse] tells me to shut up.
Though he and his colleagues “felt like we weren’t appreciated,” he reserved his ire for
the Mountain University Faculty Senate:
I felt like they rolled over and played dead. Now, we had to make cuts at the
university; that’s a given. Somebody’s gonna go. We’re a small program,
we’re a new program. We had time over the twenty years the program was
in existence before I got here to do those kinds of things. They didn’t do it.
Frustrated with a lack of faculty advocacy, Dr. Covey nonetheless acknowledged the role
of recession in this latest outcome, stating: “had the economy not gone sour we’d still be
a department and we wouldn’t be going” (personal communication, February 22, 2012).
Summary
Bound together by the shared phenomenon of departmental elimination, the
members of Units 3 and 4 revealed numerous unintended consequences of structural
change. Struggling with the loss of a third of their colleagues, remaining collegiate
faculty absorbed this workload via increased teaching and service obligations. Though
Units 1 and 2 made frequent use of military imagery, Units 3 and 4 underscored the
“death” of their respective departments. In this vein, Dr. Kingman (Unit 4) recalled
“dead bodies scattered all over the place,” while Dr. James lamented the “fait accompli”
of departmental elimination. Although somewhat accepting of this change in direction,
faculty members and former department chairs continued to voice their concerns
regarding the perceived erosion of shared governance. Chapter 5 concludes this study,
and includes a discussion of findings, theoretical and practical implications, and
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Introduction and Overview of Study
An emergent and expanding phenomenon, departmental/programmatic
eliminations represent a new paradigm in the history of American higher education.
Following decades of unprecedented growth in student enrollments, disciplinary
offerings, and campus acreage, sharp decreases in state subsidies have forced public
institutions into a precarious position. Leery of sharp tuition increases due to their
detrimental effects on student access, administrators have elected to balance budgets on
the backs of state employees. Though faculty members represent but one constituency
affected by this strategic direction, their historical status as university guardians heightens
the stakes of this perilous pursuit.
In the current study, I interviewed thirteen tenured faculty members regarding
their experiences with departmental/programmatic elimination at Mountain University.
Though grateful for gainful employment in a turbulent job market, these individuals
expressed serious concerns about the direction of their institution. While numerous
comments pertained exclusively to Mountain University, several remarks heralded
disquieting trends in American higher education. Expanding on these points, I discuss
findings, theoretical and practical implications, and recommendations for future research
in the following sections.
Research Questions
Research Question 1
How do individuals experience a potential departmental/programmatic elimination?
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Framed to provide the greatest leeway in individual responses, faculty members
expressed emotions ranging from anger to bewilderment to reluctant acceptance. Though
each scholar shared his/her own unique experiences with departmental/programmatic
elimination, certain commonalities emerged throughout the interview process. In this
manner, faculty lamented their general disempowerment as it pertained to the university’s
strategic direction. Caught between a highly competitive job market and an uncertain
future at Mountain University, many faculty members chose to stay at their current
institution. Moreover, several individuals cited family (i.e. spouse, children, etc.)
concerns as paramount in their decision-making process. Hesitant to disrupt the lives of
their family members and fearful of moving to another undesirable situation, many
faculty members elected to ride out the current financial storm in the hopes of a brighter,
post-recession future at Mountain University. Based upon the thirteen interviews
conducted for this study, gender and rank were non-factors in a faculty member’s
decision to seek new employment or remain at Mountain University. Table 6 provides
general demographic characteristics of interview participants.
Table 6
Demographic Characteristics of Interview Participants
Gender

9 men (69%); 4 women (31%)

Race

13 Caucasians (100%)

Unit Classification

4 non-STEM units (100%)

Rank

5 Associate Professors (38%); 8 Full Professors (62%)
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Research Question 2
To what extent do strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainties manifest themselves
during potential departmental/programmatic eliminations?
Absent clear, data-driven performance indicators, faculty members were free to
speculate as to their newfound status. In this manner, Mountain University faculty
members questioned the metrics which had placed them in academic jeopardy. Citing
outdated records and dubious definitions of “productivity,” faculty in Units 1 and 2
pushed back against these categorizations through varied efforts at departmental
advocacy. Alerting their respective professional associations was a tactic shared by Units
1 and 2, in addition to formulating alternative revenue generating/cost savings proposals.
Though grounded in a college-wide strategic planning process, scholars in Units 3 and 4
disputed the Dean’s vision of corporate governance. Working to recreate their familiar
departmental configuration, faculty members in Units 3 and 4 refashioned job titles and
reporting structures to mimic traditional academic organizations.
Perceiving profound organizational differences between private industry and
public education, faculty members provided several concrete examples to substantiate
these claims. Hired for his expertise in fundraising and his ties to business and industry,
the Dean of Units 3 and 4 readily admitted his inexperience with shared governance.
Conversely, faculty members in Units 1 and 2 conveyed no such issues with academic
leadership, having retained the chairs of their respective departments. Interestingly, the
possibility of elimination had opposing effects on the collective functionality of Units 1
and 2. Stronger for having shared in the fight to save their department, Unit 1 faculty
exhibited newfound solidarity, while faculty in Unit 2 fractured during their own call to
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arms. Believing that frequent meetings/faculty interaction brought their unit closer
together, members of Unit 1 witnessed a collective surge in teaching evaluations.
Alternatively, Unit 2 split according to rank, with junior faculty resentful of senior
faculty for their tenured employment and secure salary.
Running the gamut from pressing concern to trivial afterthought, job-related
uncertainty produced extreme anxiety for some and presented little worry for others.
Perhaps dependent upon personality and other unaccountable psychological factors, jobrelated uncertainty varied by individual narrator. However, of explicated concerns,
uninterrupted academic employment was the most common faculty apprehension.
Concerns regarding individual promotion/advancement were more pronounced in Units 3
and 4, while faculty members in Units 1 and 2 expressed anxieties as to departmental
prestige and the future of their respective disciplines. Table 7 provides an overview of
strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty across Units 1-4.
Table 7
Manifestations of Uncertainty
Type of
Uncertainty
Strategic

Structural

Job-Related

Unit 1
Saved
Confusion
regarding
strategy
Cohesion; Low
research
productivity;
Reporting
structure
unchanged

Unit 2
Saved
Confusion
regarding
strategy
Disunion;
Stable research
productivity;
Reporting
structure
unchanged

Unit 3
Eliminated
Disagreement
regarding
strategy
Chaotic;
Absence of
traditional
reporting
structures

Unit 4
Eliminated
Disagreement
regarding
strategy
Chaotic;
Absence of
traditional
reporting
structures

Increased class
size; Perceived
erosion of
tenure

Increased class
size; Devalued/
demoralized

Increased class
size; Fairly
secure due to
retirements

Increased class
size; Fairly
secure due to
retirements
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Research Question 3
How does the department chair affect faculty perceptions of strategic, structural, and
job-related uncertainties?
Acting as the departmental bellwether, chairs in Units 1-4 exhibited leadership by
advocating on behalf of their faculty colleagues. While management styles varied by
individual, messages of solidarity were a common theme across all department chair
interviews. In Unit 1, Dr. Smith turned negative attitudes into constructive action,
assigning faculty to fact-finding missions to focus their attention. Meanwhile, in Unit 2,
Dr. Hayes embraced faculty consultation, inviting them to comment on a departmentwide productivity report. In Units 3 and 4, Drs. Roberts and Covey encouraged their
faculty colleagues to think positively about the college’s latest direction, refusing to
publicly undermine the new Dean.
While there are no real winners in a budget battle of this magnitude, chairs in
Units 1 and 2 were instrumental in saving their units from potential elimination. Able to
contribute to unitary advocacy in ways circumscribed to regular faculty members, Drs.
Smith and Hayes accessed and deciphered departmental data, contacted national
professional associations, and used the power of the press to increase their institutional
leverage. Conversely, Drs. Covey and Roberts knew when to lay down their arms,
encouraging their faculty colleagues to support the Dean’s vision. Refusing to be a
source of dissention and divisiveness within the college, the chairs of Units 3 and 4
attempted to illustrate the positives while remaining cognizant of perceived
organizational flaws. Still in its initial stages, it is difficult to speculate as to the long-
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range outcomes of faculty advocacy in Units 3 and 4. Table 8 outlines the pertinent
activities/personality traits of the department chairs in Units 1-4.
Table 8
Activities and Personality Traits of the Department Chair
Department
Chair

Activities/
Personality
Traits

Dr. Smith
Unit 1
Saved
Acquire &
Communicate;
Tone Setting;
Strategizing;
Recruiting
Outside Help

Dr. Hayes
Unit 2
Saved
Acquire &
Communicate;
Tone Setting;
Strategizing;
Recruiting
Outside Help

Dr. Roberts
Unit 3
Eliminated
Positive
Personality

Dr. Covey
Unit 4
Eliminated
Realistic
Outlook

Research Question 4
How does strategic, structural, and job-related uncertainty differ between saved and
eliminated units?
A feature of qualitative methodology, Yin (2009) advocates cross-case synthesis
as a means to “address the most significant aspect of your case study” (p.161). In Tables
9-11, I employed a scale of mild, moderate, or severe to characterize each unit’s
response, based upon the portion of the interview devoted towards each type of
uncertainty. As illustrated below, perceptual differences existed between “saved” and
“eliminated” units. While saved units experienced considerable strategic uncertainty, the
prevalence of a strategic plan in eliminated units circumscribed this outcome.
Conversely, faculty members in eliminated units reported severe structural uncertainty,
while individuals in saved units encountered few disturbances in this arena. Though
experimentation with alternative hierarchies is indeed an admirable innovation, the swift
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erosion of a long-standing bureaucratic model engendered considerable confusion for
faculty, staff, and students. Perhaps the most opaque of the three types of uncertainty,
job-related uncertainty did not differ by unitary status. Indeed, perceptions of job-related
uncertainty tended to vary by faculty rank and unit dynamic, though all four units
reported a sharp increase in class sizes.
Table 9
A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Strategic Uncertainty

Strategic Uncertainty
Reasons for
Organizational Change
Planning & Future
Direction
Organizational
Sustainability

Nature of the Business
Environment

Unit 1
Saved
Severe

Unit 2
Saved
Severe

Unit 3
Eliminated
Mild

Unit 4
Eliminated
Mild

$ Driven

$ Driven

Strategic plan

Strategic plan

Missiondriven
TFVSIP;
Court
ruling;
Bunker
mentality
Lack of
public
support for
education

Productivitydriven
Legislative
support;
Enrollment
decline
Marketmodel;
Differential
tuition

Corporate
Corporate
model
model
Fundraising;
Fundraising;
Faculty
Faculty
demographics; demographics;
Research
Research
infrastructure infrastructure
Mountain
Mountain
State does not State does not
value higher
value higher
education
education

Table 10
A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Structural Uncertainty

Structural Uncertainty
Reporting Structures
Functionality of Unit

Unit 1
Saved
Mild

Unit 2
Saved
Mild

N/A

N/A

Positive;
Low
productivity

Negative;
Stable
productivity
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Unit 3
Eliminated
Severe

Unit 4
Eliminated
Severe

Hierarchical
confusion
Stress;
Productivity
declines

Hierarchical
confusion
Stress;
Productivity
declines

Table 11
A Comparison of “Saved” vs. “Eliminated” Units: Job-Related Uncertainty

Job-Related Uncertainty

Unit 1
Saved
Severe

Job Security
Perceived
erosion of
tenure
protections
Promotion Opportunities
Changes to the Job Role

Damaged
reputation
Increased
class size;
Increased
service
obligations

Unit 2
Saved
Moderate

Unit 3
Eliminated
Moderate

Unit 4
Eliminated
Moderate

Untenured
faculty feel
nervous;
Tenured
faculty feel
secure
Devalued
profession
Increased
class size;
Decreased
research
opportunities

TFVSIP
participation
saved jobs;
Tenured full
professors
feel secure
Pay for
publishing
Increased
class size;
Increased
service
obligations;
Decrease in
shared
governance

TFVSIP
participation
saved jobs;
Tenured full
professors
feel secure
Pay for
publishing
Increased
class size;
Increased
service
obligations;
Decrease in
shared
governance

Discussion of Findings
Though participant perceptions varied widely, it is important to call attention to
topics which resonated across departments, programs, and individuals. In this regard,
narrators universally noted increased class sizes—a decision made unilaterally and
without faculty input. In The fall of the faculty: The rise of the all-administrative
university and why it matters, long-time academician Benjamin Ginsberg (2011) offered
the following assessment of teaching in an administrative environment:
The first dimension along which the all-administrative university differs from its
faculty-directed counterpart is pedagogy. From the professorial perspective, the
university exists to promote teaching by providing faculty members with
classrooms, laboratories, libraries, computers, and other instructional resources.
From the administrative perspective, however, the purpose of teaching is to bring
fee-paying customers (sometimes known as students) into its dormitories and
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classrooms. Administrators think teaching serves the university, not the converse
(p.170).
While this new paradigm serves to erode one of the core functions of the traditional
academic triad, it is the students who suffer the severest consequences. As reinforced by
Keeling and Hersh (2012):
Why has higher education abandoned higher learning? Because learning itself is
no longer the first priority in most colleges and universities, despite the fact that
the core mission of every institution of higher education is exactly that—learning.
The many recent critiques that assail colleges and universities for rising costs,
rampant inefficiencies, and insufficient accountability hit other targets but miss
this key point. Without higher learning, higher education is just a series of steps
that lead to a degree—the receipt of which is evidence of nothing except the
completion of those steps (pp. 1-2).
As faculty-student ratios inch higher, and part-timers replace tenured faculty,
opportunities for individualized attention decline accordingly (June, 2012a). Seasoned
scholar and AAUP advocate Ronald Ehrenberg (2011) underscores this phenomenon:
As economists are fond of pointing out, there is no such thing as a free lunch.
A growing body of research suggests that reliance on lower-cost, full-time,
nontenure-track faculty and/or part-time faculty may adversely affect student
outcomes. For example, my own research with Liang Zhang, which used
institutional-level panel data, found that, holding other factors constant, when a
four-year academic institution increases its use of either full-time nontenure-track
faculty or part-time faculty, its undergraduate students’ first-year persistence rates
and graduation rates go down (p.107).
Provided faculty members’ assertions correlating increased class sizes to diminished
instructional quality, (see pp. 105-106, 133-134, 164) Mountain University may well
witness a decrease in graduation and persistence rates as current and future cohorts
progress through this modified system.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, changes to faculty working conditions
(e.g. increased class sizes) were made without due regard to established principles of
shared governance. Though Mortimer and Sathre (2007) acknowledge “that there are
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fundamental disagreements within the academy about what shared governance actually
means and how it should be implemented,” (p.21) the AAUP provides a succinct
statement on the matter:
Areas that require joint efforts among the board, administration, and faculty
include long-range planning, decisions on buildings and facilities, resource
allocation, and short-and long-range priorities. The faculty have primary
responsibility for the curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction,
research, faculty status, and areas of student life that relate to the educational
process (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007, p.23).
Provided these assertions, new forms of academic collectivization may gain momentum.
As elucidated by Fethke and Policano (2012) in Public no more: A new path to
excellence in America’s public universities:
Interest in faculty unionization may grow as public support for education declines
and universities make increasing use of part-time instructors as a way to combat
shrinking funding and to convert fixed costs to variable costs. Any erosion of
tenure might accelerate this move. The countervailing force in the current
environment is the resistance to public unions by governors and legislators in
budget-strapped states; this is happening in Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, New York,
Florida, and elsewhere (p.175).
In pages 102-103, members of Unit 1 and a Mountain University Faculty Senator
expressed deep reservations regarding the erosion of tenure. Given the current financial
recession and low status afforded public higher education in Mountain State, faculty may
continue to witness increased administrative oversight coupled with diminished
opportunities for shared governance.
Though the aforementioned trends are at the forefront of academic governance
debates, perhaps the most intriguing finding of this study pertains to the differences in
experience between those individuals in “saved” and “eliminated” units. As visually
displayed in Tables 6-8, the formal strategic planning process in Units 3 and 4 enhanced
inter-unit communication, while the absence of such a process severely inhibited the
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faculty’s directional conception in Units 1 and 2. Firmly ensconced in a familiar
departmental configuration, faculty in Units 1 and 2 experienced minimal levels of
structural uncertainty, however, faculty in the department-less structure of Units 3 and 4
(see pp. 155-160) reported dire dilemmas regarding hierarchical structures, administrative
assignments, and bureaucratic functionality. As reinforced by Mel Schiavelli, former
provost and interim president at the College of William & Mary and provost at the
University of Delaware:
The departmental structure, the college-within-the-university structure—these are
silos within which people in traditional disciplines live. I used to think you could
knock those silos down. Well, believe me, that is the most difficult thing in a
university to have happen, partly because of the reward system for faculty.
You’re rewarded for contributions to your discipline, as opposed to contributions
to your institution (Marcus, 2011, p.42).
A feature of the “functionalist paradigm,” business approaches to organizational change
have engendered considerable controversy at Mountain University, with faculty in Units
3 and 4 expressing clear frustration with the imposition of a non-academic governance
model (Kezar, 2012, p.183). Provided the stress-related losses in productivity and
professional discontent with “corporate” governance, it is likely that the departure of the
current dean will herald a return to a department-driven structure.
A pioneer of the program elimination literature, Sheila Slaughter’s (1993) seminal
study on the corporatization of academe continues to stand the test of time. Connecting
the pro-business discourse of the Reagan administration to the restructuring of academic
labor, Slaughter’s analysis underscored recession as the crux of this phenomenon.
Charged with managing the fiscal affairs of an institution, administrators must craft a
university budget which meets the funding allocation specified by the state. In times of
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fiscal crisis, intra-collegiate contests become more pronounced, opening the door to
political decision-making.
Ten years later, Peter Eckel (2003) drew similar conclusions regarding the
influence of internal politics in program closure proceedings. In this regard, Eckel’s
(2003) narrators conveyed numerous instances of institutional politics, leading the author
to the following realization:
The political frame is based upon the premise that different interest groups are
constantly in conflict as they compete for power and scarce organizational
resources. To obtain these resources interest groups are continually forming
coalitions, which dissolve and reform into new configurations as the issues at
hand shift…The political frame helped to capture and organize elements such
as coalition alignment, re-alignment, affiliations; power brokering; and
influencing negotiation and conflict (p.18).
Charting the path of least resistance, university administrators navigated these
institutional waters, choosing targets with perceived organizational inadequacies.
Discernible deficiencies included ineffectual departmental leadership, limited numbers of
low-profile alumni, and politically inexperienced faculty members.
Vestiges of Taylorism, these institutional changes signal a move to increase
existing faculty productivity through the reallocation of teaching loads. Often targeted
for low enrollment, eliminated departments must nonetheless redistribute their students to
existing units (Brint et al., 2005; June, 2012b). As substantiated by noted organizational
scholar Gareth Morgan (2006):
Interestingly, [Frederick] Taylor’s principles have crossed many ideological
barriers, being extensively used in the former USSR and Eastern Europe as
well as in capitalist countries. This fact signifies that Taylorism is as much a
tool for securing general control over the workplace as it is a means of
generating profit (p.25).
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Realities of the 21st century academic marketplace, the aforementioned themes are not
exclusive to Mountain University, but are rather a function of a business-model approach
to resource allocation in publically funded institutions.
Implications for Theory
As predicted, the Bordia et al. (2004) theoretical framework transferred creditably
to a similar public setting. Though quantitative in its orientation, Bordia et al.’s concepts
of strategic and structural uncertainty resonated with faculty narrators. Reinforced by
scholars’ strategic speculation in Units 1 and 2, the strategic planning process stifled this
type of uncertainty in Units 3 and 4. Forced to abandon their familiar departmental
organization, faculty members in Units 3 and 4 struggled to adapt to the college’s new
structure. Able to retain their departmental chairpersons, faculty members in Units 1 and
2 made less frequent mention of structural disruption.
While the Bordia et al. (2004) theoretical framework exhibited strong explanatory
powers with respect to strategic and structural uncertainty, job-related uncertainty proved
the weakest analytical component. As illustrated in Table 8, a unit’s status as “saved” or
“eliminated” had little perceptual bearing on faculty members’ job security, promotion
opportunities, or changes to the job role. The lone caveat in this regard concerned
increased class sizes—a charge voiced across all four academic units. However, these
attempts at scholastic efficiency come at a steep price. As advanced by Fethke and
Policano (2012):
Picture the faculty as allocating 60 percent of its time to teaching and 40 percent
to research, with this proportion remaining fixed regardless of faculty size. In this
case, the compound product of the university is a “tightly bundled” combination
of instruction and research. Changes in faculty size affect the level of output, but
the proportion of time allocated to research and teaching is fixed (p.74).
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A non-academic model, the Bordia et al. (2004) framework must be adapted and
refined in order to increase its applicability to university settings. As suggested by the
findings of the present study, faculty rank may hold greater explanatory powers than
faculty tenure status alone. While non-tenured faculty undoubtedly experienced greater
levels of job-related uncertainty when compared to tenured faculty, an analysis of
individual commentary supports additional conclusions. In this regard, full professorship
appears to be a mitigating factor with respect to job-related uncertainty—a component
worthy of further theoretical exploration.
Implications for Practice
Pertinent points explicated in the preceding section call attention to the need for
heightened faculty participation in institutional governance. Though many scholars
“succumb to the temptation to shirk administrative service,” Ginsberg (2011) makes a
compelling argument for faculty advocacy:
While we worked on our books and taught our classes, our universities hired
dozens of new vice provosts and associate provosts and hundreds of new deanlets.
Administrators used our absence and the absence of some of our colleagues to
strengthen their own managerial capabilities and their continuing capacity to
circumvent and marginalize the faculty (p.210).
As acknowledged by Dr. James (pp.165-166): “None of the faculty were at the
[governing body] meeting” when Mountain University administration presented the new
collegiate reporting structure. It stands to reason that had a contingent of collegiate
faculty attended this meeting, and voiced their concerns during the public comment
period, the governing body would have had an obligation to take this additional
perspective into consideration. Indeed, abstention from university and department-level
service opens the floodgates to political chicanery. As stated in Chapter 5 of the
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Mountain State System of Higher Education Governing Body Bylaws (revised June
2012):
There shall be no reconsideration of the policy decisions to declare a
financial exigency, to discontinue or reduce in size an administrative
unit, project, program or curriculum because of financial exigency or
to discontinue, reduce in size or reorganize an administrative unit,
project, program or curriculum because of curricular reasons (p.10).
A troubling pronouncement, this instantiation vests final oversight of curricular matters in
college/university administration, effectively circumscribing faculty input. Formerly the
exclusive purview of faculty (Mortimer & Sathre, 2007), administrators have virtually
foreclosed all rebuttals to institutional decision-making in the Mountain System of
Higher Education.
Confronted with carte blanche decision-making authority, faculty members may
only challenge their individual employment status, as opposed to challenging the
legitimacy of financial exigency or the departmental/programmatic discontinuance
process (Governing Body Bylaws, 2012). As substantiated in Chapter 5: “The faculty
member requesting reconsideration (of their employment status during a financial
exigency or curricular review) has the burden of showing that the decision to furlough,
reduce pay or to lay off cannot be sustained” (p.10). Though the system does provide for
faculty input via “one or more employment review committees,” the “president shall
determine the number of persons to serve on each committee, shall determine their terms
of service, shall choose the chair of the committee, and, in addition, shall choose one half
of the remaining membership of each committee” (p.10). Given these guidelines, it is
unlikely that institutional faculty could overcome administrative momentum.
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Despite the severity of these challenges, faculty members in Mountain State and
across the country have battled back against the erosion of tenure protections and
arbitrary institutional decision-making (Berrett, 2011; Etchison, 2012; Glenn, 2011;
Schmidt, 2012; Wilson, 2011). Harnessing the power of the press, professors at
Mountain University have advanced their cause via the student newspaper (Etchison,
2012) and widely circulated trade publications (Berrett, 2011; Dr. Smith, 2011; Glenn,
2011). Two thousand miles east at the University of North Carolina-Greensboro, the
Department of Theater mounted a spirited defense of their discipline when faced with
curricular review. In defense of her unit and traditional academic governance, longtime
professor Deborah Bell boldly declared: “A university is not a corporation” (Wilson,
2011, A14). Railing against “inaccurate data and poor communication,” UNC Theater
faculty countered by making their case in a front page article in The Chronicle of Higher
Education—the nation’s premiere source on the status of the profession (Wilson, 2011).
Though much remains to be accomplished in terms of restoring and enhancing
shared governance, pockets of resistance have appeared on the academic horizon. Most
notably, the AAUP has promised “big changes in its leadership and overall direction”
with new president Rudy H. Fichtenbaum. A professor of economics at Wright State
University (Ohio), Dr. Fichtenbaum “played a central role in last year’s successful
campaign for an Ohio ballot measure that repealed a state law preventing many faculty
members at public colleges from being involved in collective bargaining.” Furthermore,
the new AAUP president is committed to “expanding its membership among not just
professors but also adjunct instructors and graduate students, and trying to strengthen the
organization’s ties to other labor unions and to education-advocacy groups” (Schmidt,
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2012, A18). Referring to the welcome emergence of “critical university studies,”
chronicle.com commentator “Cewatt” offered the following endorsement:
I do not consider this criticism of higher education a negative evolution. We
need scholars across all levels and disciplines speaking out about the changes
occurring in academe. We must guard our right to speak out and keep our jobs,
something in increasing jeopardy. We must speak out—against abuses by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, U.S. News & World Report, corporate
donors. This is how we continue to grow (2012, B18).
A sobering reminder of a tenuous academic freedom, scholars must exercise their rights
to free speech before they are circumscribed in writing.
Recommendations for Future Research
A counter to the “functionalist paradigm,” Kezar (2012) distinguishes interpretive
studies as:
foreground[ing] language, discourse, and communication patterns: the
interpersonal meaning of change, the symbolic significance; the implications of
change for affected cultures and individuals, social background of actors and the
role of history and culture; and performance of organizational actors (pp.183,
188).
Grounded in the qualitative traditions of phenomenology and ethnography, these
methodological approaches:
focus on those experiencing the change, trying to understand their perspectives
and how they make meaning of a change process. These studies help illuminate
the role of resistance or barriers to change because changes are not well
understood or are considered poor by others in the organization. Through these
investigations of other actors, interpretive studies also identify new agents of
change—without positions of authority—and demonstrate how they are part
of a shared or distributed change process (Kezar, 2012, p.188).
As illustrated in Appendix F, two and a half months elapsed between the December 1,
2010 forecast of future state revenues and Mountain University’s initial presidential
announcement declaring the possibility of financial exigency. Though this timeframe
coincided with Winter Break, budgetary discussions could have begun despite this
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impediment. Provided advances in technology, Mountain University could easily have
distributed financial documentation and fiscal updates via institutional email accounts,
website postings, or live streaming video. Though Mountain University did make use of
these communicative mediums, faculty members in the present study continuously
decried the poor communication and mixed messages of institutional reorganization.
Provided these assertions, future research avenues include more effective and transparent
bureaucratic communication methods, with special attention given to communication
during organizational change.
In a separate though equally important vein, several scholars have posited that
institutional downsizing disproportionately affects liberal arts and creative disciplines
(Brint et al., 2005; Brint et al., 2012; Christensen & Eyring, 2011; Ginsberg, 2011;
Massy, 2001; Slaughter, 1993; Zusman, 2005). As emphasized by Christensen and
Eyring (2011):
The cutting of budgets and outright closure of university presses makes it harder
for scholars to publish books even through less prestigious channels. This matters
especially to tenure-track faculty in the humanities, for whom publishing books
is the ultimate test of scholarship (p.364).
Moreover, in the exercise of competing for students, “many schools have invested
heavily in lovely dormitories, dining facilities, and garages while closing language and
philosophy departments for budgetary reasons” (Ginsberg, 2011, p.169). Though a
burgeoning body of knowledge strongly suggests that institutional resource reallocation
favors investment in student services at the expense of the liberal arts, empirical
scholarship could confirm or deny this critical hypothesis. For example, a quantitative
research design could longitudinally analyze institutional resource allocation over a fixed
period of time (5 years, 10 years, etc.), examining full-time faculty lines, managerial
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budgets, and graduate assistant/postdoctoral allocations, etc. Further, non-parametric
frontier modeling in the form of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has proven an
effective means of gauging funding adequacy in the K-12 arena—with potentially
promising applicability to higher education settings (Ruggiero, 2007). Alternative
qualitative designs could generally mirror the case study methodology employed in the
present study, with minimal adjustments for phenomenological or grounded theory
approaches (Creswell, 2007).
Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the effect of institutional downsizing on
students enrolled in eliminated departments/programs. As referenced by Dr. Hayes on
pages 130-131, Mountain University has increasingly turned to student workers to
replace lost administrative support staff. While part-time on-campus employment can be
a positive and rewarding experience, Mountain University and colleges across the
country must be careful not to exploit student labor in order to enhance institutional profit
margins. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that students enrolled in eliminated and
potentially eliminated departments/programs experience uncertainties equal to or greater
than the faculty members housed in said units. As reinforced by academician Bettina
Drew: “Students are unsuspecting consumers in a financial endeavor in which their
satisfaction plays no role” (p.B20). Collateral damage in institutional power plays,
students often bear the burden of accelerated programs of study, diminished human (i.e.
faculty, staff) resources, and emotional distress. Future research angles may include
individual/multiple case studies of student(s) in eliminated or potentially eliminated units,
as well as phenomenological approaches to similar lines of inquiry.
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Conclusion
A distressing development in American higher education, departmental and
programmatic eliminations are by no means unstoppable phenomenon. Though historical
reflection reinforces universities’ “stubborn resistance to systemic change,” the continued
commitment to this ideology may result in further erosion of the liberal arts foundation
(Marcus, 2011, p.44). Referred to as “currency,” departmental prestige increasingly
reflects entrepreneurial research orientation, with the greatest favor bestowed upon
faculties with high volumes of external grant funding (Fethke & Policano, 2012, p. 172).
In addition, branch campuses, such as the University of North Texas at Dallas, have hired
management consultants to whittle the curriculum down to “a narrow set of careerfocused majors in fields like business, information technology, and criminal justice,” and
refashion the academic calendar into a “year-round trimester” system (Blumenstyk, 2012,
A14).
In a popular website entitled “Junct Rebellion” (in re: adjunct), an enlightened
blogger summarizes “How the American University was Killed, in Five Easy Steps”:
First, you defund public higher education.
Second, you deprofessionalize and impoverish the professors.
Step #3: You move in a managerial/administrative class who take over
governance of the university.
Step Four: You move in corporate culture and corporate money.
Step Five – Destroy the Students
A disenfranchised voice within the academy, adjunct professors must be seen as allies,
rather than opposition, in the fight to reclaim shared academic governance. As
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underscored by Zumeta, Breneman, Callan, and Finney (2012), the strength of America’s
universities has high-stakes implications:
After remarkable gains in American educational attainment for the baby-boom
generation, more recent performance in higher education indicators has been
considerably less impressive. Whereas the United States had long been the
world leader in higher education participation and attainment rates, other nations
have now caught up and even exceeded the U.S. rates for young adults (p.5).
Declines in the literacy and mathematical skill sets of U.S. college graduates portend an
uphill battle for intellectual relevance in an increasingly globalized economy (Zumeta et
al., 2012). Long at the forefront of American innovation, U.S. colleges and universities
must again reclaim this intellectual high-ground, or continue to witness the decline of
America’s preeminence in higher education.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “SAVED” DEPARTMENT CHAIR
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated?
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination?
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination?
3. Why do you think that this unit was saved from elimination?
4. How have these events impacted you and the faculty in your unit?
a. Have reporting structures changed?
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed?
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “SAVED” FACULTY MEMBERS
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated?
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination?
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination?
3. Why do you think that this unit was saved from elimination?
4. How have these events impacted you?
a. Have reporting structures changed?
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed?
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “ELIMINATED” DEPARTMENT CHAIR
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated?
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination?
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination?
3. Why do you think that this unit was ultimately eliminated?
4. How have these events impacted you and the faculty in your unit?
a. Have reporting structures changed?
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed?
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR “ELIMINATED” FACULTY MEMBERS
1. When did you find out that this unit may be eliminated?
a. How did you find out about the possibility of elimination?
2. Why do you think this unit was slated for elimination?
3. Why do you think that this unit was ultimately eliminated?
4. How have these events impacted you?
a. Have reporting structures changed?
5. How has the functionality of your unit changed?
6. How has your job role changed as a result of these events?
7. How do you perceive your future at this institution given this budgetary context?
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APPENDIX E
EXPLICATION OF DATA ANALYSIS
Research Question

Theme Type

RQ1: How do individuals
experience a potential
departmental/programmatic
elimination?
RQ2: To what extent do strategic,
structural, and job-related
uncertainties manifest themselves
during potential
departmental/programmatic
eliminations?
RQ3: How does the department
chair affect faculty perceptions of
strategic, structural, and job-related
uncertainties?
RQ4: How does strategic,
structural, and job-related
uncertainty differ between saved
and eliminated units?

Emergent

Theory-Driven

Emergent

Cross-Case Analysis

Example of Emergent Analysis
Dr. Covey: “It doesn’t do any good to whine. That’s what I used to tell my kids. “We
don’t whine in this house.” We fought a good battle and I came here to a very bright
future. It didn’t work out that way. It’s okay. I go home at night, sleep good.”
I thematically categorized this statement as an example of the department chair’s realistic
outlook, based upon Berg’s (2007) definitions of latent and manifest messaging.
Example of Theory-driven Analysis
Dr. Grant: “Because, you know, at this point in my career, I’m pretty secure in terms of
being a tenured full professor and having enough financial resources that I could resign or
retire, as they say, anytime I want.”
I thematically categorized this statement as job-related uncertainty (job security), based
upon the definitions advanced by Bordia et al. (2004).
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APPENDIX F
TIMELINE OF THE 2011-2013 BIENNIAL BUDGET PROCESS
Date

December 1, 2010

January 20, 2011
February 7, 2011

Mountain State

Mountain University

Economic Forum forecasts
precipitous decline in state
general fund revenue for
2011-2013 biennium
Governor submits
Executive Budget to state
legislature
State legislative session
opens
President warns Faculty
Senate of possible need to
declare financial exigency

February 15, 2011
Provost directs Deans to
make vertical cuts to meet
individual college budget
reduction targets
Dean’s budget reduction
proposals due to Provost
Mountain State System of
Higher Education issues
legal opinion on tenure;
tenure resides in the
department, not the college
President announces first
budget reduction proposal
via email; meets 60% of
funding reduction
recommended by
Governor’s executive
budget

February 25, 2011

February 28, 2011

March 8, 2011

March 22, 2011

Joint legislative finance
committee on higher
education requests cut
proposals from Mountain
State System of Higher
Education institutions that
meet 100% of the
governor’s recommended
funding reductions.
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Budget reduction proposal
which meets 100% of
funding reduction
recommended by
Governor’s executive
budget due to the legislature
Department/program
elimination proposal
discussed at special meeting
of the Faculty Senate
President announces second
budget reduction proposal
via email; meets 100% of
funding reduction
recommended by
Governor’s executive
budget
President directs Deans to
consult with faculty and
staff as to how to best meet
budget reduction targets.
Dean’s revised budget
reduction proposals due to
Provost

March 28, 2011

March 29, 2011

March 30, 2011

April 8, 2011

April 29, 2011

May 2, 2011

Economic Forum revises
state general fund revenue
forecast for 2011-2013
biennium; $274 million in
additional revenue available
to the state
Provost announces third
budget reduction proposal
via email
President announces
Tenured Faculty Voluntary
Separation Incentive
Program (TFVSIP) in order
to limit the need to
terminate tenured faculty
TFVSIP applications due;
48 tenured faculty accept
one-time buy-out of 150%
of base salary

May 3, 2011

May 9, 2011

May 23, 2011

May 26, 2011

Mountain State Supreme
Court rules that the state
cannot appropriate monies
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June 1, 2011
June 7, 2011

from cities, counties, and
other localities for state
general fund use
Legislature and governor
approve 2011-2013 biennial
budget.
State legislative session
adjourns
President announces fourth
budget reduction proposal
at campus town hall
meeting
Mountain State System of
Higher Education governing
body votes to accept the
tuition increases, budget
reductions, and
department/program
eliminations proposed by
Mountain University to
meet the final legislative
budget.
President thanks TFVSIP
participants and credits
them with saving tenured
and non-tenured positions;
no new budget proposal
announced to reflect these
savings
President announces that
“for all intents and purposes
the budget cuts are done”;
no budget proposal
accounts for the
implementation of these
changes
Mountain State System of
Higher Education governing
body votes to accept
additional
department/program
eliminations proposed by
Mountain University

June 8, 2011

June 17, 2011

July 6, 2011

August 18, 2011

September 9, 2011
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APPENDIX G
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY MISSION STATEMENT

[Mountain University] is a research institution committed to rigorous educational
programs and the highest standards of a liberal education. We produce accomplished
graduates who are well prepared to enter the work force or to continue their education in
graduate and professional programs. Our faculty, students, and staff enthusiastically
confront the challenges of economic and cultural diversification, urban growth, social
justice, and sustainability. Our commitment to our dynamic region and State centrally
influences our research and educational programs, which improves our local
communities.
Our commitment to the national and international communities ensures that our research
and educational programs engage both traditional and innovative areas of study and
global concerns. [Mountain University’s] distinctive identity and values permeate a
unique institution that brings the best of the world to our region and, in turn, produces
knowledge to improve the region and world around us.
[Mountain University] is committed to and driven by these shared values that will guide
our decision making:







High expectations for student learning and success;
Discovery through research, scholarship, and creative activity;
Nurturing equity, diversity, and inclusiveness that promotes respect, support, and
empowerment;
Social, environmental, and economic sustainability;
Strong, reciprocal, and interdependent relationships between [Mountain
University] and the region around us;
An entrepreneurial, innovative, and unconventional spirit.
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APPENDIX H
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY
UNIT 3 & 4 COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
PEST ANALYSIS
The PEST Analysis is a specific look at four areas critical to the development of the
Strategic Plan. The information draws from the individuals, groups and organizations
that provided feedback.





POLITICAL








ECONOMIC
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Significant political battle between
the governor and the higher
education system over funding
Legislature is seriously divided over
funding higher education
Concern that the politics of cutbacks
and reductions are driving the agenda
of the College and University
[Governing body] support is critical
at this time to represent and advocate
the value of higher education
Political pressure and tension is
creating divisiveness in the
University and the College
Proactive leadership at [Mountain
University] and the College is
important to build political/public
support
Continued weak national economy
prolongs recovery of [the College’s
discipline] in [Mountain State]
Protracted recovery mean fewer jobs
available for graduates
State budget cuts are having
significant impact on students,
faculty, course availability, etc.
Rising financial costs for tuition, fees
and books will prevent some from
enrolling
Decreasing resources are impacting
support for the students
The need for other funding sources is
critical for long term success of the
College









SOCIAL









TECHNOLOGY
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Tremendous growth and prosperity in
the past has made adjustment more
difficult to the current realities
[Mountain University] is a
“commuter school”- not a lot of
social activities to keep students on
campus
College has no central area, “hub” to
stimulate interaction/gatherings
Many students must work while in
school, don’t feel involved
Limited opportunity for
faculty/student interaction outside of
classroom
Location of offices and organizations
that support students, spread out/not
effectively located
Communication is
inconsistent/ineffective in keeping
College community
engaged/informed
Limited use of social networks by the
College
Alumni and industry leaders not
actively involved enough given the
location of the College
Class rooms have limited technology
to support student/faculty needs
College has a minimal IT
infrastructure
The industry is utilizing state of the
art technology, but the College does
not have resources to support similar
efforts
Use of technology and web based
tools is increasingly important to the
[College’s disciplinary affiliation]
Lack of state of the art technology
marginalizes effectiveness of the
College, faculty, staff
You can’t be a world class College if
your technology is limited, obsolete

APPENDIX I
MOUNTAIN UNIVERSITY
UNIT 3 & 4 COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
SWOT ANALYSIS
The SWOT Analysis is a specific look at four areas critical to the development of the
Strategic Plan. The information draws from the individuals, groups and organizations
that provided feedback.

STRENGTHS

Location
Proximity to [Unit 3 & 4 industry]
Direct involvement with industry
The “living laboratory” of [Mountain City]
Students
Motivated and dedicated
Significant diversity
Global perspective
Faculty and Staff
Strong and committed
Extensive industry experience
Leaders in the profession
Knowledgeable and respected
Research/Teaching/Service
Excellent reputation
Authors of leading publications
Relationships – Alumni/Industry
Over 11,000 graduates
Industry leaders available/accessible
Financial
History of donations
More affordable than many other
schools/colleges
Facilities/Space
Have [strategic roadway] to use as annex to
campus
Organizational effectiveness
Over 40 years of delivering quality
education in the field
Location
Underutilizing location and proximity
Students
International students poorly assimilated
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WEAKNESSES

OPPORTUNITIES

Course schedules, curriculum overly
complicated/not user friendly
Advisors often unavailable
Faculty and Staff
Divisiveness, bickering, “turf wars”
Lack of faculty development
Research/Teaching/Service
Inconsistency in teaching effectiveness
Research not well funded
Not enough “hands on” learning
Relationships – Alumni/Industry
Not enough involvement with
alumni/industry leaders
Ineffective communication
Financial
Weak financial base, over reliance on
eroding State budget
Facilities/Space
Facilities dated/not professional
Few places for interaction among
students/faculty
Poor technology
Organizational effectiveness
Inefficient structure/Organization
Limited support/training for staff
Location
Increase profile/visibility
Improve interaction with leading [industry
professionals]
Students
Can significantly increase their
involvement with the industry
Faculty and Staff
Develop more training
Provide more resources/support
Research/Teaching/Service
Research support could be significantly
increased
Improve teaching methods
Relationships – Alumni/Industry
More involvement can increase
communication and teamwork
[Strategic location] could be used much
more efficiently
Many alumni active in industry and still
live in [Mountain City]
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THREATS

Financial
Increase resources/support funding, less
dependence on State
Facilities/Space
New academic building
[Industry] campus
Organizational effectiveness
With budget cuts, chance to streamline
Get back to basics/focus on core mission
Location
Failure to make changes will continue to
erode support
Students
Lack of rigor will erode quality
Poor assimilation of international students
will impact all students
A lack of focus on quality will prevent
significant improvements
Faculty and Staff
Continued divisiveness/resistance to
change erodes credibility
Research/Teaching/Service
Continued cutbacks prevent attracting new
quality faculty
Potential loss of existing faculty
Relationships – Alumni/Industry
Alumni and industry leaders might
continue to feel uninvolved
Financial
Continued bad economy will effect
programs/curriculum
Bad economy limits jobs
Facilities/Space
Failure to build new academic building will
be a limiting factor
Organizational effectiveness
Lack of new organization structure will
impede effectiveness
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